Abhidharma Doctrines and Controversies on Perception

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The period of Abhidharma Buddhism contributed most significantly to the development in Buddhist thought in the history of Indian Buddhism. An understanding of the active doctrinal development in this period is therefore indispensable for gaining a proper perspective of the development in Buddhist thought in India as a whole.

This book deals with the Buddhist theories of perception of the Abhidharma schools, particularly the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntika. It offers a wealth of information from the Sanskrit and Chinese sources, of which those from the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā* and **Nyāyānusāra* are especially valuable, being available only in Classical Chinese translation.

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Preface to the Second Edition

In 1997, I delivered the "Professor KN Jayatilleke Memorial Lecture" in Colombo, and the lecture was printed as a monograph entitled *The Abhidharma Controversy on Visual Perception*. The present publication is a substantially revised and enlarged version of the said monograph.

I would like to thank my student, Venerable Dhammapāla at the Post-graduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, and my two Bangladeshi pupils, Venerable Bhaddiya Tanchangya and Venerable Dhammadīpa Tangchangya, for proofreading the whole text and generating the index.

I must also express my gratitude to members of the Compassion Buddhist Publication Fund, Singapore, for their financial assistance in the publication of this work.

KL Dhammajoti
December, 2003
Mulleriyawa

Preface to the Third Edition

The first edition was a short monograph published in 1997 under the title *The Abhidharma Controversy on Visual Perception.* The second edition, published in January, 2004, was a revised and enlarged version of the first. As its content covered considerably more doctrinal ground than the first, it was renamed as *Abhidharma Doctrines and Controversies on Perception.* The present third edition is a further revision on the second edition.

In this edition, I have incorporated the content in three papers that I have published in recent years since the second edition: 1. 'Sarvāstivāda, Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra', 2. 'The *Citta-caitta* Doctrine of Śrīlāta' and 3. '*Ākāra* and Direct Perception: Vaibhāṣika versus Sautrāntika'. The first is incorporated in chapter two; the second is adapted as chapter seven; the content of the third is incorporated into chapters nine and ten (a small part is also integrated into a couple of other chapters). I am grateful to the editorial authorities of *Bukkyō Kenyū*, published by the Kokusai Bukkyōto Kyōkai, and of the *Journal of Buddhist Studies*, published by the Centre for Buddhist studies, Sri Lanka, for permitting me to incorporate the contents of these three articles in this book.

As this book grew in three stages, and contains a portion that was originally written a little more than a decade back, I must request the readers to bear with me for certain inconsistencies and overlapping within the chapters that still remain in spite of some effort (imperfect owing to pressure of time) on my part to rectify them.

The second chapter stands out differently from the other chapters, being a lengthy discussion of the historical issues related to the disputants of the Abhidharma controversies. I have decided to present the content of this chapter — at the risk of scaring away the more general readers from almost the beginning — on account of the relative scarcity of modern discussion on these issues. I suggest that those readers troubled by the numerous technical terminologies and new doctrinal categories should at first just scan the chapter, looking for only the summarized comments given at different places and the concluding remarks. They can revisit the chapter at a later stage when they feel more ready to do so.

My special thanks are due to my students, Liza Cheung for her tireless effort in proof-reading the entire book as well as overseeing all other matters related to the publication project, and Aosi Mak for proof-reading a large part of the book, drawing the charts and generating the index. Two other students of mine, Ven. P Chandaratana and Mei Ling Fok must also be thanked for participating in the proofreading of the first couple of chapters.

I must also express my gratitude to Professor CF Lee, Ven. Dr. Jing Yin, Ven. Hin Hung and other members of the Li Chong Yuet Ming Buddhist Studies Fund of the Li Ka Shing Foundation, for including this book in the publication series of the Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong.

KL Dhammajoti
November, 2007
Hong Kong

Abbreviations

ADV	Jaini, PS. Ed., *Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* (Patna, 1959).
AKB	Pradhan, P. Ed., *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam* of Vasubandhu (Patna, 1975).
AKB(C)	Chinese tr. by Xuan Zang (T no. 1558).
Avatāra	Chinese tr. by Xuan Zang (T no. 1554).
AVS	**Ārya-vasumitra-bodhisattva-saṃgṛhīta* 尊婆須蜜菩薩所集論, T no. 1549.
BL	Stcherbatsky,Th, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I & II. Indian Edition.
DhsA	*Dhammasaṅgani Aṭṭhakathā* (= *Atthasālinī*).
Entrance	*Dhammajoti, KL, Entrance into the Supreme Doctrine* (Colombo, 1998).
IBK	*Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū.*
JCBSSL	*Journal of the Centre for Buddhist Studies*, Sri Lanka (= *Journal of Buddhist Studies*).
JPŚ	*Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra*, 阿毗達磨發智論, T no. 1544.
MA	*Majjhima-aṭṭhakathā.* Pāli Text Society, London.
MCB	*Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, I'Institute Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, Bruxelles.
MVŚ	*Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* T27, No. 1545.
NBT	*Nyāyabindutīkā* (Bib. Bud. VII), Indian reprint (Delhi, 1992).
Ny	**Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra-śāstra* T29, No. 1562.
PVV	*Pañcavastuka-vibhāṣā-śāstra* (T1555).
SDS	*Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha.* Ed., Mainkar, TG., (Poona, 1978).
Siddhi(C)	*Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, 成唯識論, compiled by Xuan Zang, T no. 1585.
SPrŚ	**Abhidharma-samaya-pradīpikā-śāstra*, 阿毗達磨顯宗論, T no. 1563.
Study	Yin Shun, *A Study of the Śāstra-s and Ācārya-s of the Sarvāstivāda and other Schools* (說一切有部為主論書與論師之研究) (Taipei, 1963).
T	Taisho edition of the Chinese *Tripiṭaka.*
Tarkabhāṣā	Singh, B.N. Ed and tr., *Bauddha Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta,* (Varanasi, 1985).
TA(U-J)	Shogaito, M, *Studies in the Uighur Version of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣy ṭīkā Tattvārthā*. Vol. I.
TSP	*Tattvasaṃgraha of Shāntarakṣita with Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla,* vols. I-II, Gaewad's oriental Series, vols. xxx-xxxi (Baroda, 1226).
TVB	*Triṃśatikā vijñapti bhāṣya* in Levi, S (ed.), *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi Deux Traites de Vasubandhu* (Paris, 1925).
VKŚ	*Abhidharma-vijñāna-kāya-śāstra,* 阿毗達磨識身足論, T no. 1539.
VVS	*Viṃśatikā vijñapti-mātra-siddhi* in Levi, S (ed.), *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi Deux Traits de Vasubandhu* (Paris, 1925).
Vy (=*Vyākhyā*)	Wogihara U. Ed., *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā* of Yaśomitra (Tokyo, 1932-36).
YBŚ	*Yogācārabhūmi śāstra*, 瑜伽師地論, T no. 1579.
ZW	藏外佛教文獻 (Beijing, 1995), Vol. 1.

1. Introduction

According to Buddhism, the fundamental cause that binds us in the saṃsaric process is ignorance: the fundamental cognitive error on account of which we see things topsy turvy (*viparītam*). Absolute liberation is achieved with the attainment of perfect insight through which we see things truly as they are (*yathā-bhūtam*). Our mind then comes to be perfectly appeased, completely unperturbed — completely freed from defilement. The Buddhists in the Abhidharma period, as much as the early Buddhists and the later Mahāyānists, are deeply concerned with this question of the cognitive error. From this perspective, it is no exaggeration to state that epistemological doctrines have been, without exception, the main part of what comes to be known — for want of a better term — as 'Buddhist philosophy'. This said, however, it must be borne in mind that, for the Ābhidharmika schools, particularly the Sarvāstivāda, epistemological views are intimately connected with their ontological commitment. Often, one lends support to the other; and at times they even stand or fall together.

In spite of their divergent epistemological views, all the Abhidharma schools and individual masters accept the existence of the external reality in some form or another. The main issues of contention are:

(1) the instrument of perception;
(2) the ontological status of the cognitive objects;
(3) the mental factors involved in cognition;
(4) the process through which we acquire knowledge of this external reality.

In the following pages, we shall outline the Abhidharma doctrines and controversy on perception. The epistemological theories of the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika are still little understood, and we hope here to be able to shed a little more light on them with the help particularly of the *Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā* and Saṃghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra*. These two texts, authored by leading orthodox Sarvāstivāda masters and extant only in classical Chinese translations, are very valuable sources for our understanding of the Sarvāstivāda doctrines in their proper perspective. It is no exaggeration to say that modern discussion in the West on Sarvāstivāda doctrines have mostly been derived from Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* and the partially preserved

Abhidharmadīpa with *Prabhā-vṛtti*. However, the expositions in the first two lean heavily on the Sautrāntika stance and often do not do justice to the orthodox Sarvāstivāda perspective. The *Abhidharmadīpa*, undoubtedly an important work representing the Sarvāstivāda orthodoxy, is unfortunately only partially preserved. It is our belief that Saṃghabhadra has most brilliantly defended the Sarvāstivāda theses, and an in-depth analysis of them simply cannot neglect his expositions and arguments. Besides, by studying his **Nyāyānusāra* alongside with the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, we can avoid the pitfall of hastily labelling some Vaibhāṣika doctrines not found in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* as 'neo-Sarvāstivāda'.

The additional importance of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and the **Nyāyānusāra* lies in the fact that they also provide a wealth of information on the doctrines of the early Dārṣṭāntika and the Sautrāntika. For the understanding of the Sautrāntika doctrines, Western and Indian scholars generally rely heavily on the later Sanskrit tradition, and often through the comments and argumentations by Buddhist and non-Buddhist logicians. In this circumstance, the **Nyāyānusāra* which cites the teachings of the Sautrāntika master Śrīlāta extensively, often in great details, additionally constitutes an indispensable source for our understanding of the Sautrāntika. A study of Śrīlāta's doctrines, alongside with those that can be gatthered from the logical texts, should prove fruitful for a fuller picture of the Sautrāntika doctrines.

There is another important text, most probably belonging to the early Dārṣṭāntika lineage within the Sarvāstivāda tradition, which is relatively little known. This is the **Ārya-vasumitra-saṃgṛhīta* (T28, no.1549, 尊婆須蜜菩薩所集論) which is now preserved only in Chinese. It is the only extant post-canonical Sarvāstivāda text that antedates the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. Unfortunately, the translation is very abstruse and inconsistent, and as a result not much study, to date, has been done on it.

It is through the process of the various vigorous Abhidharma controversies that Buddhist thoughts in India developed, and continued to exert their impact throughout the doctrinal development of the Mahāyāna. The disputant schools of thought which we shall be encountering in the following chapters are the Sarvāstivāda, Vaibhāṣika, Dārṣṭāntika and Sautrāntika (and to a lesser extent the Yogācāra). But we must admit that our present knowledge as to what these sectarian appellations standpoint for is far from being satisfactory.

The historical relationship among these schools has been a keen subject of investigation in recent years among some Japanese and Western scholars. But modern researches into their historical relationship have in a way raised more questions than answered — and this is in a sense undoubtedly also a positive advancement in Buddhist scholarship. Thus, for instance, while in the relatively later texts, the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra are mentioned as two distinct schools, often mentioned together with the Sarvāstivāda and the Mādhyamika as the four representative schools of Buddhism,[1] E. Lamotte remarks that the Sautrāntika represented a philosophical movement rather than a homogeneous sect, adding that no Sautrāntika monastery has ever been attested.[2] Other modern scholars recently propose that the Sautrāntikas belonged to the Sarvāstivāda sect and that Vasubandhu, when authoring the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, was already a Mahāyānist Yogācāra basing his Sautrāntika doctrines on the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*.[3]

In this book, therefore, before we actually get into the Abhidharma doctrines and controversies, we shall begin in the next chapter with a fairly lengthy discussion on the question of the historical interrelation among these schools. Recently, a whole volume of the *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* (= JIABS),[4] was devoted to the studies on the Sautrāntikas. The discussion in the next chapter reviews some of the major views put forward by the scholars in this volume. While we may not be able to concur on most of their interpretations made by the scholars in the volume, we nevertheless greatly value their scholarly contribution which, among other things, offer fresh perspectives on the related historical issues.

Notes

1 E.g., In Mokṣākara Gupta's *Tarkabhāṣā*, ed., Embar Krishnamacharya (Baroda,1942), 34 ff.
2 Lamotte, E. *History of Indian Buddhism* (English tr), (Louvain-La-Neuve, 1988), 526.
3 E.g., See views of Yoshifumi Honjō, Robert Kritzer, *et. al.* in JIABS, vol. 26, no.2. See also discussion on their views in the next chapter.
4 Vol 26, No.2, 2003.

2. Sarvāstivāda, Vaibhāṣika, Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra

2.1. Sarvāstivāda and Vaibhāṣika

At the outset, it must be emphasized that "Sarvāstivāda", "Vaibhāṣika" and the "*Mahāvibhāṣā* orthodoxy" do not have the same connotations. The Sarvāstivāda remained the most powerful and influential school in North-western India from around the beginning of the Christian era to about the 7th century A.D., initially established in Mathurā and expanding in the north where Kaśmīra became its centre of orthodoxy. It was here that the encyclopaedic *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā* (= MVŚ) was compiled. This 'Great Commentary' (*mahā-vibhāṣā*), consisting of 200 fascicles in Xuan Zang's translation, purports to be the commentary on the canonical Abhidharma text, the *Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra* (= JPŚ, T 26, no.1544). It must have been the effort of a large group of Kāśmīrian Sarvāstivāda pandits whose motive was to establish the Sarvāstivāda orthodoxy based primarily on the *Jñānaprasthāna* positions, purging and repudiating doctrines — both within and outside the Sarvāstivāda school — that contradict the compilers' stance. The whole process of compilation, including revision and additions, resulting in its final completion around mid 2nd century A.D. could have taken more than half a century.

The Sarvāstivādins represent a fairly broad spectrum of people who are united by their categorical doctrine that *dharma*-s persist (*sarvadā asti*) through the three periods of time. This doctrinal stance is opposed to that of the Vibhajyavādins (the Distinctionists). The latter are so called because they hold that the status of existence of the *dharma*-s in the three periods of time has to be distinguished: only the present, or those *karma* which have not given fruit exist; all other past *dharma*-s as well as future ones are not existent.

As is evident from the MVŚ, the broad lineage of Sarvāstivāda is divided into several communities, including the Dārṣṭāntikas who are essentially anti-ābhidharmika, the "western" and "outside" masters (those based in Gandhāra, west of and outside Kaśmīra), and some individual masters. Generally speaking, those labelled as "western masters" are observed to

doctrinally lean more on the *Prakaraṇa-pāda*, rather than the JPŚ, and their doctrines often differ to varying degrees from those of the Kāśmīrian masters. These masters outside Kaśmīra apparently do not even consider JPŚ as a treatise of their affiliation. For instance, contrary to the Kāśmirian masters, they maintain that *rūpa-dharma*-s do not have homogenous cause (*sabhāga-hetu*). When asked how, in that case, they would explain the statement in the JPŚ[1] that past *mahā-bhūta*-s and *bhautika*-s can serve as the homogeneous causes for the similar future *mahā-bhūta*-s and *bhautika*-s, they answer thus:

> Why should we bother to comprehend [statements] in the treatise of others (他論)?[2] (See below, § 2.2)

Since the compilation of the MVŚ, the adherents of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, based mainly in Kaśmīra, came to be known as the "Vaibhāṣika". But even this orthodox and conservative group of Sarvāstivādins are not entirely unanimous in what they uphold as the true doctrines of the MVŚ. It must be borne in mind that the Vaibhāṣika doctrines themselves, since the compilation of the MVŚ, had gone through centuries of development, some indications of which are visible in the various Chinese recensions, distanced by some four centuries, of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. In fact, the doctrines in the MVŚ are the fruition of some three or four centuries of studies by the Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas from the time of the JPŚ (2nd B.C.) to that of the compilation of the MVŚ. Reflection of this evolving nature in the Vaibhāṣika doctrines can be observed in Saṃghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra*. (*circa* 5th century A.D.) Thus, whereas the MVŚ compilers and Vasubandhu severely criticised Dharmatrāta's explanation on the theory of tri-temporality (*sarvāstivāda*), Saṃghabhadra, a staunch Vaibhāṣika, enthusiastically defends it and in fact extensively employs it in his own expositions.

2.2. Dārṣṭānika, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra

Most scholars studying the historical relationship between the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntikas adopt and are influenced by the theory of Przyluski, J., that "Dārṣṭāntika" and "Sautrāntika" are two names referring to the same group of Buddhist masters: the former is used derogatorily by their opponents, namely the Ābhidharmikas; the latter, by these masters themselves with a sense of pride.[3] La Vallee Poussin[4] endorses this view, citing in support

a passage from the MVŚ[5] which condemns the Dārṣṭāntika way of establishing a doctrinal point by using worldly similes (*dṛṣṭānta*). Katō, J., does likewise.[6] Arguing that *dṛṣṭānta* has a depreciative connotation, Przyluski asserts:

> ...just as *śruta* is opposed to *dṛṣṭa*- or *śruti*- to *pratyakṣa*- the former term applied as compared to the latter, a knowledge of superior quality.[7]

Professor Jayatilleke, KN.,[8] however, has already refuted Przyluski's view. In conclusion, Jayatilleke states, referring to the Buddhist tradition:

> We see here the very opposite of what Przyluski was suggesting, namely the superior valuation of *diṭṭhaṃ* (what is seen) over *sutaṃ* (what is heard). Przyluski has also apparently confused *diṭṭhaṃ* with *diṭṭhi*.[9]

As an example of modern scholars influenced by Przyluski's view, Yoshifumi Honjō in a recent study claims that the name "Sautrāntika" dates back to the pre-*Vibhāṣā* period.[10] Among the evidences cited by him, one is that:

> If we are to accept Przyluski's view, it is unnatural that the Dārṣṭāntikas in the *Vibhāṣā* should have had only a pejorative name.[11]

However, contrary to Honjō's reasoning, we may equally — and perhaps more justifiably — argue that if Przyluski were right, we should expect at least an occasional mention of the name 'Sautrāntika' in the gigantic volume of the *Vibhāṣā*. The term '經部' — usually corresponding to 'Sautrāntika' — does occur in Xuan Zang's version of the text a couple of times. But as has long been pointed out by Yin Shun,[12] this rendering was in fact Xuan Zang's own responsibility.

As a matter of fact, the MVŚ passage cited by Poussin and Kato in their support do not sufficiently lend support to Przyluski's view. For, the criticism therein are clearly against the manner in which *dṛṣṭānta*-s, eulogizing hymns, poems, stories are employed, which happen to contravene Vaibhāṣika doctrines. There does not seem to be any specific and deliberate contrast between *dṛṣṭānta* and *sūtrānta*, in the manner suggested by Przyluski, Poussin and Kato. The Dārṣṭāntika masters are in fact not the only ones criticized in this manner; the Mahāsāṃghika and other Vibhajyavādins, some individual masters mentioned by name and some heretics, are likewise condemned wherever the similes they employ present a challenge to the Sarvāstivāda tenet under discussion.[13]

In such contexts, the compilers or the Savāstivādin masters concerned would simply reject the simile as being outside the *tripiṭaka*, unworthy of any attempt at comprehending. Yet, in most cases, such a rejection is actually followed by an attempt — given as an alternative to the rejection — to expose the logical fallacy of the simile. Thus, when the Mahāsāṃghika claims that knowledge (*jñāna*) is self-aware, illustrating with the example of a lamp that illuminates itself as well as other things at the same time — thus contradicting the Ābhidharmika thesis that a *dharma* itself (a *svabhāva*) does not know itself — the Sarvāstivādins argue in an ostensibly logical manner that it is a case of false analogy:

> This need not be comprehended, for it is not included in the *sūtra, vinaya* or *abhidharma*. Moreover, one cannot object to the *ārya-dharma*-s by means of the worldly *dharma*-s, [the two] being different from each other. If it has to be comprehended, the fallacy of the example should be explained. The example being fallacious, what is to be illustrated is not established.
>
> Just as a lamp is without any sense faculty (*indriya*) or the ability to take an object, pertaining to the non-sentient (*asattvākhya*) as it does; the knowledge [compared to] ought to be likewise. Just as a lamp is composed of atoms (*paramāṇu*), knowledge ought to be likewise. Since such is not the case, how can it serve as an illustration? Moreover, do they concede that a lamp is of the nature of illumination? If it is, why does it need to be illuminated? [On the other hand] if it is not of the nature of illumination, then it ought to be darkness and ought not be called a lamp. A lamp is so-called on account of its shattering darkness, how can it not be of the nature of illumination? Hence it should not be held that a lamp illuminates itself. Accordingly, that which is to be illustrated also is not established (不成 *asiddha*).[14]

Another such instance concerns the Vibhajyavādins' claim — and the corresponding Sarvāstivādin refutation — that an *arhat* cannot retrogress since the defilement he has destroyed cannot possibly re-arise, citing the worldly example that a vase broken into pieces cannot be reconstituted. There, it is concluded that "the example and the *dharma* are dissimilar."[15]

It must, moreover, be noted that the Sarvāstivādin Ābhidharmikas themselves — both the Kāśmīrians and non-Kāśmīrians — are quite aware of the important logical function of examples and similes, and certainly employ them themselves at times in support of their own propositions. Thus, in the above cited argument concerning the impossibility of an intrinsic nature knowing itself, while rejecting the Mahāsāṃghika's use of a commonplace simile to claim the opposite, the MVŚ compilers earlier have quoted one

opinion, presumably by some Sarvāstivādin masters — "some say" (有說) — who argue as follows:

> It is seen in the world that the blade of a knife does not cut itself; the tip of a finger does not touch itself; an eye pupil does not see itself; a heroic person does not think highly of himself. Thus, an intrinsic nature does not know itself. [16]

This argument purely on the basis of commonplace similes is not rejected or even criticized! The Kaśmīrian Sarvāstivādin attitude towards the use of similes as proof given on the part of other fellow Sarvāstivādins is also clearly seen in a discussion on the homogeneous cause (*sabhāga-hetu*, a causal category that generates a result of the same moral nature). The Kāśmīrian view is that, just as mental *dharma*-s, material *dharma*-s too have this causal category. The foreign Abhidharma masters (outside Kaśmīra), however, disagree, maintaining that they arise solely by virtue of the coming together of other conditions. The only proof they offer consists of two commonplace examples: (i) It is seen that (現見 *dṛṣyate*) from mud grass appears on account of being exposed to sunlight and wind, and then rain. (ii) It is also seen that plants grow on roofs and mountain peaks even though there has not previously been any seed. When asked how they would explain the statement in the JPŚ which says that past *mahā-bhūta*-s and *bhautika*-s can serve as homogeneous causes for the similar future *mahā-bhūta*-s and *bhautika*-s, these foreign masters first answer that such statements need not be explained by them, since they occur in the treatise of others (See above, §2.1). Immediately following this, however, they proceed to interpret the statement to avoid the contradiction: "If it need be comprehended, one should explain thus ..." (*Cf.* this to the way the Sarvāstivādins comment on the use of similes as proofs by the Dārṣṭāntikas and others). Interestingly, when the Kāśmīrian Sarvāstivādins are next asked how they would explain the examples cited by the foreign masters; instead of beginning by condemning such use of similes as we have observed above, they straight away proceed to interpret the examples:

> There have previously been seeds in the mud from which [the grasses subsequently] arise; it was due to the deficiency in other conditions that the grasses could not arise ...[17]

Besides similes, the Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas at times also do not hesitate to cite stanzas in their support. As one of the proofs for their most important doctrine of *sarvāstitva*, the Kāśmīrian masters rely on a *gāthā* from the *Udānavarga* which likens the gradual maturation of *karma* to the transformation of milk into curd and to a fool's gradual realization of

the heat underneath the ashes on which he has been treading.[18] One final example: To establish the doctrine of simultaneous causality (*sahabhū-* and *saṃprayukta-hetu*-s), the Sarvāstivādins heavily rely on a few visible examples: two bundles of straws mutually supporting each other; many people crossing a river by joining hands together; etc. Saṃghabhadra certainly vehemently defends this doctrine by dealing at great length with the example of the simultaneous causal relationship between a lamp and its light.[19]

As to the contention that the appellation "Dārṣṭāntika" is pejorative, it is very noteworthy that we find instances where the Dārṣṭāntikas are referred to as "The Venerable Dārṣṭāntika" (譬喻尊者), which is hardly humiliating. Moreover, the well-known Dārṣṭāntika masters, Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva, are in fact respected by the compilers of the MVŚ as among the "four great *ācārya*-s of the Sarvāstivāda". Very recently, it has further been pointed out that the Dārṣṭāntika leader, Kumāralāta entitled his own book as *Dṛṣṭāntapaṅkti*,[20] and it is hardly imaginable that he would have chosen such a title had *dṛṣṭānta*/*Dārṣṭāntika* been treated by his opponents as a pejorative term.

A key factor in considering the relationship between the early Dārṣṭāntikas and the later Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika is the doctrinal position concerning *sarvāstitva*. Whereas the latter indisputably are Vibhajyavādins, the former are Sarvāstivādins. Evidently under the influence of Przyluski's theory, however, Katō considers the Dārṣṭāntikas as being opposed to the Sarvāstivāda standpoint.[21] In this context, he cites the following view of the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ:

> When *dharma*-s arise, they arise by reason of a cause; but when they cease, they do not cease by reason of a cause.[22]

But this view can hardly serve as evidence that these Dārṣṭāntikas are opposed to *sarvāstitva*. The issue here concerns whether or not *dharma*-s require a cause for their ceasing. The Ābhidharmikas, as much as the Dārṣṭāntikas hold that all conditioned *dharma*-s are momentary! Robert Kritzer[23] similarly asserts that the Dārṣṭāntikas share the same present-only-exist position with the Sautrāntika. But in his case, he refers to the following passage in the MVŚ:

> The Dārṣṭāntika-vibhajyavādins maintain that time (*adhvan)* and the conditioning forces (*saṃskāra*) are distinct entities. Time is a permanent entity; the conditioning forces are impermanent entities.[24] When the conditioning

> forces are coursing in time, they are like the fruits in a vessel, coming out from this vessel and turning into that vessel. ... Likewise are the conditioning forces: they enter into the present time from the future time, and enter into the past time from the present time. To repudiate their proposition, it is shown [here] that time and the conditioning forces are not different in intrinsic nature.[25]

It is not clear whether the term 譬喻分別論師, which we have rendered here as a compound, stands for "the Dārṣṭāntikas who are Vibhajyavādins", or "Dārṣṭāntikas and Vibhajyavādins" (i.e., as a *karmadhāraya* or a *dvandva*). If it is the former, Kritzer might be justified in his interpretation. This is also how Yin Shun takes it, though he thinks that the Dārṣṭāntikas referred to here probably represent only a section of those who were beginning to merge with the Vibhajyavādins.[26] However, we must note that in the older translation of the MVŚ (T no.1546), the term here is simply 'Dārṣṭāntikas' (譬喻).[27] More importantly, although in this context, the *Vibhāṣā* compilers begin by citing the *Jñānaprasthāna* that "there are three [categories] of *dharma*-s, viz, past, present and future; it is only after quoting the above passage that, they say:

> Furthermore, [another reason why the *Jñānaprasthāna* presents this topic is that] there are some who are deluded with regard to the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva)* of [the *dharma*-s] of the three times, denying the existence of the past and future [*dharma*-s], and maintain that the present [*dharma*-s] are unconditioned. To repudiate their proposition, it is shown [here] that the characteristic and intrinsic natures of the past and future [*dharma*-s] exist truly, and that the present [*dharma*-s] are conditioned. Why? If the past and future [*dharma*-s] were non-existent ... (*loc. cit.*).

It is therefore clear that concerning the Dārṣṭāntika view, the point to be refuted is the independent existence of time. The impermanence of the *svabhāva* of conditioned *dharma*-s is no problem at all for the Sarvāstivādins. The intrinsic nature of a *dharma*, though existing throughout time (*sarvadā asti*), is not permanent; only the unconditioned *dharma*-s, transcending the temporal process, are permanent (*nitya*).[28] It is only the second group of people (probably the Mahāsāṃghika) who are to be refuted concerning the unreality of the tri-temporal *dharma*-s. The same view of this second group is refuted elsewhere several more times,[29] and in each case the *Vibhāṣā* compilers argue for the reality of the tri-temporal existence of *dharma*-s. In the two occurrences of this view in the older version of the *Vibhāṣā*, the compilers' argument is also unambiguously against the unreality of the past and future *dharma*-s.

Kritzer remarks here that although otherwise the Dārṣṭāntikas are not identified as those who deny the existence of past and future, "since the *Tattvasiddhi* clearly denies the reality of past and future, it is probably safe to say that this position was held by the Dārṣṭāntikas." (*loc. cit.*) But this is yet another instance of confounding the early Dārṣṭāntikas with those in the later, post-MVŚ period. It is even a case of begging the question, since he has not yet ascertained the nature of the Dārṣṭāntikas in the *Vibhāṣā*. Xuan Zang's tradition tells us that Kumāralāta was the "original master" of the Sautrāntika.[30] But even this Dārṣṭāntika *guru* of the post *Vibhāṣā* era holds the *sarvāstitva* standpoint.[31] Harivarman, the author of **Tattvasiddhi*, who, according to tradition, was his pupil, on the other hand, had become a Vibhajyavādin. From this fact, we should learn to be more cautious not to hastily equate the early with the later Dārṣṭāntikas. Moreover, Buddhadeva and Dharmatrāta, two early Dārṣṭāntika masters, are well known to subscribe to the *sarvāstitva* doctrine.[32]

Honjō,[33] who also seems influenced by Przyluski, states the following as an evidence for his assertion that "Sautrāntika" is pre-*Vibhāṣā*:

(1) Commentators on the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, such as Saṃghabhadra, do not distinguish between Sautrāntika and Dārṣṭāntika.
(2) Przyluski's theory implies the Dārṣṭāntika ought to have the other name as "Sautrāntika".
(3) The severe attack in the MVŚ on the Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy is substantially a claim that *Abhidharma* is not *Buddhavacana* (this for Honjō, is the "basic definition" of "Sautrāntika"[34]).
(4) The *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā* (= Vy) contains two instances mentioning a Sautrāntika view.

Among these four points, the second one has already been examined above. As for (1), these commentators/critics were of the 5th or 6th century when the Dārṣṭāntika had evolved into the Sautrāntika. As for (3), as Honjō himself observed, there is no evidence that the Dārṣṭāntika in MVŚ explicitly rejects the authority of the Abhidharma. (*loc. cit.*) In fact, Buddhadeva, Dharmatrāta, and the "Dārṣṭāntika", alongside with the Ābhidharmikas, each is recorded to have offered a descriptive definition of '*Abhidharma*', and none of these definitions is rejected by the compilers.[35]

As for (4), the two textual instances Honjō gives in his support are:

(i) Vy, 673: *vibhāṣāyāṃ Bhadantena Sautrāntikenoktam* /
(ii) Vy, 44: *Sautrāntikadarśanāvalambī cāyaṃ bhadanto Vibhāṣāyāṃ likhitaḥ* /

(i) concerns a Dārṣṭāntika view that the *dhyānāṅga, sukha*, is a bodily *sukhendriya,* which contradicts the Vaibhāṣika position.[36] Yaśomitra states here that in this connection a Sautrāntika *Bhadanta* in the *Vibhāṣā* reasons that since according to the Ābhidharmikas one in the second or higher *dhyāna* (though without *vitarka* and *vicāra*) can 'draw' the *cakṣurvijñāna* etc. from the lower *dhyāna*-s, it is thereby conceded that there exist sensory consciousnesses in the second and higher *dhyāna*-s as well. This seems likely to be a reference to the Dārṣṭāntika view in the MVŚ that there can be visual consciousness etc in the last three *dhyāna*-s; but unlike the Ābhidharmikas, they hold that the sensory consciousnesses are generated directly from the sensory faculties pertaining to these three *dhyāna*-s.[37] This is in keeping with the Dārṣṭāntika position that *vitarka* and *vicāra* exist throughout from *kāmadhātu* up to *bhavāgra*.[38] On the other hand, elsewhere in the MVŚ, Bhadanta (Dharmatrāta) is reported as stating that whatever is bodily *vedanā* is also mental *vedanā*, but not conversely.[39] It therefore seems likely that Yaśomitra, whose era had already witnessed the emergence of the Sautrāntika descending from the Dārṣṭāntika, interprets the statement in question as coming from a "Sautrāntika *Bhadanta* in the *Vibhāṣā*". This is probably in the sense as expressed by him in instance (ii): 'a *Bhadanta* in the *Vibhāṣā* inclined towards the Sautrāntika (*sautrāntikāvalambī*)'. This latter description occurs in the context of commenting on a *Bhadanta*'s explanations of *rūpa*-s said to be "gross", "subtle", etc. Here, he disagrees with Bhagavadviśeṣa that this *Bhadanta* is *Bhadanta* Dharmatrāta in the *Vibhāṣā*; Dharmatrāta is recorded in the *Vibhāṣā* as holding the standpoint of *sarvāstitva* and is hence not a Sautrāntika.[40]

It is interesting to observe that this very same difference in opinions is also recorded in Sthiramati's *Tattvārthā.* Commenting on "*bhadanta āha*" in the AKB,[41] Sthiramati states:

> "The *Bhadanta* further says thus"[42] — One[43] master says that this is a Sautrāntika master named Dharmatrāta, ... Another says that if this were Dharmatrāta, he ought to be a Vaibhāṣika, not a Sautrāntika. The Sautrāntika calls [this master by the word] '*Bhadanta*' only, and this master does not accept the Vaibhāṣika explanations; hence he is not Dharmatrāta. Why does he not accept? Because the *Bhagavat* himself has spoken of past and future; why should they explain the past and future as that which are far and the present as that which is near? The 'far' has this nature; the meanings of 'gross' and 'subtle' are indeterminate; and the meanings of "inferior" "superior" are not completely reasonable — for these reasons, this master offers another explanation.[44]

These information, firstly, conspire to confirm that there had indeed been some confusion — even on the part of the ancient — concerning the sectarian affiliation of "the *Bhadanta*". In the MVŚ, this term generally refers to Dharmatrāta whom everybody knew as a Dārṣṭāntika leader. But because a major section of the later-time Sautrāntika — such as that led by Śrīlāta — advocated doctrines derived from or heavily influenced by him, some commentators seemed to think of him as a Sautrāntika or 'one leaning towards the Sautrāntika'. Secondly, for others, the *Bhadanta* Dharmatrāta — and for that matter the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ — was a Vaibhāṣika/Sarvāstivādin, sharing the thesis of *sarvāstitva*. Thus, to say the least, it is certain that the ancient did not indiscriminatively equate 'Dārṣṭāntika' with 'Sautrāntika'. In brief, Honjō's arguments for his proposition that 'Sautrāntika' predates the *Vibhāṣā* are unconvincing.

2.3. Sautrāntika and Yogācāra

Several scholars concur that the Sautrāntika doctrines in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* are to be traced to the *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* (YBŚ). Thus, Y Honjō proposes that:

> The Sautrāntika theories of Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* have their origin in the *Yogācārabhūmi.* Therefore, it is highly probable that Vasubandhu was a Mahāyānist already at the time of writing the *Abhidharmakośa*. Śrīlāta and others, on the other hand, seem to have been "Hīnayānists".[45]

In a similar vein, Robert Kritzer asserts:

> An examination of the passages in which Vasubandhu attributes a doctrinal position to Sautrāntika shows that, in almost every case, a closely related, if not identical, position can be found somewhere in the *Yogācārabhūmi.*[46]

Nobuyoshi Yamabe states that "the Dārṣṭāntika or Sautrāntika tradition was fairly closely linked to meditative traditions".[47] This statement seems to correspond better to historical facts. As noted by Yamabe himself (*loc. cit.*), Yin Shun (1968) has already demonstrated elaborately that the early Dārṣṭāntikas were at once preachers and meditation masters.[48] However, Yamabe goes further. He observes that some passages on meditation practices in the *Saundarānanda* of Aśvaghoṣa, a Dārṣṭāntika, find parallels in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* of the YBŚ . While admitting that "these two texts seem to

have had common sources in the *Āgamic* literature", he nevertheless thinks that "the similarities are too extensive for us to assume that these two texts separately relied on common sources."[49] However, since all the parallels he has presented on *śīla* and *bhojana* are traceable to the Pāli *sutta*-s and *Vinaya*,[50] all long antedating the two texts under discussion, it would indeed seem more reasonable to assume that the *Āgamic* and *Vinaya* parallels are indeed their common sources, unless and until the direct connection between these passages of the two texts can be established beyond doubt. This is all the more probable when we consider that these passages concern the daily practices of a *bhikṣu* most likely since the Buddha's time.

Sharing a similar stance with Honjō, Kritzer and others, Yamabe in this regard also provides three doctrinal parallels which we shall examine below:[51]

(1) Basing on Honjō, Harada and his own observations, Yamabe concludes that the *Saundarānanda,* AKB and YBŚ share the same tenet of *anuśaya* as dormant defilement in contrast to *paryavasthāna* as its manifestation (*samudācāra*). Yamabe further proposes that "Vasubandhu directly based his description of this Sautrāntika theory ... from the *Yogācārabhūmi. ...* ", and that this theory cannot be confirmed in the earlier Dārṣṭāntika sources such as the MVŚ and the **Tattvasiddhi*. Many other scholars, such as Harada[52] and Kritzer,[53] share this latter conviction with Yamabe. According to Kritzer, other *Yogācārabhūmi* sources for Vasubandhu include the doctrines of *santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*, mutual perfuming of *nāma* and *rūpa*, etc.[54]

But, as Yin Shun has shown, Aśvaghoṣa was a typical Dārṣṭāntika master characterized by a combination of being at once a meditator and a *Dharma*-preacher[55] — a combination to which Yamabe would agree. Besides the *Saundarānanda* reference above, Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* also alludes to an elementary form of *bīja* theory, along with the (at least implicit) notion of *santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa:*

> The spout arises as a result of the seed, [yet] the seed is not the sprout itself; [the two] are neither identical nor different. Likewise is the birth of a sentient being.[56]

As is too well known to require elaboration, another somewhat more explicit reference to such a doctrine of Aśvaghoṣa is alluded to by Vasubandhu in his *Karmasiddhi.*[57] The same doctrine is clearly discernible in another Biography of the Buddha, the 佛本行集經

(T3, no.190)[58] which is probably also a work by a master belonging to the broad Dārṣṭāntika movement:

> Just as, the sprout arises because of the seed;
> Apart from the seed, the sprout does not arise.
> This does not obtain when the two are mutually separated;
> And yet it is neither [a case of] permanence nor impermanence.[59]

An even more concrete expression of the *bīja* and *santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa* doctrines, said to belong to the Ābhidharmikas[60] is cited by Yin Shun[61] from Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.[62] Other sources on this doctrine predating the AKB, cited by Yin Shun are: Dharmaśreṣṭhī's **Abhidharma-hṛdaya* (阿毘曇心論);[63] Upaśānta's **Abhidharma-hṛdaya-sūtra* (阿毘曇心論經);[64] Dharmatrāta's **Abhidharma-hṛdaya-vyākhyā* (雜阿毘曇心論[65] — regarded by many as a direct source for the AKB); Aśvaghoṣa's stanza (referred to above) in **Karmasiddhi*; and the MVŚ.[66] All these references relate to the serial continuity of *avijñapti* and the notion of *vāsanā*. I shall quote below the MVŚ reference which is perhaps relatively little noticed by scholars in this connection:

> According to some: the *prātimokṣa-saṃvara*, from the first moment of its projection by the informative *karma,* is present at all times [in the ordainee who] is endowed (*samanvāgata*) with it: Whether he is asleep, drunk, mentally derailed, fainted; whether he is having a volition or not; whether he is having a defiled or neutral thought, or is thoughtless (*acittaka)* — in all states it is present, existing as an uninterrupted serial continuity.[67]

This description of *avijñapti* is essentially the same as Vasubandhu's definition in the AKB which speaks of it also as a continuous series (*anubandha*).[68] It is significant that this notion was already in the MVŚ. I have proposed elsewhere[69] that the doctrine of *avijñapti* as an ever-present, transforming serial continuity enables the Sarvāstivādins to explain their notion of a *karmic* force projected by a *cetanā* that continuously undergoes transformation: A meritorious *karma* continuously grows in strength (*abhivardhate*, as said in the *sūtra*; also: *upacita*) in the person (this is regarded as one of the scriptural supports for the doctrine) when he is subsequently rejoicing in the action; an unskillful *karma* can have its effect counteracted when the doer subsequently truly repents. As far as the notion of a *karmic* series undergoing continuous transformation until fruition is concerned, it is essentially the same as the Sautrāntika doctrine of *santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*; with the important difference, of course, that for the Sautrāntika,

avijñapti is unreal and the *cetanā* that initially projects the continuity, being past, is also non-existent. We can therefore see clearly here that, to account for the Buddhist conception of *karmic* continuity, the Vibhajyavādins in particular need some such notion of *santati-pariṇāma* that continuously arises in the present — the only temporal point of *dharma* activity left for them![70] It is probably for this reason that Saṃghabhadra, the orthodox Vaibhāṣika, considers all such notions as *bīja*, *anudhātu, avipranāśa, vāsanā*, etc, as being essentially the same doctrinally.[71] In brief, as Yin Shun remarks, it seems reasonable that the Sautrāntika doctrines of *bīja* and *vāsanā* are derived from the early Dārṣṭāntikas, representing as they do the present-only-exist version of the Ābhidharmika theory.[72]

In this connection, it is illuminating to note in the MVŚ (96b), the following Vibhajyavādin position of the Kāśyapīya:

> They are some who hold that the *vipāka-hetu*-s exist always as entities (其體恆有) so long as their retribution fruit-s have not ripened. Once their fruits are ripened, they are destroyed as entities (其體便壞). Thus, the Kāśyapīyas assert: Just as, so long as the sprout has not been generated, the seed always exists as an entity; it is destroyed once the sprout is generated. Likewise are the retribution causes (*vipāka-hetu*-s). To repudiate their claim, it is shown here that a retribution cause still exists even when its fruit has ripened.

To account for *karmic* continuity, the Vibhajyavādins can no more employ the Sarvāstivāda notion of the continued existence of a past cause. They must find a mechanism through which the karmic efficacy is continuously transmitted until final fruition: This is the reason why they need a doctrine of *bīja* and *santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*. Saṃghabhadra reports as follows this common tenet of the later Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika, stated more articulately than the Kāśyapīya statement above:

> According to the tenet of ... the Dārṣṭāntikas: ... It is just as a seed in the external [world]; when distinctive conditions obtain, it functions as the cause directly transmitting [the generative efficacy]; having effected the fruition, it ceases. Following this stage, there arise successively the root, the sprout, the stem, the branches and leaves, etc. *Dharma*-s of different forms, though not enduring as entities, arise as a serial continuity. At the final stage, it is again when distinctive conditions obtain that it can become the cause generating its specific fruit.[73]

We may also note in this connection another early Dārṣṭāntika reference to the *bīja* theory, albeit once again not as developed as that in the AKB. This is found in the **Sūtrālaṅkāra/ Dṛṣṭāntapaṅkti/ Kalpanā-maṇḍiṭīkā* of Kumāralāta (or according to the Chinese translation and also some modern scholars: Aśvaghoṣa):

> Now I would like to give a *dṛṣṭānta* in order to make its meaning clear. Just as the seed of a crop which, as a result of the coming together of various conditions (*pratyaya*-s) gives rise to the sprout. However in reality this seed does not produce the sprout. By virtue of the fact the seed ceases, there is the growth of the sprout; because the seed ceases, there is no fault (*doṣa*) of eternalism. By virtue of the fact that there is a growth of the sprout, there is no annihilism.[74]

In summary: the *anuśaya—paryavasthāna* doctrine and those of *bīja* and *santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*, at least in their less developed form, already exist in the MVŚ and are attributed to the Vibhajyavādins. The early Dārṣṭāntikas, being originally Sarvāstivādins, did not need them for their doctrinal expositions. But at the same time, we have also found some early Dārṣṭāntika masters, such as Aśvaghoṣa and Kumāralāta, propounding these doctrines in some form. When later on the Dārṣṭāntikas decisively leaped over to the Vibhajyavāda camp, it is only natural to find them advocating these doctrines. From this perspective, therefore, there is no necessity to assume that Vasubandhu relied on the *Yogācārabhūmi* for his exposition of these doctrines.

(2) Vasubandhu refutes the view that there is no real *sukha*. Concurring with Honjō, Yamabe observes that this view is not in YBŚ, but is attested in the Dārṣṭāntika sources, such as the **Satyasiddhi*. He highlights the point that the theory "seems to have been propounded by some of the earlier meditators."[75]

Moreover, Dharmatrāta's *Pañcavastu-vibhāṣā* also contains a very similar debate between the Ābhidharmikas and 'some' who deny real *sukha*.[76] Saṃghabhadra too attributes it to Śrīlāta whom he calls a Dārṣṭāntika, and like Vasubandhu, rejects it. The MVŚ too records similar arguments, and the compilers likewise reject it.[77] We can therefore be sure that the doctrine must have existed at a very early stage within the Sarvāstivāda lineage — but not even necessarily confined to the meditators. On this point, then, even if it could properly be established that the doctrine was taught among some early meditators, there seems to

be no sufficient reason to necessarily link it with the Yogācāra tradition that later came to be represented by the YBŚ. Rather, we can also see here a good illustration that Vasubandhu is familiar with, and probably draws from, the Dārṣṭāntika and other early sources, and that he does not always side with the relatively later Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika.

(**3**) *Saundarānanda* says that man is bound by *abhūtaparikalpa* of the object. Honjō links the verses concerned to a Dārṣṭāntika view in Ny (639b) which speaks of the relativity of experience on account of discrimination (*parikalpa*) with regard to the object. Yamabe further refers to a passage in the MVŚ in which the Dārṣṭāntikas argue for the unreality of the object using the simile of different people having different perceptions of one and the same woman (MVŚ, 288b). Nevertheless, Yamabe thinks that the verses are also significantly closely linked to the Yogācāra tradition because of the expression *abhūta-parikalpa*. To further substantiate his contention, he also refers to an argument in the **Mahāyānasaṅgrahopa-nibandhana*, and further to a *Śrāvakabhūmi* passage which speaks of *vikalpakaṃ manovijñānam* following the visual consciousness.

However, these references do not add up to much weight, since the Ābhidharmika schools too would agree that in contrast to the five sensory consciousnesses, *manovijñāna* is *vikalpaka* on account of which we have attachment or aversion. Yamabe further argues that the close link between the *Saundarānanda* and the *Śrāvakabhūmi* is also to be seen in the fact that both discuss 'grasping the *nimitta* and *anuvyañjana*'. On the basis of all these, he concludes:

> Therefore, Aśvaghoṣa, Dārṣṭāntika, and Yogācāra seem to share the same position on this matter. It is clear that this view is not shared by the orthodox Sarvāstivāda, since it is expressly rejected in the *Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545:288b27-c1)"[78]

But while it is true that the orthodox Sarvāstivādins maintain the reality of the external objects, they equally speak of the cognitive process as involving the grasping of *nimitta* and *anuvyañjana*,[79] and stress the negative conditioning of *vikalpa*. Thus, arguing for the position that the five sensory consciousnesses are morally definable (as *kuśala* and *akuśala*), Saṃghabhadra explains:

> [A sensory consciousness] though staying for one thought moment in the *viṣaya*, is capable of grasping *nimitta*; they are therefore morally definable. Thus, the *sūtra* says: "Having seen *rūpa*-s with the eyes,

> he does not grasp the *nimitta* (相), [or] the *anuvyañjana* (好) (*sa cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā na nimitta-grāhī bhavati / nānuvyañjana-grāhī*)."[80] Because the visible objects are grasped by two consciousnesses, there is first the arising of visual consciousness that grasps the *nimitta* of *rūpa*, and then the arising of mental consciousness that grasps its *anuvyañjana*. Thus, the *sūtra* intends to show that because visual consciousness can grasp *nimitta*, it can also generate defilement. But if so, why is mental consciousness alone said to be *vikalpaka*? It should be understood that it is only account of the force of *vikalpa* that there comes to be the various faults.[81]

Moreover, we should not over-stress the connection of '*abhūta-parikalpa*' with the Yogācāra tradition in the description of the perception of an ordinary worldling. The term 虛妄分別 which is Xuan Zang's usual rendering for *abhūta-parikalpa* occurs twice in Ny.[82] In MVŚ, other slightly different renderings which probably translate *abhūta-parikalpa* are: 不實分別[83] and 不正分別.[84] The following occurrence in Ny, in the same context as the above discussion, describes its role in the arising of *kleśa*:

> Sentient beings are of different natures; some with feeble defilements, others with strong defilements. For those with feeble defilements, there must first be the generation of false discrimination (虛妄分別, *abhūta-parikalpa*) before a defilement can come into play (*sam-ud-ā-√car*). For those with strong defilements, without depending on *vikalpa*, a defilement arises as soon as it accords with the object. Accordingly, there are cases where a defiled mental consciousness first arises, and other cases where another type of defiled consciousness first arises.[85]

2.4. Vasubandhu, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra

It seems, in the main, a reasonable assumption that the Yogācāra as represented by the tradition of the YBŚ was evolved from among members of the meditator community within the broad lineage of the Sarvāstivāda. The term Yogācāra master (瑜伽師) occurs about 140 times in the MVŚ. These masters are the meditators whose primary concern is spiritual praxis and realization, generally well respected by even the Ābhidharmikas. These Yogācāra masters articulated certain doctrinal explanations on the basis of their meditational experiences, and some of these explanations are accepted by the Ābhidharmikas. Yin Shun[86] cites the following example in which the meditational experience of Yogācāras is invoked as authority — even more important than that of the sūtra-s — by the compilers of the *Vibhāṣā*:

> "Comment (by the compilers): Whether there is scriptural support or not, there is definitely the *ākāra* having the *nairātmya* of all *dharma*-s as object. That is, the Yogācāra masters give rise to this *ākāra* at the stage of practising contemplation."[87]

Against this backdrop, we may understand that Vasubandhu would have been familiar with doctrines propagated within the larger Sarvāstivāda lineage, some of which later developed into the so-called Sautrāntika doctrines, and others, Yogācāra doctrines. Of course, being within the same milieu, the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika and the Mahāyānic Yogācāra — particularly those who are praxis-oriented — must have been mutually influenced doctrinally. Accordingly, it should not be surprising to find doctrinal parallels between what Vasubandhu identifies as Sautrāntika doctrines in the AKB on the one hand, and some of the doctrines in the *Yogācārabhūmi* on the other. This does not necessarily imply that Vasubandhu bases his Sautrāntika doctrines on the *Yogācārabhūmi.* This, however, is precisely what Robert Kritzer, and it would seem Honjō (see above) and others as well, seek to establish. But while not ruling out the possibility entirely at this stage, and not contesting that Vasubandhu was probably familiar with the *Yogācārabhūmi*,[88] we must say that the parallels that Kritzer presents are mostly unconvincing.

Among these "parallels", the ones that that are relatively more persuasive are the *bīja* theory together with its associated notion of *santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*, and the description of *anuśaya* as dormant seeds.[89] But I have already argued against these points above — regarding *vāsanā* and *santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*, I have argued that they were already found in the doctrines of as early a Dārṣṭāntika as Aśvaghoṣa, and also Kumāralāta.

Kritzer remarks here that in the defense of *sarvāstitva*, the MVŚ does not refer to the notion of *santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*. But again, we have seen that in defending the continued existence of a past cause, it in fact does refer to the Vibhajyavādin Kāśyapīyas who speak of the cessation of a seed as soon as the sprout arises, which necessarily implies the notion that a fruit does not arise directly from the seed, but due to a kind of *santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*.

Moreover, the 'main version' of *bīja* theory in the *Yogācārabhūmi* is actually closer to Śrīlāta's version known in Ny as the *anudhātu* theory than Vasubandhu's (See *infra*, § 6.5), and Śrīlāta is vehemently against the *sahabhū-hetu* which the *Yogācārabhūmi* version cannot do without.

One of the biggest issues to be addressed by Kritzer is the absence of the term *ālaya-vijñāna* in the whole of the AKB. On this issue, he argues at length concerning Vasubandhu's view that in the *ārūpya*, there is no support for consciousness external to consciousness itself. To make possible a parallelism between the AKB passage (112) and the YBŚ passages, he suggests that *citta-santati* in Vasubandhu's passage could stand for *ālayavijñāna*. However, he seems to have read far too much into the passage. The only thing that we can be definite about here is Vasubandhu's/Sautrāntika explanation that (i) for those free from attachment to *rūpa* — as beings born in the *ārūpya* are — their *cittasantati* can operate without depending on *rūpa*; (ii) the force of the *ākṣepa-hetu* is sufficient to sustain the *cittasantati* of a being in the *ārūpya*. This Sautrāntika position is made clear in the following criticism by Saṃghabhadra:

(a) If as Vasubandhu claims, the *cittasantati* continues by virtue of the *ākṣepahetu*, then it would be without a support (*niśraya*) when a *kuśala* or *kliṣṭa citta* arises.

(b) Since he acknowledges that the *citta,* etc of beings in the *kāma-* and *rūpa-dhātu* definitely cannot operate without depending on the physical body, why is it that for beings in the *ārūpya*, their *citta,* etc., can operate without absolutely any support?[90]

Accordingly, Vasubandhu's primary stress here is the strength and nature of the *ākṣepa-hetu*; and he acknowledges at least the dependence of the *cittasantati* on *rūpa* in the two lower *dhātu*-s. There seems no need to extrapolate, as Kritzer does, that the Sautrāntika statement is based on a notion of a consciousness that has already "transcended its original feature of essentially being bound, and somehow subordinate, to corporeal matter, and has rather in its turn become a fundamental constituent of personality."[91] At any rate, it is noteworthy that whereas Saṃghabhadra can detect a similarity between Vasubandhu's denial of tri-temporal existence on the one hand and the *Śūnyatā* doctrine negating all *svabhāva*-s on the other (see below), he does not observe any connection between Vasubandhu's conception of the *cittasantati* here and the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine which should have been well-known by his time.

Concerning the *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa*-s (Kritzer's point 3), their denial is already attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ (198a).[92] The same comment in fact applies to the other passages concerning the denial of *pṛthagjanatva* (= *asamanvāgama*), *avijñapti, saṃsthāna-rūpa*, the *asaṃskṛta*-s,[93] etc. Concerning the Sautrāntika denial that the Buddha said an *asaṃskṛta* is a cause (point 4), Kritzer finds no parallel in YBŚ, while as he observes,

a similar denial is found in MVŚ (103c). We might also note that the main point in the Sautrāntika denial of *ākāśa* is that it is none other than *ākāśa-dhātu* which is just a *prajñapti*.[94] In the MVŚ, the Ābhidharmikas precisely endeavour to show that the two are not the same.[95] Both in the AKB and MVŚ, the Ābhidharmikas maintain that *ākāśa* has as its *svabhāva* the absence of obstruction; it is against this notion that the Sautrāntika [96] argue that it is simply the absence of any obstructible/tangibles. From this perspective, there is even more similarity on this debate between the MVŚ and AKB, than between the AKB and YBŚ. All the above considerations taken together, then, we cannot rule out the possibility that Vasubandhu's sources in most cases could very well be the MVŚ or some other sources which are now no more extant, rather than necessarily the YBŚ.

2.5. Hīnayāna Sautrāntika and Yogācāra Sautrāntika?

One more parallel pointed out by Kritzer (point 1)[97] concerns the debate on what sees *rūpa*. The MVŚ tells us the different positions here — Vaibhāṣikas: the eye sees; Dharmatrāta: visual consciousness; Ghoṣaka: the *prajñā* associated with visual consciousness; Dārṣṭāntikas: *sāmagrī*.[98] At the end of the debate in the AKB, Vasubandhu ascribes to the Sautrāntika the remark that it is futile to argue on this, because there is nothing that sees or is seen — only the momentary *dharma*-s qua causes and effects (*dharma-mātram / hetuphala-mātram /*).[99] Concurring with Katō, Kritzer states:

> As Katō points out, the commentators think that Vasubandhu favours Dharmatrāta's opinion, but in fact, he may simply be using it to refute the Vaibhāṣikas.[100]

However, it does seem wiser to trust the commentators' opinion, not only because these ancient masters were much closer to the time of the AKB,[101] but also in consideration of the following fact: The Sautrāntika remark at the end effectively denies the reality of the *āyatana*-s — there is neither the internal *āyatana* as that which sees, nor the external *āyatana* as the object of vision. This is in line with Śrīlāta's position that "both the supporting bases (*āśraya;* i.e. the organs) and the objects (*ālambana*) of the five [sensory] consciousnesses do not exist truly; the *dhātu*-s alone are real existents."[102] For him, even the consciousnesses themselves do not exist as real entities:

> When the *sūtra* speaks of consciousness as that which is conscious (*vijānātīti vijñānam*), it is not a discourse of *paramārtha*; it is a conventional one

> (*saṃvṛti-deśanā*). If what is conscious is consciousness, then it ought also to be called non-consciousness. That is: if what is capable of being conscious is called consciousness, then it ought to become non-consciousness when it is not capable of being conscious, [as when a requisite assemblage of conditions is lacking]. It ought not be the case that what is a non-consciousness can be called a consciousness. [103]

In contrast, Vasubandhu is known to hold that the *āyatana*-s exist truly in as much as they are epistemic facts.[104] According to Sthiramati,[105] this view, contrary to the understanding of some scholars, is not Vasubandhu's own, but a Sautrāntika view. Accordingly, it is more reasonable to understand Vasubandhu as basically advocating the "consciousness sees" position, rather than the one that is in line with Śrīlāta's denial of the *āyatana*-s. There is some confusion concerning the holders of this "consciousness sees" position. In the MVŚ, it is attributed to Dharmatrāta; in ADV (31), the Dārṣṭāntika-pakṣa, likewise in Ny (367b: 譬喻部師, 有於此中...), in *Tattvārthā*,[106] the Sautrāntikas. As we have argued above, however, this confusion results from the fact that in the period of these commentaries, the early Dārṣṭāntikas, of whom Bhadanta Dharmatrāta was an important representative, had already evolved into the Sautrāntika, or Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika. The "consciousness sees" view attributed to Dharmatrāta must have been inherited by some sections of the Sautrāntika . This would of course be problematic to Katō, Kritzer and others who have decided that the views specifically labeled in the AKB as 'Sautrāntika' are those of Vasubandhu himself.

In this connection, there is an interesting comment in the Uighur version (Japanese tr.) of the *Tattvārthā* that deserves our attention:

> [The *bhāṣya*:] *sautrāntikā āhuḥ ... janapadaniruktiṃ nābhiniveśeta saṃjñā ca lokasya nābhidhāved iti* / Commentary: Before this, it has been said "consciousness can see". [There] the tenet of the masters of the Sautrāntika among the eighteen schools is included. The Sautrāntika masters now spoken of [in *sautrāntikā āhuḥ*] are all the Yogācāra masters of the Sautrāntika School.[107]

According to this commentary, then, it is correct to attribute the "consciousness sees" view to the Sautrāntika(-Dārṣṭāntika), and also correct to attribute the concluding remark to the Sautrāntika. But the two Sautrāntika are not exactly identical. The former is the Hīnayāna Sautrāntika, and we might call them Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika; the latter, the Sautrāntika Yogācāra,

who were probably Mahāyānists (since they are not included under the eighteen sects) derived from the broad Sautrāntika lineage. Unfortunately, I cannot trace any explanation to this effect in the Tibetan version in which *mdo sde pa rnam* occurs only once in the debate — at the end (as in the AKB). Compared to the Tibetan version, and the portion of the Chinese version included in the ZW, Vol.I, we can see that the Uighur version which is a translation from the Chinese, is much more lengthy, often providing elaborate explanations. But on the other hand, the quality of the Tibetan translation is not so satisfactory and at times incomplete, and therefore difficult to comprehend. Moreover, it often simply transcribes the Sanskrit sentences in the Tibetan script without translating them. This being the case, it is difficult to be absolutely certain whether the above-quoted distinction was in fact in the original Sanskrit.[108] If it was not, it was probably supplied by the Uighur translator or taken from the Tang dynasty[109] notes written on the Chinese original; but even in this case the comments should still be valued as a relatively ancient source. In any case, the distinction seems to make good sense, and helpful at least as a clue to the understanding of the well noticed close relationship between the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra.

We of course should refrain from making too big a fuss with this explanation at least until we are certain that it was indeed transmitted in the original *Tattvārthā.* But in the light of this distinction as a clue, we might now feel a little more confident in understanding that the Yogācāra at least in part evolved from the praxis-oriented Sautrāntika who in turn evolved from the early Dārṣṭāntikas. In this process, it is possible that, given the attitude of openness to non-orthodox doctrines among the early Dārṣṭāntikas — as witnessed in the MVŚ — and their predilection towards the authority of meditation experience, some of them had been influenced (and reacted to) the then flourishing Mahāyāna tenets such as *Śūnyatā,*[110] becoming perhaps the early members of the 'Mahāyānic' Yogācāra. But judging by the earliest portion of the YBŚ (*maulī bhūmi*), even these early 'Mahāyānic Yogācārins' were still realists. Yin Shun remarks that the early Yogācārin doctrine of the *nirābhilāpya svabhāva*-s of *dharma*-s was in fact adopted from the Sautrāntika doctrine (of Śrīlāta and others) of the eighteen *dhātu*-s being the only reals transcending epistemological superimposition.[111] Others within the Sautrāntika lineage, who were in some way more 'resilient' to the new doctrines and ideals, remained as 'Hīnayāna' Sautrāntika , holding on in particular to their form of realism. This latter group seemed to have been greatly influenced by Bhadanta Dharmatrāta (and later on also Kumāralāta and others), and in Vasubandhu's time had Śrīlāta as a prominent leader. It is this group which preserved — sometimes with slight modification

(e.g. Śrīlāta doctrine that there are only three *caitta*-s *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā*; all the other *caitta*-s being *cetanā-viśeṣa*) — many of the Dārṣṭāntika doctrines in the MVŚ. Probably for this reason, he is generally called a Dārṣṭāntika master in the Ny.

In the AKB, Vasubandhu himself seems to be generally partisan to this latter Hīnayāna group. But, he too was evidently open-minded, of which fact the AKB is a testimony, and accordingly did not seem to have become exclusively partisan to the tenets of any group as such — be it those of Hīnayāna or Yogācāra Sautrāntika or Sarvāstivāda. Thus, in the context of the "what sees" debate, he seems to basically side the view of Dharmatrāta; and yet at the same time probably senses the meaningfulness of the Yogācāra-Sautrāntika's concluding remark. As another illustration, Vasubandhu is known to accept some of the Sarvāstivāda *caitta*-s, and the notion of *saṃprayoga* of *citta-caitta*-s — differing from Śrīlāta. This also necesarily means that he accepts the *sahabhū-hetu* doctrine which Śrīlāta rejects. Furthermore, he disagrees with a Sautrāntika view — held also by Śrīlāta[112] — that a subtle *citta* exists in the *nirodhasamāpatti*, and endorses the *Pūrvācārya*-s' view[113] of the mutually seeding of *nāma* and *rūpa*, a view that is found in YBŚ. Yet quite often, Saṃghabhadra has to protest that he is partisan to Śrīlāta.[114]

The "Two-Sautrāntika" explanation in the *Uighur *Tattvārthā* also makes good sense when we read in *Karmasiddhi* that the *vipākaphala-vijñāna/ ālaya-vijñāna* doctrine was proposed by "a certain group of Sautrāntika" (一類經為量者).[115] It likewise makes sense in our attempt to understand why such masters as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, known to hold Sautrāntikas like views, are generally taken by tradition to belong to the Yogācāra.

In terms of the above analysis, we might understand the Vasubandhu of the AKB thus: He belonged to the Hīnayāna Sautrāntika school of thought, while also maintaining allegiance to certain acceptable Sarvāstivādin tenets, and at the same time was open to the developing Yogācārin tenets. This is not surprising considering his own doctrinal background,[116] as well as the fact that the Yogācāra evolved from the broad Sarvāstivāda lineage. He must have been quite well exposed to the evolving Yogācāra tenets in North-western India[117] where he had been active. In Ny, Saṃghabhadra at several places accuses Vasubandhu and Śrīlāta for siding with the *ākāśa-puṣpa* (空花) doctrine[118] in an attempt to deny the *svabhāva* of all *dharma*-s. The following is an illustrative example:

> Further, he holds that there exist defilement-seeds (*kleśa-bīja*-s) ... You are used to taking as your own tenets such types of false assertion of a non-existent as an existent. ... It is now abundantly clear that the *Sūtrakāra* seems to be generally averse to the Vaibhāṣika tenets, and intends to deny the *svabhāva* of all *dharma*-s from the standpoint of the sky-flower (i.e. *śūnyatā*) [doctrine] ... If one truly wishes to advocate the Vaibhāṣika tenets, one should not be partisan to theories that repudiate the *dharma*-s. ... (T29, 432a-b)

The tone of Saṃghabhadra's complain seems to suggest that Vasubandhu pretends to be still a Vaibhāṣika when in fact he clearly is not. This kind of pretension on Vasubandhu's part is highlighted by Yin Shun[119] who rightly believes that the best criterion for judging whether or not Vasubandhu is Sarvāstivādin is actually his own definition given in the AKB:

> Those who hold 'all exists' — the past, the present and the future — belong to the Sarvāstivāda. Those, on the other hand, who hold that some exist, viz. the present and the past *karma* which has not given fruit; and none of those which have given fruit or the future exist, are followers of the Vibhajyavāda.[120]

In accordance with this definition, Vasubandhu, subscribing to the Vibhajyavādin standpoint as he does, cannot qualify as a Sarvāstivādin. This is in contrast to the suggestion by Honjō[121] and others who base the judgment on Yaśomira's explanation below:

> What is the meaning of "Sautrāntika"? Those who take the *sūtra* as the authority, and do not take the *śāstra* as the authority.[122]

Honjō's view is that Vasubandhu belongs to the Sarvāstivāda, but does not recognize the authority of the Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma śāstra*-s.[123] But it seems to me that Yaśomitra's definition provides the necessary, but not the sufficient condition for the qualification of being a Sarvāstivādin. The fundamentally different doctrinal standpoint of Sarvāstivāda versus Vibhajyavāda cannot be completely ignored in this judgment, in as much as the argument that a Sautrāntika is one who rejects the authority of the *Abhidharma śāstra*-s itself entails a doctrinal element of consideration: the central Sarvāstivādin tenet that cannot dispense with the stamp of authority of the *Abhidharma śāstra*-s is *sarvāstitva*. The distinction between the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika is not merely one pertaining to the attitude with regard to the *Abhidharma śāstra*. Otherwise, a sect like the Vātsīputrīya with its five-fold Categories[124] that include past, present and future *dharma*-s, and is said by the compilers of the MVŚ to differ only with

respect to a few doctrinal points from the Sarvāstivāda,[125] and moreover respects certain Abhidharma texts of the Sthaviravāda lineage, would be better qualified as Sarvāstivāda. Although such a consideration still cannot ascertain beyond the fact the Sautrāntika is a distinct school of thought, it may be noted that the Vibhajyavādins and Vātsīputrīyas are indeed also distinct Buddhist sects. The issue of the absence of the featues of the Sautrāntika as a sect will be addressed below. (§ 2.6)

Furthermore, as we have seen above, Yaśomitra, who gives the above-cited definition on "Sautrāntika", himself acknowledges that the Dārṣṭāntika Dharmatrāta cannot be a Sautrāntika since he subscribes to *sarvāstitva*. This goes to show that Yaśomitra's definition is not intended to be a sufficient one.

In Ny, Saṃghabhadra bluntly excludes the Vātsīputrīya and others from the name of Sarvāstivāda:

> Only [those who] believe in the existence of the tri-temporal [*dharma*-s] and the three types of truly existent *asaṃskṛta* can claim to be Sarvāstivāda. For it is only on account of their holding the existence of these *dharma*-s that they are acknowledged as Sarvāstivāda. The others are not; because they either superimpose/add on, or subtract from, [the *dharma*-s recognized by the Sarvāstivāda]. The Superimposers assert that there exist the *Pudgala* and the previous *dharma*-s. [On the other hand], the Vibhajyavādins assert the existence of only the present and those past *karma*-s which have not yet given fruit. The Kṣaṇikavādins assert the existence of only the 12 *āyatana*-s in the single moment of the present. The Prajñaptivādins assert that the *dharma*-s of the present too are mere *prajñapti*-s. The Vaināśika-s assert that all *dharma*-s are completely without any *svabhāva* like *ākāśa-puṣpa*-s. All of them are not Sarvāstivāda.
>
> In this context, the Sūtrakāra vilifies thus: If one says that the past and the future truly exist, it is not a good proposition with regard to the Noble Teaching. .... You people assert that among the present 12 *āyatana*-s, some exist truly, some do not; like the tenet of Sthavira [Śrīlāta] concerning *rūpa, śabda, spraṣṭavya* and *dharma*-s — how can you be Sarvāstivāda? There are others who, owing to the force of defilements assert that all *dharma*-s exist as mere *prajñapti*-s — can they too be Sarvāstivāda? There are yet others who, owing to the force of false views, assert that all *dharma*-s are completely without any *svabhāva*; they too say that the present exists as an illusion — can such an assertion of existence in such a manner be also named Sarvāstivāda?[126]

Obviously, then, we cannot interpret Yaśomitra's explanation as intending to offer a sufficient definition of a Sautrāntika. Fundamental doctrinal commitment does matter in this regard.

Fukuda, T. asserts that Vasubandhu "carefully avoids introducing fully developed Yogācāra conceptions, for they might conflict with the scheme of abhidharmic philosophy that forms the substructure of the *Kośa.* Thus he succeeds in formulating a coherent high-level *abhidharma* theory of his own, under the name of "Sautrāntika".[127] But is there any need for such an avoidance if Vasubandhu feels religiously committed enough to those "fully developed Yogācāra conceptions", when he has already so vehemently repudiated the central Sarvāstivāda doctrine of tri-temporal existence? In the concluding remarks at the completion of the AKB (end of chapter eight), Vasubandhu expresses his 'religious sentiment', stressing the importance of the True Doctrines and True praxis and realization for the continuance of the Buddha's teaching. All the expositions within the AKB from the different doctrinal perspectives are declared to be for this sole purpose. It would therefore be difficult to imagine him holding back from introducing in the AKB what he has truly understood and felt in his heart to be the true doctrines. It is useless for him as a monk with a sense of religious mission to work out a system of Abhidharma of his own simply for the sake of doing so, when what he knows to be the Truth cannot be expressed.

Kritzer argues that *ālayavijñāna* is not expounded in the AKB because this text is an exposition of provisional truth. It is because of "the nature of the text which is an exposition and criticism of traditional *abhidharma*."[128] But, this, again, would conflict with what is expressed in Vasubandhu's concluding sentiment. Besides, the distinction of the two levels of truth — provisional and absolute — is very much stressed throughout the *Abhidharma,* and certainly elaborately discussed in the MVŚ and AKB.[129] Moreover, we shall have to explain why then, subsequent to composing the AKB, in *Karmasiddhi,* Vasubandhu did not hesitate to refute even positions that he himself had endorsed — such as the mutual seeding of *nāma* and *rūpa* — in the AKB, and proceeds to expound on the *ālayavijñāna* as the true doctrine. Like the AKB, *Karmasiddhi* too is a Hīnayāna work dealing with *Abhidharma* categories; more specifically, the topic of *karma.* It is also "an exposition and criticism of traditional *abhidharma.*" With the only exception of a single reference to the *Sandhinirmocana,* all the sources cited by Vasubandhu there in support of the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine are Hīnayānic. Significantly, the text urges the *śrāvaka*-s not to think that the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine was not taught by the Buddha Himself simply because no *Āgamic* exposition on it can be found. For, he argues, "at this juncture, infinite number of *sūtra*-s belonging to each *nikāya* have been lost."[130]

It is not surprising that, as Kritzer observes, the compilers of the *Yogācārabhūmi* distinguishes between levels of teachings within the text.

When a new doctrine of a particular school or movement has been articulated, there must be justification accounting for its absence hitherto, and a usual one is that the new doctrine expounded now pertains to a higher (/highest) level of Truth.[131] This is not just with regard to the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine. When the *tri-svabhāvatā* (and *tri-niḥsvabhāvatā*) doctrine was first proposed, it was presented in the Yogācāra texts as representing a new doctrine and a higher level of understanding Reality, in contrast to standpoints of the two extremes of '*sarvaṃ śūnyam*' (of the Mādhyamika) and '*sarvam asti*' (of the Sarvāstivādin Ābhidharmikas). Moreover, the *Yogācārabhūmi* is a compilation representing a record of the doctrinal developments of the school, and it is quite understandable that the compilers at appropriate places remark on the different historical stages of doctrinal explanations within the school. It is from this perspective that we ought to understand the following explanation in the YBŚ:

> Furthermore, the explanation in terms of *bīja* established here should be understood as that expounded before the establishment of the Noble Teaching of the *ālayavijñāna*. If [it is in the manner of exposition] after the establishment of the *ālayavijñāna*, it should be understood that in brief all the *bīja*-s have the *ālayavijñāna* as their supporting basis.[132]

This passage, cited by Kritzer (*loc. cit.*), can hardly support Kritzer's contention that the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine is to be expounded only at the highest level of Truth; and the *bīja* doctrine, at the provisional level! In this connection, Kritzer also refers to the distinction made by Vasubandhu between *abhidharma* in the conventional sense and that in the absolute sense (*pāramārthika*),[133] suggesting that "from Vasubandhu's point of view, although most of the Sarvāstivāda *abhidharma* that he describes without criticism in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is conducive to pure wisdom, it is not necessarily a statement of all that is known by pure wisdom." But, even the Vaibhāṣika would have no problem with this observation: the said distinction is in fact not Vasubandhu's own, but based on the explanations given in the *Vibhāṣā*,[134] and Saṃghabhadra expounds on it without the slightest protest.[135]

I therefore see no justification for the assertion that Vasubandhu intentionally avoids the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine, and prefer to think that he in fact himself did not believe in it at the stage of composing the AKB. Yin Shun explains Vasubandhu's initial reluctance to accept the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine as follows: Vasubandhu basically accepted the Ābhidharmika doctrines pertaining to the *citta-caitta*. At the initial stage of the development of the *ālayavijñāna*, it did not seem acceptable to Vasubandhu that the *ālayavijñāna*

as a *vijñāna* could be without associated *caitta*-s. It is in fact out of the same kind of consideration that he preferred the doctrine of the mutual seeding of *nāma* and *rūpa*, rather than the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika doctrine that in *nirodhasamāpatti*, there can be a *citta* without any *caitta*. But when later on (at the stage of the *Karmasiddhi*) it came to be articulated that it too had associated *caitta*-s, the doctrine became acceptable to him.[136]

2.6. Why the Sautrāntika did not develop into a Buddhist sect in the proper sense

One more final issue: If the Sautrāntika cannot be considered to belong to the Sarvāstivāda school and is a relatively independent school in its own right, why is it that as Lamotte points out, no Sautrāntika monastery has ever been attested? Despite the school being known throughout the Buddhist tradition as an important representative of the Hīnayāna, Xuan Zang and Yi Jing who traveled in India in the 7th century described the regional centres and strongholds of various India sects, but not any of the Sautrāntika. Were the Sautrāntika indeed content with — or even capable of — remaining throughout merely as a school of thought within the Sarvāstivāda sect? Some would no doubt see this situation as yet another indication in support of their view that the Sautrāntika had always been Sarvāstivādins. Yin Shun, however offers a different perspective. According to him, the Sautrāntikas failed to establish their organized monastic strongholds for the following reasons:[137]

(1) They emerged too late (to be properly established as a distinct sect), when the Buddhist sects with their *sūtra-vinaya* as basis were continuing to thrive after flourishing for some 500 years, having long established their specific areas of propagation and monastic systems. The fact that the Vinaya was not the Sautrāntika emphasis also did not help in this regard.

(2) Doctrinally, they tended to (a) be liberal, resulting in the lack of unity and stability; (b) merge with other sects in the process of breaking away from the Sarvāstivāda, which in turn added to the inconsistency in their tenets; (c) be transformed by the then well-flourishing Mahāyāna thoughts of the Śūnyatāvāda and Yogācāra, given the compatibility of some of their tenets with those of the Mahāyāna — especially Yogācāra that was nearing doctrinal maturation.

(3) The early Dārṣṭāntikas and the Ābhidharmikas were at first mutually benefiting, and each in their own way — the former being influential

religious preachers and meditation masters, and the latter, articulate and thorough theorists — contributing to the common cause of the Sarvāstivāda. But once the later Dārṣṭāntikas themselves had turned into full-fledged theorists claiming to be *sūtra-prāmāṇika* and were constantly engaged in anti-*ābhidharmika* confrontation, they began to lose the charisma that they once had in the hearts of the devotees whose support was needed in establishing regional strongholds of their own.

It seems that the historical facts involved in the emergence of Buddhist sects — in the sense of distinct monastic traditions — are probably more complex than have been assumed by some. The Vātsīputrīya is a good case in point. This school shared most of the doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda sect, including *sarvāstitva*. Yet it (especially its branch, the Sāṃmitīya) established itself as an influencial sect, distinct from the Sarvāstivāda, with many regional strongholds. The main reason for its split from the Sarvāstivāda, as well as for its apparently powerful influence on some other sects and probably also on many devotees, was its innovative Pudgala doctrine. Their successful establishment was also partly due to their early emergence in the pre-Christian era (*cf* point (1) of Yin Shun above). At the same time, it is equally noteworthy that some of their members co-existed closely with, and were receptive to, the Mahāyāna to the early stage of which they in turn seemed to have contributed doctrinally.[138] We learn, for instance, that the Vātsīputrīya master, Dharmaruci, went from South India to Sri Lanka and resided at the Abhayagiri, preaching the Vaitulya (= Vaipulya) doctrines. He even succeeded in establishing a sect, named after him as the Dharmaruci-nikāya which very likely advocated a hybrid of Vātsīputrīya and Mahāyānic doctrines. Āryadeva, the famous follower of Nārgārjuna, was said to have been a monk of the Vātsīputrīya. Another Vātsīputrīya master, Saṃghassena, was described as being an aspirant for the Mahāyāna[139], and composed works, such as the **Avadāna-śataka* (百喻經) very much in the style of a typical Dārṣṭāntika.[140] In addition, Xuan Zang tells us that there were in his time "Mahāyāna Sthaviravādins (大乘上座)" from Sri Lanka residing around the Mahābodhi Temple; some others described by the same appellation also resided in Kaliṅga.[141]

When we survey the modern history of Sri Lankan Buddhism, we find three distinct *nikāya*-s — the *Siam*, the *Amarapura* and the *Rāmañña*, which came into existence not on account of doctrinal disputes, but owing to historical circumstances. Although all are really sub-divisions within the Theravāda, upholding the same *tripiṭaka*; each nevertheless has its own strongholds, effective head-quarter and ordination system, and their members do not

mix with those of the other sects in matters relating to ecclesiastic acts — i.e., each is effectively a sect (*nikāya*) — even a "Vinaya sect" — in the proper sense of the term. A similar situation is seen in Thailand, with the Dhammayutta-nikāya and the Mahā-nikāya as the two major nikāya-s.

All these indicate that in ancient India, members belonging to a particular sect might actually at heart belong to a school of thought other than that of their sectarian allegence. On the other hand, one dissident standpoint — such as Pudgalavāda — if considered of fundamental importance, was enough to cause a schism and the formation of another distinct sect. Furthermore, monks belonging to a particular school of thought might reside in centres which did not quite advocate their doctrinal commitment, but were nevertheless able to accept them as co-residents. The *Nikāya*-s or sub-*nikāya*-s were sometimes formed as a result of an influencial leader, and sometimes largely due to historical and social circumstances (such as in the case of the Sri Lankan *nikāya*-s). Returning to the case of the Sautrāntika, it is possible that some of these Buddhist masters belonging to the Sautrāntika school of thought, being unable to establish their own sectarian strongholds, might have opted to reside in those of other Buddhists sects of their choice — a choice partly determined by such factors as affinity in respect of outlook and doctrinal inclination. Others, however, for some reason or other, might have remained within the Sarvāstivāda sect, even though we have no evidence that any self-professed Sautrāntika had ever explicitly at the same time identified himself as a member of the Sarvāstivāda.

2.7. Conclusion

Modern studies on the relationship between the Dārṣṭāntika and Sautrāntika are often influenced by Przylusky's theory. I believe that once we are freed from the shadow of this influence, there will be much space for more instructive investigation. It should be understood in the proper historical perspective that whereas the early Dārṣṭāntikas were Sarvāstivādins, the relatively later Dārṣṭāntikas were Vibhajyavādins.

We are inclined to think that the Sautrāntika gradually evolved from a certain section of the Dārṣṭāntikas, taking a drastic leap from the standpoint of Sarvāstivāda to that of Vibhajyavāda — a leap made possible on account of their anti-Ābhidharmika and liberal attitude from the beginning. The Dārṣṭāntika leader Kumāralāta, known to have held distinctly Sarvāstivāda doctrine,[142] must have been instrumental in the final stage of

the transition from the Dārṣṭāntika to the Sautrāntika. By the time of the AKB, Ny, and ADV, the two names are seen to be used interchangeably, and sometimes hyphenated as Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntika. Thus, in the Vy, Yaśomitra explicitly states that the Dārṣṭāntikas are just the Sautrāntikas[143] (without any suggestion on the pejorative implication of the former term). In the Ny, Saṃghabhadra ridicules Śrīlāta, often referred to as the Dārṣṭāntika leader at the time, in the following words:

> He does not comprehend the difference in characteristic between the *nītārtha* and *neyārtha sūtra*-s and yet claim to be *sūtra-prāmāṇika* (經為定量). This is most illogical.[144]

Another instance indicating the interchangeability between appellations "Dārṣṭāntika" and "Sautrāntika" concerns the famous controversy in the AKB between the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas on the interpretation of the compound *kāmarāga-anuśaya*. Vasubandhu sides the Sautrāntikas (*evaṃ tu sādhu yathā sautrāntikānām*) who interpret it as "*anuśaya* of *kāmarāga*"[145] (i.e as a genitive *tatpuruṣa*). In the Ny, Saṃghabhadra states that the Sthavira Śrīlāta asserts that the defilements themselves such as *rāga* etc., are the *anuśaya*-s — i.e. sharing the same view as the Sautrāntikas — and then says that Śrīlāta's explanation therein is not acceptable because it does not tally with the Sautrāntika tenets.[146]

However, in the study of the Sautrāntika doctrines, we must bear in mind that the Sautrāntika movement, with its liberal attitude from the very beginning, comprises an even broader spectrum of sub-groups and more or less independent individual masters than the Sarvāstivāda, united by their professed adherence to the *sūtra*-s as the final authority. Xuan Zang's tradition speaks of the later — probably around or sometime after the time of Kumāralāta (late 2nd to early 3rd century A.D.)[147] — Dārṣṭāntikas as 'variant Sautrāntika masters' (經部異師), and divide the school into three subgroups:

(1) the "original", represented by Kumāralāta as the supposed "founding master"[148];
(2) the group led by Śrīlāta;
(3) the group known simply as the Sautrāntika, being followers of Kumāralāta.[149]

The question of the degree of credibility of this tradition conveyed through Xuan Zang's disciple, Kuei Ji apart, we may note that Yaśomitra likewise

speaks of the Dārṣṭāntika as "a particular group of the Sautrāntika" (*Sautrāntika-viśeṣa*).[150] Accordingly, we must be cautious not to forcibly synthesize some of the widely divergent tenets coming from members of this broad movement and over-enthusiastically treat them as if they are commonly held and fidelity-bound doctrines of a single sect in the strict sense. Generally speaking, we can divide the Sautrāntika masters into two broad groups:

(1) Some are popular preachers and meditators, continuing with the tradition of the early Dārṣṭāntika preachers that we come across in the MVŚ;
(2) others, on the other hand, are more theoreticians, and in the process of counteracting and refuting the Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas are gradually turning into Ābhidharmikas of a sort in their own right.

Xuan Zang tells that the Sautrāntika master, Śrīlāta, composed the *Sautrāntika-vibhāṣā* in Ayodhyā.[151] It is likely from the latter sub-group that the Buddhist logicians evolved into effectively a school of its own — sometimes known as the '*pramāṇa*' school, of which Dharmakīrti is perhaps the most illustrious master.

It seems not quite accurate to describe the Sautrāntikas as simply those members of the Sarvāstivāda who do not accept the authority of the Abhidharma *śāstra*-s — given that Sarvāstivāda and Vibhajyavāda are completely and fundamentally diametrically opposed to each other. That the Sautrāntika did not seem to have established any distinctive monastic identity of their own was not the result of their choice; but largely due to historical circumstamces and might be called "the laws of religious evolution". While it is possible that some of the emerging Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras could have, for various reasons, stayed on in the broad Sarvāstivāda tradition, it is more likely that in the process of breaking away from the Sarvāstivāda, they were being merged into other sects.

I have also drawn attention to a distinction between 'Hīnayāna Sautrāntika' and 'Yogācāra Sautrāntika' in the Uighur version of the *Tattvārthā*. Although it is at this stage difficult to confirm that this distinction was indeed passed down by Sthiramati, it nevertheless makes sense and offers a plausible perspective in our understanding of some aspects of the historical issues discussed.

Notes

1 JPŚ, 985b; *cf.* MVŚ, 686b.

2 MVŚ, 87c.

3 Przyluski, J., "Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivādins" *Indian Historical Quarterly* Vol. XVI, 2, 1940, 246 ff.

4 Poussin, Louis De La Vallée, *L'Abhidharmakośa De Vasubandhu*, Volume 6 (Louvain, 1931), LII.

5 T27, 43c, 105b, etc.

6 Katō, J. 經量部の研究, 73 f.

7 *Ibid.*, 246.

8 Jayatilleke, KN, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1963) 381 f.

9 *Ibid.*, 382

10 JIABS, 326 f.

11 O*p. cit.* , 327.

12 Yin Shun, *Study*, 533. Yin Shun proved his point by comparing Xuan Zang's version with the older Chinese translations of the *Vibhāṣā*, more than 30 years before Katō, L., *op. cit.*, 20, 113 ff.

13 E.g.: MVŚ, 105b, 241b, 312b, 383b, 361c, 648a, etc.

14 MVŚ, 43c.

15 喻與法不相似 MVŚ, 312b–c.

16 MVŚ, 43a.

17 MVŚ, 87c–88a. See also, *ibid*, 659b, where the compilers interpret a *gāthā* — which is cited as a contradiction to their tenet on the *svabhāva* of *Buddha-vacana* — without rejecting it.

18 MVŚ, 393a–b; also, 264a. *Cf. Dhammapada* 71: *na hi pāpaṃ kataṃ kammaṃ / sajju khīraṃ va mucchati/ dahaṃ taṃ bālam anveti/ bhasmacchanno va pāvako //*; 17.13; etc.

19 MVŚ, 80b–81c, 88b. See also Dhammajoti, KL, "The Sarvāstivāda Doctrine of Simultaneous Causality", in *Journal of the Centre for Buddhist Studies, Sri Lanka*, Vol. I, May, 2003, 20 f, 38 ff.

20 Harada, Wasō. "經量部をめぐる諸問題", in *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, Vol. LIV, No. 2 (Tokyo, 2006), 1063.

21 Katō, *op. cit.*, 70.

22 MVŚ, 103c.

23 JIABS, 206 and n.13.

24 世體是常,行體無常. But T no.1546 has simply: 世是常,行無常.

25 MVŚ, 393a; also, 700a.

26 *Study*, 303.

27 T26, no.1546, 293c.

28 T27, 1003c–1004a; T29, 630b.

29 T27, 65b, 85b, 116b, 190a, 479a, 796a-b, 919b, 919b–c ; also *cf.* 74b.

30 E.g., T51, 492a; T43, 358a; etc.

31 *Cf.* Jaini, PS. ed. *Abhidharmadīpa with Prabhā Vṛtti* (Patna, 1959), 277.

32 MVŚ, 396a–b; AKB, 296 f.

33 JIABS, 327.

34 JIABS, 328.

35 MVŚ, 4b.

36 AKB, 430; Ny, 760b–761a.

37 MVŚ, 377a. *Cf.* also a view in MVŚ, 463a.

38 E.g., MVŚ, 269b–c.

39 MVŚ, 599b, 949c; see also MVŚ, 416c which explains the bodily feeling of *sukha* as that of *manaḥ-kāya*

40 Vy, 44: *atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ / yadi dharmatrāto 'tītānāgatāstitva-vādī / sa iti na sautrāntio na* Dārṣṭāntika *ity arthaḥ /*

41 AKB, 131: *bhadanta āha audārikarūpaṃ pañcendriya-grāhyaṃ sūkṣmamanyat /* Xuan Zang here adds "Dharmatrāta" to "*Bhadanta*" (T29, 131: 大德法救).

42 Xuan Zang has here 大德法救. But the Sanskrit (*bhadanta āha*) and the Tibetan *Tattvārthā (btsun pa zhes bya ba*: *bhadanta iti*), as well as the context in the explanations that follow, show that 法救 was added by Xuan Zang. See also note 36.

43 二 in 有二師 seems to be a misprint for 一.

44 ZW, I, 175. The Tibetan (Derge, 70a) is brief, and somewhat different here:
'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa ni rang gi sgras brjod pa yin bzhin du ring por sgro btags pa dang ngan pa dang gya nom pa'i don yongs su rgyas par ma rangs pas bye brag tu smra ba rnams na re zhes gsungs so // btsun pa zhes bya ba ni dpe ston sde pa'i gnas brtan chos skyob bo //

45 JIABS, 321, n.1.

46 JIABS, 368. See also his *Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhūmi* (Tokyo, 2005), xxxi ff.

47 JIABS, 243.

48 *Study*, 365 ff.

49 JIABS, 230.

50 E.g., Virtually identical sentences on *bhojana* are found in the *Vinaya* admonition on alms food (*paṭisaṅkhā yoniso piṇḍapātaṃ paṭisevāmi ....*), and constitutes the training on the four basic requisites of a *bhikkhu.*

51 JIABS, 231 ff.

52 See Yamabe, *op. cit*., 227.

53 E.g., JIABS, 362 f.

54 Kritzer, *A Comparison of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Yogācārabhūmi*, xxviii.

55 *Study*, 335 ff.

56 T4,33a: 芽因種子生　種非即是芽　不即亦不異　眾生生亦然

57 T31,784c: 心與無邊種, 俱相續恆流, 遇各別熏緣, 心種便增盛。種力漸次熟, 緣合時與果, 如染枸櫞花, 果時瓤色赤。

58 In the Song, Yuan and Ming editions of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, there is at the beginning the statement: "[The translator], Tripiṭaka [Master], Śramaṇa *Jñānagupta, of the Gandhāra Country of northern India". So this work possibly belongs to the Gandhāra region. See also, Lenz, T, *A New Version of the Gāndhārī Dharmapada and a Collection of Previous-Birth Stories* (Seattle, 2003), 180.

59 T3, 717a.

60 T30, 100a.

61 History, 225–227. Also, *Study*, 555-557.

62 T30, 22a.

63 T28, 812c.

64 T28, 840a.

65 T28, 888c.

66 T27, 643c.

67 MVŚ, 643c.

68 AKB, 8: *vikṣiptācittakasyāpi yo 'nubandhaḥ śubhāśubhaḥ / mahābhūtāny upādāya, sā hy avijñaptir ucyate //*

69 Dhammajoti, KL, 'Karmic role of the *avijñapti* of the Sarvāstivāda', in *Buddhist Studies* (Hamamatsu, 2003)

70 *Cf.* Ny, 421b-c where Saṃghabhadra shows that Śrīlāta as a Vibhajyvādin must need some sort of "successive cause" which however, from Saṃghabhadra's standpoint, is untenable since denial of the existence of past *dharma*-s entails the impossibility of the notion of "succession".

71 T29, 398b.

72 History, 227.

73 Ny, 535a.

74 T4, 260b.

75 JIABS, 238.

76 T28, 994c–995b.

77 T27, 402c–403a.

78 JIABS, 242.

79 Besides the Ny passage tr. below, see also MVŚ, 489c; *Saṅgīti-paryāya-śāstra* (T26, no.1536), 372b, 372c, 407a.

80 This *sūtra* statement is also cited in Vy (81) in the "what sees" debate.

81 T29, 349a.

82 T29, 349a, 629c.

83 T27, 507a, 507b, 510b.

84 T27, 39a, 987c, 988c.

85 T29, 349a-b: 然諸眾生有種種性, 或軟煩惱, 或利煩惱。軟煩惱者, 要先發起虛妄分別, 然後煩惱方現在前。利煩惱者, 不待分別;境纔相順, 煩惱便起。由此道理, 或有先起染污意識, 或有先起染污餘識。

86 *Study*, 615.

87 MVŚ, 45a.

88 Yaśomitra for one, certainly at times suggests that Vasubandhu implicitly refers to the *Yogācārabhūmi* standpoint. To take one example: On the issue of *sukhendriya* in the *dhyāna,* Vasubandhu says at the end: *asty eṣa ekeṣāṃ vādaḥ / naiva tu pūrvācāryā nirdiśanti sma yāvantaḥ prajñāntam / tasmād vicāryam etat /* (AKB, 440), and Yaśomitra comments: *tasmād vicāryam etad iti Yogācārabhūmi-darśanena vicāryam etad iti /* (Vy, 673).

89 JIABS, 362 f, 364 f.

90 Ny, 457c–459a. Saṃghabhadra raises three other points.

91 JIABS, 347.

92 Here, Kritzer (JIABS, 337 and n.24, n.25) remarks here that Vaubandhu's explanation on the *lakṣana*-s is very similar to YBŚ. We might also note that it is a Theravāda explanation in the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha-vibhāvinī.*

93 Kritzer himself remarks that he has not found any explicit statement in YBŚ that the category of *asaṃskṛta* is not really existent (JIABS, 341).

94 Ny, 347b.

95 T27, 388a–389a; T29, 347b-c. See also *Tattvārthā*(C), ZW, I, 210 ff.

96 As noted by Kritzer, the **Abhidharmahṛdaya-vyākhyā* (T28, no.1552, 944a) attributes the denial of the reality of *ākāśa* to the Dārṣṭāntikas.

97 JIABS, 333 ff.

98 T27, 61c.

99 AKB, 311.

100 JIABS, 333.

101 The younger contemporary, Saṃghabhadra (Ny, 24), for one, says explicitly that Vasubandhu sides the "consciousness secs" view.

102 Ny, 350c: 上座作如是言：五識依緣俱非實有。. . . 故處是假, 唯界是實。

103 Ny, 484b.

104 AKB, 14.

105 ZW, I, 183.

106 ZW, I, 214 (stated in another context — that of *sanidarśana* and *anidarśana*). In the Tibetan *Tatthārthā, mdo sde pa rnam* occurs only at the end of the debate (as in AKB): *mdo sde pa rnam na re zhes bya ba la / ci migs mthong ngam rnam par shes pas mthong zhes bya ba'i skabs gang yin pa der ro / de dag ji skad zer zhe na / nam mkha' ba ldad pa .... //.*

107 Shōgaito, M. *Studies in the Uighur Version of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya-ṭīkā Tattvārthā*, Vol. II (Kyoto, 1993), 103.

108 One might be inclined to think that it was not, on account of there being no Sanskrit transcription here.

109 According to the editor of the Chinese version (amounting to only to the 3rd fascicle), according to paper type, script style, etc. the Chinese manuscript belonged to the late Tang dynasty. (ZW, I, 169) Shōgaito, M. (1) thinks that the Uighur manuscript was around the period of the Yuan dynasty.

110 We might note that Yaśomitra accurately quotes the stanza from Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhaymaka-kārikā* on the two levels of Truth (Vy, 524) without even feeling the need to mention the source.

111 Yin Shun, 唯識學探源 (Taipei, 2nd edn, 1992), 205.

112 T29, 420b.

113 AKB, 72.

114 E.g., Ny, 625b.

115 T31, 784b–c.

116 In the *Biography of Ācārya Vasubandhu* (T50, no.2049, 188c-189a), tr. by Paramārtha, we are told that he hailed from Puruṣapūra of Gandhāra, and became a monk in the Sarvāstivāda sect. The same text (190c) also tells us that he was 'converted' to Mahāyāna Yogācāra by his brother, Asaṅga at Ayodhyā where Yogācāra thoughts developed.

117 Yin Shun believes that the *Yogācārabhūmi* was partly derived from the Śrāvakayāna Yogācāra propagated from the ancient 'Revata Monastery' of Northern India (centred around Gandhāra) as the centre. (History, 246 f; *Study*, 634–637).

118 Ny, 340b, 352a, 430b–c, 432b, 431b, 434a, 465c (speaks of 空花論宗 which teaches that all *dharma*-s do not keep their nature), 598a, 630c. PS Jaini has also pointed out certain statements by the Dīpakāra (author of ADV) that accuse Vasubandhu in similar terms.

119 *Study*, 666 ff.

120 AKB, 296: *ye hi sarvamastīti vadanti atītam anāgataṃ pratyutpannaṃ ca te sarvāstivādāḥ / ye tu kecid asti yat pratyutpannam adatta-phalaṃ cātītaṃ karma kiṃcin nāsti yad datta-phalam atītam anāgataṃ ceti vibhajya vadanti te vibhajyavādinaḥ /*

121 JIABS, 322.

122 Vy, 11: *kaḥ sautrāntikārthaḥ / ye sūtra-prāmāṇikā na śāstra-prāmāṇikāḥ / te sautrāntikāḥ /*

123 JIABS, 328.

124 The five are: future, present, past *dharma*-s, the *asaṃskṛta*-s and the 'Ineffable (*pudgala*)'.

125 T27, 8b.

126 T29, 630c–631a.

127 JIABS, 283 f.

128 JIABS, 376.

129 See AKB, 333 f. Also, the discussion in Ny quoted above on nature of consciousness at the absolute level.

130 T29, 785b.

131 *Cf.* also the declaration in the *Sandhi-nirmocana-sūtra* of the three-fold turning of the *Dharma-cakra*.

132 T no.1579, 584a–b. For the Tibetan version and Schmithausen's remark, see JIABS, 377, n.147.

133 AKB, 2; Kritzer, JIABS, 379.

134 *Cf.* MVŚ, 2c, 3b (Although the *svabhāva* of *abhidharma* is none other than *anāsrava-prajñā*, the *Jñānaprasthāna* is also called *abhidharma* because it is an instrument for it), 4a–c; etc.

135 T29, 329a–b.

136 *Study*, 678 ff; especially, 680 f.

137 *Study*, 604 ff.

138 *Cf*, for e.g., the formulation of the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine, and the well-known mention in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* (T5, 306a; *cf.* T25, 74c) of Classification of the Fivefold Categories of Dharma-s (五法藏).

139 T55, 73b.

140 See History, 206.

141 T51, 918b–c, 928c–929a, 934a.

142 In ADV, 277, Kumāralāta illustrates the doctrine of the tri-temporal existence of *dharma*-s with the *dṛṣṭānta* of the dust motes in the sunlight.

143 *Cf.* Ny, 44: *na sautrāntiko na dārṣṭāntika ity arthaḥ* /

144 Ny, 495c.

145 AKB, 278

146 Ny, 598a

147 Xuan Zang records the tradition which speaks of Kumāralāta, together with Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, as "the four suns illuminating the world" "at that time" in India (T51, 942a) — thus, putting Kumāralāta chronologically more or less on a par with the other three great masters whose dates range from around the 2nd to 3rd century A.D.

148 On this, see also T51, 942a; T41, 35c; T43, 274a.

149 T43, 358a.

150 Vy, 400.

151 T51, 896b.

3. The Ontological Status of the Cognitive Objects

3.1. The Sarvāstivāda notion of the real as that which engenders perception

In the *Abhidharma* period, the question of the ontological status of the objects of knowledge (*jñāna*) became an increasingly important topic of investigation. Several terms, some of which with distinguishable significations, are used. Perhaps the most generic term corresponding to 'object of knowledge' is *jñeya*, 'knowable', which increasingly occupied the mind of the Buddhist scholiasts. Consistent with the 'empirical attitude' — in the broader sense — throughout the whole Buddhist tradition from its inception, this term came to be synonymous with 'existent' or *dharma*-s as factors of existence. Thus, the *Prakaraṇa-pāda-śāstra* states:

> What are the knowable *dharma*-s (*jñeya-dharma*)? All *dharma*-s are knowable by knowledge, accordingly as the case may be (*yathā-vastu*). How is this? The knowledge with regard to *duḥkha* (*duḥkha-jñāna*) knows *duḥkha*. The knowledge with regard to *samudaya* (*samudaya-jñāna*) knows *samudaya* ...[1]

Another generic term is *artha*, 'object', which seems to be used preferentially by the Yogācārins to refer to an objective entity whose ontological status they deny.[2] Two other terms, more important from the epistemological point of view, are *viṣaya* and *ālambana*. The first may be rendered as 'object', 'object domain' or 'object field'; the second, 'cognitive object'. The Sarvāstivāda distinction is that whereas an external object that is sensed by a sense faculty is called a *viṣaya* — the domain wherein it can exercise its activity — sometimes also called an *artha*; an object that generates a corresponding consciousness is called an *ālambana (<ā-√lamb*, 'hang on to'). This latter is so called because it is that which is hung on to — i.e., is grasped (*gṛhyate*) — by a mental *dharma* so as to arise at the present.[3] In this capacity of serving as one of the two necessary conditions for the arising of a consciousness, it is called an *ālambana-pratyaya*, 'condition qua object'. Thus, whereas the mental *dharma*-s have both *viṣaya*-s and *ālambana*-s, the sense faculties have only *viṣaya*-s. The *ālambana-pratyaya*

subsumes all *dharma*-s – i.e. all the twelve *āyatana*-s – since all real entities known as *dharma*-s have this capacity.[4] Whereas the ontological status of the *ālambana-pratyaya* is contentious among the Buddhists, the following definition as given in Diṅnāga's **Ālambana-parīkṣa*, is apparently accepted in its essentials by most schools:[5]

> An *ālambana-pratyaya* is that which the perceiving (*ālambaka*) consciousness [takes as object] arising with its image, and which exists as a real entity (*dravyato 'sti*) enabling the perceiving consciousness to arise in dependence of it.[6]

For the Vaibhāṣika, all *viṣaya*-s are real existents; for "whatever that does not fall outside the object-domain of [sensory] consciousnesses, visual, etc., exists truly."[7] "Whatever that is conceptually real (*prajñaptito 'sti*) can only be the object domain of mental consciousness."[8] The main epistemological argument advanced in the *Vijñāna-kāya-śāstra* (= VKŚ), one of the seven fundamental *abhidharma* texts of the Sarvāstivāda, for the central thesis of the tri-temporal existence of *dharma*-s, is that in conformity with the Buddha's teaching, consciousness necessarily has a cognitive object; the fact that we can be conscious of past and future objects proves that these objects exist truly.[9] The AKB inherits this as one of the four major arguments for *sarvāstitva:*

> Consciousness arises when the object exists, not when it does not exist. And if the past and future [*dharma*-s] were non-existent, the consciousness would be having a non-existent as its cognitive object (*asad-ālambana*). Then, in the absence of an existent cognitive object, the consciousness itself would not occur.[10]

The MVŚ states that "all perceptions (*buddhi*) have real existents as their objects. .... There is no knowledge — the knower — that does not know the knowable; and there is no object of knowledge that is not known by knowledge."[11] Saṃghabhadra states succinctly that "the characteristic of an existent (*sal-lakṣaṇa*) is that it serves as an object producing perception (*buddhi*)." On these existents, he further articulates as follows:

> This is divisible into two: What exists truly (*dravyato'sti*), and what exists conceptually (*prajñaptito'sti*), the two being designated on the basis of *saṃvṛti-satya* and *paramārtha-satya* [respectively]. If, with regard to a thing, a *buddhi* is produced without depending on anything else, this thing exists truly — e.g. *rūpa, vedanā*, etc. If it depends on other things to produce a *buddhi*, then it exists conceptually/relatively — e.g., a vase, an army, etc.

> Those which exist truly are further divisible into two: Those which have only their essential natures (*svabhāva/svarūpa*), and those which [in addition] have activities (*kāritra*). Those which have *kāritra* are again of two types: with or without function (*sāmarthya/vyāpara/śakti*) ... Those which exist relatively are also of two types: having existence on the basis of something real or on something relative, like a vase and an army respectively .[12]

Saṃghabhadra's characterization of the existents emphasizes their cognitive distinctiveness: Eye sees only forms, ear hears only sounds, etc. Moreover, a particular form is seen in its particularity, a particular sound is heard in its particularity, etc. Even a mistaken perception, such as the illusion of a fire-wheel, presupposes an existent as the real object on which, due to various factors, a mental construction or illusion comes to be possible:

> It is only with regard to an existent constituting the visual object, that there comes to a difference in perception — correct or mistaken — on account of the difference in the sense faculty, brightness, distance and location.[13]

This fact of distinctive cognition in each case is due to the distinctiveness in the object itself. It is a mark of the reality of the object, intrinsic to which are unique specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) and common characteristic (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*):

> A non-existent is an absolute non-entity — what does not exist being necessarily without (越, *lit.* 'going beyond') *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, what is it that is said to be the object of cognition or consciousness? Should one say that non-existence itself is the object of consciousness — no; for a consciousness necessarily has an object. That is: All mental *dharma*-s have *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* as their objects; it is not the case that an absolutely non-existent *dharma* arises as an object.[14]

In other words, the possibility of a perception necessarily implies the true ontological status of the object perceived, correctly or mistakenly. It is, of course, only in the case of immediate perception (*pratyakṣa*) that the object as a uniquely real is perceived (see *infra*). For this reason, Saṃghabhadra's argument may be characterised as epistemic-ontologic. The author of the ADV expresses an essentially similar notion:

> An objective entity having a unique form established by its intrinsic nature, whose distinctive characteristic is observed by an error-free observation of *dharma*-s, is said to be a real/existent entity.[15]

3.2. The Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika doctrine of non-existent cognitive objects

Contrary to the Sarvāstivāda position, the Dārṣṭāntika and Sautrāntika maintain that the cognitive object may either be existent or non-existent. This notion seems to have been in existence among the Ābhidharmikas since fairly ancient time. The **Śāriputrābhidharma* (T no.1548) which seems to have been a fundamental *abhidharma* text for many of the *abhidharma* schools — and hence probably of a very ancient date — including the Pūrva-Sthaviravāda, the Vibhajyavādins and the Vātsīputrīya,[16] enumerates various types of knowledges among which is that of non-existent objects (無境界智 **asad-viṣayaṃ jñānam*),[17] defined as mental perception of past and future *dharma*-s.[18] In the VKŚ debate alluded to above, Maudgalyāyana (= Moggaliputta Tissa?), as the proponent of Vibhajyavāda also claims that there can be consciousness of a non-existent object (無所緣心 *asad-ālambanaṃ cittam*), as in the case of the perception of past, future and the unconditioned *dharma*-s.[19]

In the MVŚ, we are informed that the early Dārṣṭāntika masters claim that there can be knowledges whose cognitive object is non-existent (*asad-ālambanaṃ jñānam*). Such objects include a fire-wheel, a mirage, an illusion, the imaginary city Gandharva-nagara, etc.[20] They also hold that the objects of conjunction (*saṃyoga-vastu*) — i.e., of mental defilement — are unreal, contrary to the Sarvāstivāda view that both the defilements as well as their objects exist truly. How do they arrive at such a view?

> They explain that the objects [of perception] do not have a fixed nature, as they may or may not generate defilement: This is just like the case of a good-looking woman, variously adorned, who enters into an assembly. On seeing her, some give rise to respect, some to greed, some to hatred, some to jealousy, some to disgust, some to compassion, and some to equanimity. That is to say: herein a son gives rise to respect; those sensually indulgent, greed; those with enmity, hatred; those sharing a husband with her, jealousy; those who have practised the contemplation on the impurities (*aśubha-bhāvanā*), disgust; those sages who are detached (*vīta-rāgarṣi*), compassion, thinking this beautiful appearance will soon be destroyed by impermanence; those who are *arhat*-s, equanimity. Accordingly, one knows that the object does not exist as a real entity.[21]

In a similar vein, the great Dārṣṭāntika master, Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, asserts that there can be experience or sensation of objects which are purely imagined by the mind:

> There are two types of sensation (*vedanā*), one bodily, the other mental. Whatever is a bodily sensation is also a mental sensation. There exist mental sensation which are not bodily sensation — all those sensation which, without grasping an external thing, gives rise to a conceptual construction (*vikalpa*); depending solely on internal things, they grasp their forms and give rise to conceptual constructions. That is: [those sensation] which perceive (*ālambante*) that all *pudgala*-s are existent, and those which perceive the *rūpa*-s subsumed under the *dharmāyatana* (i.e. the *avijñapti-rūpa*), the *viprayukta-saṃskāra*-s, the *asaṃskṛta-dharma*-s, etc. [Remarks by the compilers of the MVŚ:] The Bhadanta intends that such mental sensation are devoid of real objects and are merely the operation of conceptual construction.[22]

The later Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntika masters continue to maintain this stance of the unreality of the cognitive objects. In the Ny, Saṃghabhadra contrasts this with the Vaibhāṣika stance:

> The masters of the Dārṣṭāntika (譬喻部師) assert thus: "Since *duḥkha* and *sukha* arise through the strength of conceptualization (分別, *vikalpa*), it is known that object-domains (*viṣaya*) are not existent entities at the absolute level (體不成實, **svabhāvena apariniṣpanna*). For, the Buddha in the *Māgandika-sūtra* speaks of lepers feeling pleasure when touched by fire of *duḥkha*. He also says that a *rūpa* may be called an agreeable mental object for a given beings, but not for other beings. Moreover, the pure and the impure are not existent at the absolute level (*apariniṣpanna*): this is because beings of the same homogeneity (*sabhāga;* i.e. of the same species, e.g. human beings)[23] differ from those of other [homogeneity] (i.e. of another species, e.g. beings in hell) in the way they experience the pure and the impure. Since purity and impurity cannot be apperceived in a determinate manner, both pure and impure objects are not existent at the absolute level.
>
> [In contrast], those conforming to logical reasoning (正理論者, **yuktavādin*; i.e. the Sarvāstivādin) assert thus: All object domain is existent at the absolute level. ...

We can easily understand that such doctrines, denying the objective reality of the cognitive objects as they do, are just one step before the later full-fletched Yogācāra idealistic doctrine that all objects of knowledge are nothing but the superimposed manifestation within consciousness itself. It may be noted that the Dārṣṭāntika illustration that different sentient species experience pure and impure objects differently is also among the major arguments put forward by the Yogācāra idealists to establish their thesis of *vijñaptimātratā*.[24]

Thus, to prove that nothing exists apart from consciousness, Sthiramati, in his TVB, makes good use of this tenet that consciousness can arise even where the cognitive object is a non-existent:

> How is it known that the cognitive object is non-existent? Because whatever thing is the cause of whichever, when that thing [as the cause] is complete and unobstructed, that [of which it is the cause] arises from it, not from another. But consciousness arises even with regard to non-existent cognitive objects such as an illusion, the [imaginary] city of Gandharva, a dream, an optical illusion due to eye defect, etc. Now, if the arising of consciousness could occur [only] when it is bound up with a cognitive object; then no consciousness will arise with regard to an illusion, etc, since there exists no real object (*artha*). Hence, consciousness arises from a preceding consciousness of the same species which has ceased; not from an external object, since it comes into being even in its absence.[25]

The Yogācāra maintains that there are two types of *ālambana-pratyaya*-s, one immediate, the other remote. The first is integral to the perceiving consciousness and is grasped by the perceiving aspect (*darśana-bhāga*) of the consciousness which in fact requires it as a supporting basis for its arising. Every consciousness thus must have this condition qua the immediate cognitive object. The second, though separated from the perceiving consciousness, is the substratum for generating the internal image — the perceived aspect (*nimitta-bhāga*) of the consciousness — grasped by the perceiving aspect. A perceiving consciousness may or may not have this type of remote *ālambana-pratyaya*-s, "since it can arise even without any external [object] on which it bears and is supported."[26]

In the Ny, there is a lengthy debate between the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika on the issue. The Sautrāntika, represented by Śrīlāta, enumerates the following cases which they claim to represent examples of perception of non-existent objects:[27]

(a) Optical illusion of a fire-wheel (*alāta-cakra*) resulting from a whirling firebrand.
(b) The cognition of the non-existent Self (*ātman*).
(c) The meditational experiences, such as the all pervasiveness of a meditational object (the so-called 'base of entirety', *kṛtsnāyatana*), e.g., a primary colour, that results from resolute mental application (*adhimukti-manaskāra*).
(d) The view (*dṛṣṭi*) that has non-existence as its object, as mentioned in the *sūtra*.[28]

(e) The awareness of the non-existence of certain mental states such as craving, as spoken in the *sūtra*.
(f) Objects in a dream.[29]
(g) Optical illusion of a double-moon, etc., resulting from ophthalmic disease.
(h) Knowing something that is non-existent.
(i) Cognition that takes as its object the prior non-existence (*prāg-abhāva*) of a sound.

As a general reply to the Sautrāntika claim, Saṃghabhadra invokes the scriptural authority that each of the six cases of cognition — visual, etc., up to mental — necessarily has two requisites: the sense faculty and the corresponding object. There is not a 7th type of cognition that is generated apart from the object, so that one can call it a cognition of non-existent object. In fact, if this could be the case, then a blind person ought to be able to see as much as one possessing eyes, there being no specifically requisite conditions that distinguish the two cases. Besides, non-existent *dharma*-s cannot be subsumed under any of the six types of objects taught in the *sūtra*-s. All the Vaibhāṣika arguments here are based on the main premise — which we have seen above — that whatever that can serve as a cognitive object producing a cognition is an existent, though it may be real in the absolute sense or in the relative sense as a mental construction or concept. What is non-existent in the construction necessarily has as its basis something real. It is this latter basis that constitutes the actual object of the perception. An absolute non-existent (*atyantam asad*) has no function whatsoever, and hence can never engender a consciousness. Thus, in the case of the perception of the unreal *pudgala*, the cognitive object is not the *pudgala* which is superimposed, but the five *skandha*-s which are real existents. The illusory perception of a double-moon has as its object the single moon; etc. In the same way, dreams, illusion, are actually recollections of real entities previously experienced — just that the element of imagination sets in resulting in the superimposition on these real entities under certain influences such as mental sluggishness, etc. Likewise, the imagination of a fictitious thing such as the tortoise's hair (*kaurmasya romaḥ*) and a hare's horn (*śaśa-śṛṅga*) become possible because the rabbit, the horn, etc, have been experienced before. Even in the case of negations, their perception do not arise having absolute non-existents as objects. Thus, the perception of what we ordinarily regard as a pure abstraction such as 'non-existence' too has a real object: the expression (*abhidhāna*) itself which for the Vaibhāṣika is real, being word (*nāman*) which is a *viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharma*. When the knowledge taking this as its object arises, it knows that

the negated does not exist. In the case when one perceives a negation such as 'non-brahmin' (*abrāhmaṇa*), the knowledge arises with the expression and the expressed (*abhidheya*) as its objects; the expression itself negates '*brāhmaṇa*', operating with regard to what is expressed by it — '*kṣatriya*':

> When this knowledge first arises, by taking merely the expression as its object, it knows that the negated [— i.e., *brāhmaṇa* —] does not exist. When it arises subsequently, it may also take the expressed [— i.e. *kṣatriya* —] as its object and knows that what is negated therein does not exist.[30]

Notes

1 These four knowledges pertaining to the four truths are the outflow-free knowledges arising in the practitioner when he is in direct comprehension(*abhisamaya*).

2 *Cf.* TVB, 16: *katham etad gamyate vinā bāhyenārthena vijñānam evārthākāram utpadyata iti /*

3 AKB, 19: *kaḥ punar viṣayālambanayor viśeṣaḥ / yasmin yasya kāritram sa tasya viṣayaḥ / yac citta-caittair gṛhyate tad ālambanam /*

4 *Cf.* Ny, 447b, 521c.

5 Kuei Ji (T43, 269c) tells that only the *Sāṃmitīya* does not accept the two-fold conditon specified in the definition. It requires only that the *dharma* engenders a corresponding consciousness.

6 *Ālambana-pratyaya-parīkṣā* (T41, no.1624), 888b. *Cf.* T31, 4b; also *cf.* TVB, 16: *bāhyo hy arthaḥ svābhāsa-vijñāna-janakatvena vijñānasyālambana-pratyaya iṣyte / na kāraṇatva-mātreṇa ... /*

7 Ny, 472b. For this reason, Saṃghabhadra (*loc. cit.)* argues that since reflections in the mirror can be seen, they exist truly.

8 Ny, 536a.

9 VKŚ, 535a ff.

10 AKB, 295: *sati viṣaye vijñānaṃ pravartate nāsati/ yadi cātītānāgataṃ na syād asad-ālambanaṃ vijñānaṃ syāt / tato vijñānam eva na syād ālambanābhāvāt/*

11 MVŚ, 558a.

12 Ny, 621c–622a. See also the definition given in **Satya-siddhi-śāstra*: "The mark of the existent consists in the fact that it is where cognition operates" (T32, 254a: 知所行處, 名曰有相).

13 Ny, 471b. *Cf.* the logician Dharmakīrti's notion of the absolutely real in his *Nyāya-bindu* — See *infra.*

14 Ny, 622b.

15 ADV, 264: *yasya khalv artha-vastunaḥ svabhāva-siddha-svarūpasyā 'viparītākārayā dharmopalakṣaṇayā paricchinnaṃ lakṣaṇam upalakṣyate tat sad-dravyam ity ucyate /*

16 *Cf Study*, 66 ff.

17 T no.1548, 590a.

18 T no.1548, 593c.

19 T no.1539, 535a ff.

20 MVŚ, 228b. We may note that, being also Sarvāstivadins, these early Dārṣṭāntika masters do not include past and future *dharma*-s in their list of non-existent objects.

21 MVŚ, 288b.

22 MVŚ, 599b.

23 In the Sarvāstivāda*, sabhāgatā* or *nikāya-sabhāga* is a *cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra* which causes the similarities in appearance, inclination, etc., among members of the same species.

24 E.g., The *Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, 4: *tulya-karmavipākāvasthā hi pretāḥ sarve 'pi pūyapūrṇāṃ nadīṃ paśyanti naika eva / ...* Also *cf.* Vasubandhu's commentary on the **Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, T 31, no.1596, 310b; etc.

25 TVB, 35: *kathaṃ punar etad vijñāyate tad ālambanam asad iti / yad dhi yasya kāraṇaṃ tasmin*

samagre cāviruddhe ca tad utpadyate nānyataḥ / vijñānaṃ ca māyā-gandharvanagara-svapna-timirādāv asatyālambane jāyate / yadi ca vijñānasyālambana-pratibaddha utpādaḥ syāt / evaṃ sati māyādiṣv arthābhāvān na vijñānam utpadyate/ tasmāt pūrvakān niruddhāt taj-jātīya-vijñānād vijñānam utpadyate/ na bāhyād arthāt tasminn asaty api bhāvāt /

26 Siddhi(C), 40c.

27 Ny, 622a ff. Also *cf.* ADV, 271 ff; **Satyasiddhi-śāstra*, T32, 254a ff.

28 The 幻網經 (*Māyā-jāla-sūtra*) corresponding to the *Brahma-jāla-sūtra* of the *Dīrgha-āgama.*

29 Also *cf.* the same stance of the early Dārṣṭāntikas in MVŚ, 193a–b. They also assert the unreality of such other objects like echo, etc. (MVŚ, 390c).

30 Ny, 624a.

4. What Sees the External Reality

4.1. "The eye sees" view of the Vaibhāṣika

The question of what actually constitutes the instrument through which we come to acquire knowledge of the external world is one of the important epistemological issues among the Abhidharma schools. In the following chapter, we shall be presenting the controversy in full. Before we proceed, however, to examine the relevant literary sources, we need first of all to clarify as to whether the "eye sees" theory is a Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāika one. As regards the problem: "What sees?", the MVŚ[1] informs us that in addition to the Vaibhāṣika's own view, there are three others, which are all refuted:

> There are some who hold that visual consciousness sees, like Venerable Dharmatrāta.
>
> There are some who hold that the understanding conjoined with visual consciousness sees, like Venerable Ghoṣaka.
>
> There are some who hold that the complex/assembage (*sāmagrī*) [of *citta-caitta*][2] sees, like the Dārṣṭāntika ...
>
> Now, if visual consciousness sees, then consciousness should have the characteristic of seeing; since consciousness does not have this characteristic, the proposition is not acceptable. If the understanding conjoined with visual consciousness sees, the understanding conjoined with auditory consciousness should also hear sound; since understanding does not have this characteristic of hearing, the proposition is not acceptable. If it is the complex that sees visible forms, it follows that we should be able to see forms at all times, since a complex always exists; hence this proposition too is unacceptable.

The above sources then make it clear that "the eye sees" is a specifically Vaibhāṣika view, since great Sarvāstivāda masters like Dharmatrāta and Ghoṣaka (Ghoṣaka, however, is not entirely opposed to the Vaibhāṣika view. See below) deviate from it.

This controversy, in a more elaborated form, is also found in the *Pañcavastuka-vibhāṣā* (=PVV)[3] by a certain Dharmatrāta of about the 4th Century A.D. (Despite De La Vallee Poussin's remark[4], this Dharmatrāta is

unlikely to be the same one as Bhadanta Dharmatrāta of the MVŚ; since as quoted above, the MVŚ tells us that the latter holds the "consciousness sees" theory). Here, all the four divergent views (i.e. including the Vaibhāṣika one) are also enumerated and then refuted, by a certain disputant. This concise account is as follows:

> Question: What sees — the visual organ, or visual consciousness, or the understanding (*prajñā*) conjoined with visual consciousness, or the complex of *citta-caitta*?
>
> The author asks: What are your doubts?
>
> The disputant continues: If the visual organ sees, how is it that it does not see when other forms of consciousness are operative? Why are all objects not grasped at once? If visual consciousness sees, then all consciousness having only the characteristic of cognizing, and not seeing, how can it see visible forms? If the understanding conjoined with visual consciousness sees, then it must be conceded that the understanding conjoined with auditory consciousness can hear. Since that cannot hear, how can this see? If the complex of *citta* and *caitta* sees, since the complex is never fixed — a wholesome visual consciousness are conjoined with 22 *caitta*-s; an unwholesome visual consciousness is conjoined with 21 *caitta*-s; a veiled-nondefined (*nivṛtāvyākṛta*) visual consciousness are conjoined with 18 *caitta*-s; a nonveiled-nondefined (*anivṛtāvyākṛta*) visual consciousness is conjoined with 12 *caitta*-s — how can it see?
>
> The author, upholding the Vaibhāṣika position, then answers: It is the visual organ that sees. But it can only do so when associated with visual consciousness. It is just like the case that visual consciousness can exercise its function of cognizing visible forms only by relying on the force of the eye, and that the functions, sensation, etc., of *vedanā*, etc., must rely on the mind. Accordingly, when another form [than visual] of consciousness is operative, the eye cannot see, since it is devoid of consciousness. This also explain why [our position] does not entail the fallacy of [the eye] grasping all objects at once; for within one and the same series there cannot be two *citta*-s operating simultaneously.
>
> The disputant asks: But why is it that within the one series where all the six supporting bases and objects are present, the six forms of consciousness cannot operate simultaneously?
>
> The author continues his answer: This is because there can only be one *samanantara-pratyaya* (condition qua the immediately precedent *citta*).

> There are other reasons [why we reject the other theories]: If visual consciousness sees, who then cognizes? If understanding sees, who then understands? As to the theory that the complex of *citta-caitta* sees, this is definitely impossible, as their individual functions are all different from one another. Moreover, it entails that one given essence has two different functions — seeing and sensing, etc. There are other problems: If consciousness sees, being not susceptible to obstruction, it should see visible forms which are screened. The same applies to the other theories — "understanding sees" and "the complex sees". For these reasons, only the visual organ can be said to see.

Aiyaswami, N., who has rendered this text into Sanskrit, seems to have got it wrong here when he asserts:

> The author points out that each of these four propositions is defective ... Since the above four propositions are defective, Dharmatrāta arrives at the conclusion that the eye when it becomes associated with consciousness perceives the visible.[5]

It should be clear from our rendering above (note the words "Question" and "Answer") that the author upholds the Vaibhāṣika view which consistently and explicitly insists that "the eye sees". In the AKB, the Vaibhāṣika position is stated categorically: "*cakṣuḥ paśyati rūpāṇi*"[6]; and "*eṣa tu kāśmīra-vaibhāṣikāṇāṃ siddhāntaḥ / cakṣuḥ paśyati...*"[7] Saṃghabhadra defends this elaborately, emphasizing, as the PVV's author does, that it is the eye, sustained by the force of visual consciousness, that sees. It will be a blatant contradiction on their part if the Vaibhāṣika themselves were to deny that "the eye sees"!

Another work of this Dharmatrāta, the **Abhidharma-hṛdaya-vyākyhā* (T no.1552) contains an even more elaborate account of the controversy, the first part of which is very similar to that in the PVV. Vasubandhu (known to have been substantially based his AKB on this work and Dharmaśrī's **Abhidharma-hṛdaya*, of which this work is a commentary/ revision), the author of the *Abhidharmadīpaprabhāvṛtti* (= ADV), as well as Saṃghabhadra, seem most likely to have consulted this text in their accounts.

The Sanskrit text of the ADV[8] also gives an almost identical account here, as the *Pañcavastuka*, differing only with regard to the notion of "the complex which is given as that of the eye, etc. (*cakṣurādisāmagrī paśyati*)". The text here begins by enumerating the four views in the form of asking a question:

> This has to be explained: Of [the four] — the eye, visual consciousness, *prajñā* and the assemblage (*sāmagrī*) — what sees? (*idaṃ tu vaktavyam / cakṣuścakṣurvijñāna-prajñāsāmagrīṇāṃ kaḥ paśyati /*)

It then immediately poses an anticipatory objection, followed with the detailed rejection of all the four views, in much the same way as we find in the Chinese *Pañcavastuka*: "*kutaḥ saṃśaya iti cet/ sarvatra doṣadarśa*(*nā*) *nāt* ... " Jaini, P.S.,[9] explains as follows:

> Of these, the eye alone, independent of *vijñāna*, cannot be said to apprehend ... After showing the invalidity of all these four views, the Dīpakāra sets forth the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣika theory: "The eye apprehends ...".

Obviously, Jaini, like Aiyaswami, has erred here. The author is only trying to anticipate and explain the objections raised with regard to the four views. In any case, the Sanskrit in this context does not at all mention the first view as that it is the "eye alone that sees."

The material available does not offer much by way of explanation on behalf of those who hold the "understanding sees" and "complex sees" views. However, from other information in the MVŚ, we may also derive a more faithful version of Ghoṣaka's view. To the question why only one out of ten *āyatana*-s is called *rūpa-āyatana* as such, the MVŚ says:

> According to the Venerable Ghoṣaka, that which comprises the *viṣaya* for the two eyes and is the *ālambana* for visual consciousness is named *rūpa-āyatana*.[10]

The immediate context here makes it clear that the "two eyes" refer to the human "fresh-eye (*māṃsa-cakṣus*)" and the "wisdom-eye" (*prajñā-cakṣus*). Now, for Ghoṣaka, "all *dharma-s* are visible (*sanidarśana*) because they are the objects of the wisdom-eye"[11]; even "atoms should be said to be visible, as they are the objects of the wisdom-eye."[12] Obviously, this *prajñā* in the context of *prajñā-cakṣus* is not the same as the *prajñā* qua one of the ten universal thought-concomitants (*mahā-bhūmika*-s). Accordingly, despite the representation made on his behalf by the MVŚ compilers, Ghoṣaka does not seem to deny that visible forms are seen by the physical eye, even if he at the same time holds that the view that the *prajñā* associated with visual consciousness too sees visible forms.

Both the ADV[13] and the AKB[14] explain that the Vaibhāṣika considers the eye as a view in the sense of seeing/perceiving, *ālocanārthena*. This is unlike the other views subsumed under *prajñā* which are views on account of their judgmental nature.[15] The dialogue we have given in the following chapter should also show clearly that the emphasis on this non-judgmental and

non-discriminative nature is echoed in the AKB and the Ny. These sources then, unanimously relate the Vaibhāṣika insistence that the mere-seeing by the eye is strictly speaking, non-epistemic, since the operation of *prajñā* is not involved — which is to say that in this instantaneous process, there is no element of understanding, properly speaking. This is to be contrasted with the function of cognizing by simultaneously arising visual consciousness and the discriminative function of the mental consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*) induced in the subsequent moment.

In the context of explaining why the five sense faculties are so-called — that is, in each case an "*indriya*" which is said to denote *ādhipatya*, "supremacy/dominance" — Vasubandhu in the AKB differentiates the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika views: According to the Vaibhāṣika, the eye is an *indriya* because it exercises dominance in the seeing of visual forms; whereas for the Sautrāntika, the dominance is with regard to the apperception of its specific object (*svārthopalabdhi*).[16] As far as the statement in the Sautrāntika proposition — "dominance in the perceiving of its specific object" — is concerned, the author of the ADV may be justified in remarking that it is not any different from the Vaibhāṣika view.[17] However, the different senses ascribed to the statement underscores their fundamentally different views as regards the perceptual process. For the Sautrāntika, it means that the dominance is with regard to consciousness (*vijñāne tu tayor ādhipatyam*), for the perceiving — as far as one can speak of a "perceiving agent" in a relative sense — is performed by visual consciousness, not by the visual faculty. There is in fact no "seeing of a visual form" or "hearing of a sound" apart from consciousness:[18] There can be no seeing of form apart from grasping (*grahaṇa*), and grasping is none other than consciousness.[19] In other words, in as much as the eye has dominance in the arising of visual consciousness, one could speak of its "seeing of a visual form". But this should really mean the "perceiving of a visual form by consciousness". And as the Dīpakāra notes elsewhere, the mere seeing (*ālocana*) by the eye is vastly different from the apperceiving (*upalabdhi*) by consciousness.[20] (See below, on the process through which an external object is "seen"/perceived by visual con sciousness).

4.2. The MVŚ: The eye as a view — in contrast to other views, and to *prajñā* and *jñāna*

The MVŚ[21] in fact discusses at great length, the distinction between the eye as a view/seeing (*dṛṣṭi*) and other views on the one hand, and that between these

other views from knowledge and understanding, on the other. Having defined the differences as regards self-nature, between view, knowledge (*jñāna*) and understanding (*prajñā*), three important mental categories in the Vaibhāṣika epistemology, it further explains their inter-relationship in the form of a 'four-alternative scheme' (*catuṣkoṭi*). These descriptions provide considerable amount of information, both positively and negatively, on the Vaibhāṣika doctrines concerned. It must be borne in mind that in the Sarvāstivāda system, *prajñā* as the faculty of understanding has different modes of operation according to which it receives the different appellations —*jñāna*, *dṛṣṭi*, etc. Moreover, unlike in other schools, such as the Theravāda, *prajñā* may be skillful (*kuśala*), unskillful (*akuśala*), proper or right (*samyañc*), false or wrong (*mithyā*), with-outflow (*sāsrava*, 'impure'), outflow-free (*anāsrava*, 'pure'); etc. Thus, even the form of ignorance known as the non-defiled ignorance which is said to still exist in the *arhat*, is *prajñā* in its intrinsic nature.[22] In its highest form, it is the perfect insight of a Buddha.

4.2.1. Understanding

As one of the ten universal thought concomitants (*mahābhūmika*-s) in the Vaibhāṣika system, understanding (*prajñā*) necessarily arises in any mental state. It is usually defined as the "discernment/examination of *dharma-s* (*dharma-pravicaya*)".[23] The MVŚ[24] describes it as the discrimination of the self-characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) and common-characteristic (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) of *dharma-s*. Skandhila's *Abhidharmāvatāra* gives a somewhat more descriptive explanation:

> Understanding is the discernment of *dharma*-s. It is the examination, as the case may be, of the following eight kinds of *dharma* — inclusion (*saṃgraha*), conjunction (*saṃprayoga*), possession (*samanvāgama*), cause (*hetu*), condition (*pratyaya*), fruit (*phala*), self-characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) and common-characteristic (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*).[25]

In the above mentioned context, the MVŚ[26], besides giving the usual description that it is "discernment of *dharma*-s" and that it is found in all mental states, also defines it as the set of understanding conjoined with all the six forms of consciousness.

4.2.2. Knowledge

For the Sarvāstivāda, knowledge is not synonymous with consciousness (*vijñāna*). There indeed can be consciousness without knowledge as such.

This category is described as the set of all understanding conjoined with the first five forms of sensory consciousness, as well as all the understanding conjoined with mental consciousness excepting the Pure Receptivity (*anāsrava-kṣānti*)[27]. The latter is excepted because it represents only a preliminary stage of receptivity, but not final, thorough and decisive knowledge, as regards the four noble truths. Here, we learn that knowledge must be full, ultimate, thorough knowing. Vasumitra, the *ācārya* generally taken as the authority by the MVŚ compilers, offers a similar view. The Bhadanta (Dharmatrāta) requires that "It is only the thorough seeing of a thing that can be qualified as knowledge, while Vāṣpa says that knowledge is derived through repeated examination. These *ācārya*-s' explanations are apparently uncontested by the compilers.[28]

4.2.3. View

View is actually the first of the three categories discussed by the MVŚ[29] in this context, and is described in comparatively much greater length. The text begins by saying that the discussion on view is given "so that heretic views can be refuted and logical reasoning can be shown."[30] It then states, as in the AKB, that only the eye and the understanding which is of the nature of judgement or decision, are views. They comprise the eye, the five false views, the worldly right view and the views of the trainees and non-trainee. A view is defined as that which has the nature of judgement or decision (*saṃtīrakatva*), which is also part of Vasumitra's definition which requires judgement and investigation.[31] Elsewhere,[32] four characteristics of view are given — seeing, judging, firm attachment, and penetrating into the objects of perception (*ālambana*).

The inter-relationship of the three can be summarized as follows:

1. Some views are not knowledges — viz. visual organ and the pure receptivity.
2. Some knowledges are not views — viz. the understanding conjoined with the group of the first five forms of sensory consciousness (*pañca-vijñānakāya-samprayukta-prajñā*); knowledges of exhaustion (*kṣaya-jñāna*) and non-arising (*anutpāda-jñāna*); all impure understanding conjoined with mental consciousness (*sāsrava-mano-vijñāna-samprayukta-prajñā*), excepting the five false views (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*) and the worldly right views (*laukikī samyag-dṛṣṭi*)
3. Some views are also knowledges — viz. the five false views; the worldly right view; all pure understanding, excepting the pure receptivity, the knowledges of exhaustion and of non-arising.

4. Some views are not understanding — viz. the visual organ.
5. Some understanding are not views — viz. the understanding conjoined with the group of the first five forms of sensory consciousness; the knowledges of exhaustion and of non-arising; all impure understanding conjoined with mental consciousness, excepting the five false views and the worldly right views (as in 2 above).
6. Some views are also understanding — viz. all pure understanding excepting the knowledges of exhaustion and of non-arising, the five false views, and the worldly right view.
7. All knowledges are also understanding.
8. Some understanding are not knowledges — viz. the pure receptivity (for it has vision of the truths for the first time, and therefore cannot make decisive judgement).

This inter-relationship may be diagrammatically (not to the scale) represented as follows:




Diagram Text Abbreviations
pvksp = *pañcavijñākāya-samprayukta-prajñā*
kj = *kṣaya-jñāna*
aj = *anutpāda-jñāna*
mvsp = *manovijñāna-samprayukta-prajñā*
lsd = *laukikī samyag-dṛṣṭi*

These distinctions clarify that the eye is not a member of the set of understanding; and therefore not knowledge, a subset of understanding. On the other hand, the understanding conjoined with the first five forms of sensory consciousness all fall within the set of knowledge. That is, the necessary condition for knowledge is understanding, defined as having

the discerning/discrimination of mental objects as its nature. But this condition is not sufficient. Understanding becomes knowledge only when it is full, final, and decisive. Such a requirement in the Vaibhāṣika notion of knowledge may seem more demanding than that in our ordinary usage of the term. These distinctions and explanations in MVŚ, together with the other sources given above, make it abundantly clear that, for the Vaibhāṣika, visual consciousness, but not the eye as seeing (i.e. the seeing by the eye) is knowledge. In other words, the mere seeing by the eye is non-epistemic, whereas visual consciousness is "conscious seeing" and epistemic.

The diagram also shows that the first five forms of consciousness are outside the subset of views. This in fact further specifies the epistemic scope of visual (and for that matter, the other four) consciousnesses induced by the eye's seeing: Though it has the ability to understand, it cannot do so decisively, arriving at final judgement after repeated reflection. It is in the next (second) moment, when the corresponding mental consciousness is induced that the possibility of such a capability exists. The Vaibhāṣika is even more specific: the first five forms of consciousness in *kāmadhātu*, though associated with *prajñā* and *smṛti*, are capable of only one of the three types of superimposition (*vikalpa*), called *svabhāvavikalpa* which is of the nature of reasoning (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*).[33] But they are not capable of the other two types — superimposition by way of recollecting (*anusmaraṇa-vikalpa*), and superimposition by way of determining (*abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa*).[34] (See also *infra*, chapter 6)

But though visual consciousness is said to be devoid of this ability of the two types of superimposition and of decisive judgement (*saṃtīrakatva*), it is nonetheless not of an amoral nature which might be taken to imply its non-epistemic nature, moral significance obtaining only where deliberate thinking exists. That it is capable of being endowed with moral significance is explicitly stated in various contexts in the MVŚ. Thus:

> The three roots of unwholesomeness (*rāga, dveṣa, moha*) are present ... in all the six forms of consciousness. Why? ... If [they] are present only in the mental domain (*mano-bhūmi*), then the unwholesomeness in the first five forms of consciousness would arise without roots.[35]

Again: "... Another explanation is that the first five forms of consciousness can also give rise to physical and vocal *karma*..." — which is endorsed by the MVŚ compilers. This is quite unlike the opinion of the Theravāda Ābhidhammikas that "visual consciousness is just the mere seeing of

a visible form. Herein, no lusting, or hating, or deluding exists (*cakkhu-viññāṇaṃ hi rūpadassana-mattameva / ettha rajjanam vā dussanam vā muyhanam vā n'atthi /*).[36] The Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika too likewise holds that the five sensory consciousnesses are free from defilements.[37]

The explanations offered by the MVŚ in the above context as to why the eye is called view, however, are hardly those of a logical nature. They are:

(1) Because it is said to be so by the Sages.
(2) Because it is said so in the world.[38]
(3) Because it is said so in the *sūtra*-s.
(4) Because of what can be observed in the world.

Two *ācārya*-s' explanations are also given :
Vasumitra: Because in the world, it is observed that those with pure eyes say, "I see purity", and those with impure eyes say, "I see impurities";
Bhadanta: Because the *sūtra* says, "what is attained by the visual organ, what is discerned by visual consciousness, is the seen."

4.3. Saṃghabhadra's major arguments in Ny (See following chapter)

In the Ny, Saṃghabhadra shows up as a vigorous and formidable debater, scrupulously supporting his arguments not only with scriptural quotations — skillfully interpreting them where necessary — but also logical reasoning (*āgama* and *yukti*). An instance of his skill in interpretation is where he has to face the opponent's challenge with a clear-worded *sūtra* quotation that "the eye is a gate, to the extent of seeing visible forms." Saṃghabhadra says that the "eye" here actually should be taken to refer to consciousness. He offers several "implicit" meanings of "gate" in this context: It signifies "condition"; it signifies "expedience", and it signifies the "*tatsabhāga* eye". On the other hand, where the Vaibhāṣika's position finds a very clear support in the *sūtra* sentence: "Seeing visible forms with the eye"; he, by means of logical argument, leaves no room for the opponent's attempt at any metaphorical interpretation.

His method of turning the opponents own weapons back onto themselves, as it were, is exemplified in the following example:
The opponent argues: If you say that the eye sees, but it cannot do so when the object is screened, then why is it that objects screened by a glass, etc., are visible?

Saṃghabhadra: If you say that visual consciousness sees, but it cannot arise with regard to a screened object, then why is it that it arises with regard to objects screened by a glass, etc? If you say that this is because in this case the passage of light is not hindered (the opponent actually does say so), then you have *ipso facto* conceded that visual consciousness does actually arise with regard to a screened object — contradicting your earlier assertion.

Again, in the AKB,[39] the opponent argues: if it is the eye that sees, then it ought to see even when it is occupied with other forms (than visual) of consciousness.

In the Ny,[40] Saṃghabhadra argues: If the function of seeing visible forms is a *dharma* produced by consciousness, then this function ought to arise even when consciousness is separated from the eye.

Similarly, the opponent argues: when the *sūtra* says the eye sees visible forms, it is a metaphorical attribution of the action of visual consciousness, the supported, to the eye, the support. A clear instance of such an attribution is when it says, "having cognized *dharma*-s with the mind", as the mind, being always past, cannot cognize.

Saṃghabhadra uses a similar strategy: When the *sūtra* says the eye is the gate for seeing visible forms, it metaphorically refers to visual consciousness, the support for seeing, as the eye. The *sūtra* cannot say, as we might wish, visual consciousness is the gate, etc., for it would have to say later on in the same passage that mental consciousness (and not "mind") is the gate, etc. This would then be incorrect since it is mental consciousness itself that cognizes; rather than that it serves as the gate (= expedience) for another mind to cognize — the mind can never cognize.

As should be evident, however, many of Saṃghabhadra's arguments in his Ny are often traceable to earlier Vaibhāṣika sources, and must not be too hastily assumed to be brand new or even "neo-Sarvāstivāda". In most cases, all he has done is to present the Vaibhāṣika viewpoint more articulately and put their arguments in clearer terms. In support of the "eye sees" doctrine, Saṃghabhadra[41] quotes from the MVŚ which says:

> What is attained by the eye, what is experienced (受) by visual consciousness, is called the seen (*cakṣuḥ-samprāptam cakṣur-vijñānānubhūtam dṛṣṭam ity ucyate*).

The same MVŚ passage is also quoted in the AKB;[42] but there it was quoted by the opponents against the Vaibhāṣika. (See dialogue in § 5). In the MVŚ, this passage occurs as "Bhadanta's" (Buddhadeva according to the earlier Chinese version of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*)[43] quotation of the *sūtra* ("The *sūtra* says ...") in explaining why the eye is called a view. The compilers of the MVŚ makes no criticism or comment on this, which means that it is accepted as a Vaibhāṣika explanation. In fact, elsewhere[44] the MVŚ uses this explanation to show that it is the sense organs, rather than their corresponding forms of consciousness that do the seeing, etc. There it also explains, in accordance with the consistently Vaibhāṣika standpoint that "consciousness is mentioned to indicate that the organs eye etc., can grasp their objects only when assisted by consciousness" (*loc. cit.*).

Saṃghabhadra actually lays stress on this qualification in interpreting this same passage. He interprets "*cakṣuḥ-samprāptam*" as the subject clause, with "*dṛṣṭam ity ucyate*" as the predicate. "*cakṣur-vijñānānubhūtam*" is said to have been added to qualify that the visual organ becomes capable of attaining only when sustained by consciousness. We can see therefore that Saṃghabhadra has offered nothing new (nothing "neo-Sarvāstivāda") as a Vaibhāṣika explanation here. However, we may say that he has made things more explicit by arguing clearly that "consciousness is the cause for seeing, and hence not the essence (the agent) that sees."[45] That is, in the simultaneous (*sahabhū*) cause-effect relationship which obtains when visual consciousness, the eye, and other necessary conditions flash forth their individual functions in co-ordination to give rise to the seeing of a visible form; visual consciousness is a cause, not an effect (seeing). This is in contrast to the Sautrāntika view that visual consciousness — which is the seeing of the object — is an effect that is produced in the moment subsequent to that when the eye, the visible form, etc. were present (See *infra*, § 7. more details on the Sautrāntika view).

In addition, Saṃghabhadra is quite articulate in explaining the sense in which consciousness is a cause in the process of visual perception: It serves as the proximate condition and as the support for the visual organ; it nourishes the co-nascent Great Elements (*mahā-bhūta*-s), causing the potent (*viśeṣa* — *lit.* specific: that is the *indriya* that has come to the stage of being capable of exercising its potency) sense organ to arise and see visible forms.[46] No knowledge as such is derived at this stage of seeing. But at the stage of cognizing, the visual organ in turn serves as a support as well as the proximate cause for consciousness, so that the cognizing of a visible

form can take place. It is also the visual organ that serves as a support for a particular mental state (*citta-caitta*) so that it can operate in its specific manner with regard to an object.[47]

More important is Saṃghabhadra's argument that it is absolutely necessary that the function of seeing visible forms uniquely belongs to the visual organ. It is in fact, for that matter, absolutely necessary that each *dharma*, in the complex process of conditioned co-arising, is able to exercise its specific function. Here we can better appreciate why Saṃghabhadra insists at such great length that it is the eye that sees. This absolute necessity, of course, stems from the central Vaibhāṣika conception that in the persistence of all *dharma*-s in the three periods of time, each and every *dharma* is a distinct *dharma* by virtue of its specific nature and function. Thus the MVŚ says:

> How are the twelve *āyatana*-s to be established? Answer: On the basis of the difference as regards intrinsic nature and function.[48]

Now, if the eye does not have a specific function — the only one of seeing visible forms — as mentioned in the *sūtra* (at least so from the Vaibhāṣika viewpoint) and confirmed in experience of the world — the eye as a *āyatana* or a unique *rūpa dharma* will fail to be established. By the same token, the specific nature and function of consciousness has to be established and distinguished from those of the eye. The conditioned *dharma*-s, however, are said to be "feeble in their *svabhāva*, not free, dependent on others, not capable of exercising their functions by themselves, and unable to accord with their own wishes."[49] This means that "the *dharma*-s cannot exercise their function without the help of causes and conditions."[50] *Dharma*-s in fact are transcendent as far as their *svabhāva* is concerned.[51] The dimension of our empirical experience is that of their functions or activities. It is here that causality pertains:

> We say that the causes have the functions [of *dharma*-s], and not their natures qua entity (實體, *dravya*), as effects. We also say that the effects have the functions, and not the natures qua entity, as causes. The natures qua entity of *dharma*-s remain unchanged in time, being neither causes nor effects.[52]

The Vaibhāṣika believe that they can remain as good Buddhists in explaining the causality of the functions of *dharma*-s in accordance with the Buddha's teaching of *pratītya-samutpāda*. But their theory of "*sarvāstitva*" logically requires that each function too must not only uniquely belong to a given *dharma*; it must also persist in time together with the *dharma*. Unlike the

dharma's intrinsic nature (the *dharma* as an entity in itself), it can be brought into operation with the help of causes and conditions, but it is not anything new that comes into existence.

It is in accordance with such a Vaibhāṣika doctrine that Saṃghabhadra seeks persistently to establish that the seeing by the eye must properly belong to the eye, even though at the same time its exercise needs the assistance of visual consciousness as a supporting condition. Towards the end of the debate in the AKB, the Sautrāntika ridicules the debaters for their attempt to "devour the Empty Space", Saṃghabhadra retorts in the Ny that it is in fact the Sautrāntika who is "trying to grab the Empty Space"! He argues that the Buddhist principle of conditioned co-arising will in fact collapse altogether if the reality of the individually specific functions of the *dharma*-s — such as the seeing of visible form by the eye — is denied.

Saṃghabhadra further claims that the Sautrāntika has misunderstood what the Buddha means when He urges us "not to obstinately cling on to regional linguistic usage nor to over insist as regards worldly conventions." He argues that when the Buddha's advice is applied in the context of their debate, it means that the reality of the collective must be denied — this accords with absolute truth; but not that of the individual *dharma*'s function participating in the collective, complex process of conditioned co-arising. Denial of the latter amounts to a denial of the possibility of conditioned co-arising in toto. The Vaibhāṣika position in this debate, he concludes, is in fact founded in accordance with this reasoning, and stands firmly on both conventional and absolute truths: Following the Buddha's advice, in asserting that

> the eye sees, it does not unnecessarily clash with the conventional point of view. By establishing that the eye — rather than a fictitious collective agent such as the soul — has the unique, intrinsic function of seeing, it conforms to the absolute truth that while a collection of *dharma*-s as such are unreal, real *dharma*-s indeed exist, each being uniquely defined by its specific *svabhāva/svalakṣaṇa* and *kāritra/kriyā*.[53]

From the dialogue in the next chapter, the dispute between the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika as to whether we can really say there exist the subject and object of perception in the perceptual process could at least in part be regarded as a semantic one: It depends on what one really means by the "seer" and the "seen" in this situation. Likewise, the "eye sees" theoreticians and the "consciousness sees" theoreticians could very well be seen as saying about the same thing in different words: It depends on what one means by "seeing".

Neither of the party has actually articulated their definition of "seeing" throughout the debate. When one says that the visual organ cannot see alone without the support of consciousness; the other that consciousness cannot see alone without the visual organ serving as its supporting basis, it gives the impression that the whole issue depends on where one wants to lay the stress in the act of seeing — eye or visual consciousness. Part of the dialogue also shows that both parties even attempt to assign different meanings to "eye" or "visual consciousness" or "eye sees". Interpreting the *sūtra* statement: "the eye is the gate to the extent of seeing visible forms", the Vaibhāṣika says that "eye" here refers to "visual consciousness". Interpreting the *sūtra* statement: "seeing visible forms with the eye", the Vijñānavāda says the real meaning is that visual consciousness sees, and that "eye" is mentioned here only because it serves as the support for seeing.[54]

It is interesting to note here that the subcommentarial tradition in the Theravāda seems to be well aware of these arguments recorded in the AKB. Thus, in Sumaṅgala's *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī* (12th century A.D.), we see very similar arguments succinctly summarized in the words of its author: The eye cannot see because it is material. If the eye could see, then one in whom another form of sensory consciousness (e.g. auditory) is operating would also see. On the other hand, if consciousness sees, then even objects screened by a wall should also be visible. Sumaṅgala then concludes: when the *sutta* says that one sees *rūpa* by the eye, what is intended is that one sees by the eye-door.[55]

But of course such semantic nuances alluded to above are mostly found only when they attempt to interpret the *sūtra* in their own favour. It can hardly be concluded thereby that either the Vaibhāṣika or the Vijñānavāda (such as Theravāda) would actually equate "visual consciousness" with "eye" in their *Abhidharma*-systems. Beyond this much of "semanticism", their fundamentally different positions are sufficiently clear: The Vaibhāṣika maintains that the seeing of visible forms is a non-conscious act, belonging specifically to the eye. For him, consciousness is consciousness — be it visual or otherwise — its specific nature is that of cognizing, not seeing. On the other hand, the Vijñānavāda maintains that seeing is possible only by a mental agent, not a material organ; there is no difference in this case between seeing and cognizing. The Theravāda, as a Vijñānavādin, may not go along so far as to equate seeing with cognizing; but also unambiguously concurs that the eye cannot see on account of its not being of a mental nature: *cakkhu rūpaṃ na passati acittakattā* (*Visuddhimagga* 20).[56] The view that "consciousness is consciousness" is a perfectly orthodox

one — the *svabhāva* of each *dharma* is unique. Saṃghabhadra argues that if consciousness can both cognize and see, then a single *dharma* would have two *svabhāva*-s! This argument is already found in the PVV (see above) and the **Abhidharma-hṛdaya-vyākhyā*.[57]

Finally, it is interesting that the *viniścaya* section of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra*[58] (*circa* 300-350 A.D.), a representative Yogācāra work, concerning this dispute, offers a comment that could almost be read as a concession, on the part of some Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntikas, to the Vaibhāṣika position. In answering the question as to whether it is the sensory organs, eye, etc., that see, etc., or their corresponding consciousnesses, it explains:

> From the point of view of absolute truth, it is neither the eye, etc., nor their corresponding consciousness. Why? Because the self-nature of *dharma*-s is such that they are dependently originated; because they are momentary; and because they are without any activity. From the point of view of conventional truth, [however], since the eyes, etc., are the most prominent, we may designate them as the agent of seeing, etc. Why? Because, where the visual organs, etc., are present, [the corresponding] consciousness is bound to arise, without any diminution. Also because, even where a consciousness-stream obtains, [the corresponding consciousness] cannot be obtained independent of the sensory organ, eye, etc. Herein, the true doctrine is: It is only seeing itself, that can be spoken of as the agent of seeing. The same applies to other forms of perception.

Such explanations seem to reflect the impact that this long drawn out *Abhidharma* controversy, since the early period of the Abhidharma schools, must have had on the newly emerged Mahāyāna Yogācāra.

Notes

1 MVŚ, 61c.
2 *Cf. Pañcavastuka-vibhāṣā* quoted below.
3 T1555, 991b–c.
4 Poussin, Louis De La Vallee, *L'Abhidharmakośa De Vasubandhu* (Paris, 1923), 47 f.
5 *"Pañcavastuka Śāstra and Vibhāṣā" in Viśva-bhāratī Annals Vol. X, ix.*
6 AKB, 30.
7 *Ibid.*, 31.
8 Jaini, P. S., *Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāshāprabhāvṛtti* (Patna, 1959), 31 f.
9 *Ibid.*, 75.
10 MVŚ, 379c.
11 *Ibid.,* 390b.
12 *Ibid.,* 684a.
13 ADV, 32.
14 AKB, 30.
15 *Cf.* Vy, 80: *rūpālocanārtheneti cakṣur na saṃtīrakatvena dṛṣṭiḥ ... prajñā saṃtīrakatveneti darśitaṃ bhavati.*
16 AKB, 39.
17 ADV, 47.
18 AKB, 39: *nāpi vijñānād rūpadarśanaṃ śabdaśravaṇaṃ vā 'sti /.*
19 Vy, 96: *nāpi vijñānād anyad rūpa-darśanaṃ śabda-śravaṇaṃ vā 'stīti / na rūpa-arśana-śabda-śravaṇaṃ grahaṇa-vyatiriktaṃ vicāryamānaṃ labhyate / grahaṇaṃ ca vijñānam eveti nānyad bhavati /*
20 ADV, 32: *caksuḥ paśyati vijñānaṃ vijānāti svagocaram/ ālocanopalabdhitvādviśeṣaḥ sumahāṃstayoḥ //*
21 MVŚ, 489b ff.
22 See Dhammajoti, KL, 'The Defects in the *Arhat*'s Enlightenment: His *akliṣṭājñāna*', in Soto Mori (ed.), *Buddhist Studies*, Vol.XXVII (Hamamatsu, 1998), 65 ff.
23 AKB, 54: *matiḥ prajñā dharmapravicayaḥ*. ADV, 70: *dhiḥ prajñā dharma-saṃgrahādy-upalakṣaṇasvabhāvā.* Similar in *Prakaraṇa-śāstra* (T1542), *Saṅgītiparyāya-śāstra* (T1536), etc.
24 MVŚ, 217a.
25 T1554, 982a.
26 MVŚ, 490b.
27 *Ibid.,* 490b.
28 *Ibid.*, 490b–c.
29 *Ibid., loc. cit.*
30 See Poussin's translation, Pruden L. *op. cit.* 147 note 173.
31 MVŚ, 490c–491a.
32 *Ibid.,* 744a.
33 *Cf.* AKB p.35 and Ny, 350b.

34 MVŚ, 219b; AKB, 22.
35 MVŚ, 243b.
36 MA II 349.
37 Ny, 331c.
38 *Cf* ADV, 29: *cakṣustāvalloke dṛṣṭīti pratītam.*
39 AKB, 30.
40 Ny, 364b.
41 Ny, 367b.
42 AKB, 31.
43 T28 360b.
44 MVŚ, 631c.
45 Ny, 364b.
46 *Ibid.,* 364b.
47 *Ibid.*, 366a.
48 MVŚ, 379a.
49 *Ibid.*, 283b.
50 *Ibid.*, 108c.
51 *Ibid.*, 395c–396a.
52 *Ibid.,* 105c.
53 Ny, 367c–368a.
54 *Cf.* Interpretation in Visuddhimagga 20: *cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā ti kāraṇa-vasena cakkhū ti laddhavohāreṇa rūpadassanamattena cakkhuviññāṇena rūpaṃ disvā.*
55 *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī* (Pāli Text Societ, 1989), 109 f.
56 See also the *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī*, 109, which states that *rūpa*, being blind, cannot see.
57 T no. 1552, 876c.
58 T no. 1579, 610a.

5. The "What Sees" Debate in the AKB, VY and NY

5.1. Preliminaries

In the first chapter of the AKB (= *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*)[1], we find a dispute as to what really sees (*paśyati*). The Vaibhāṣika insists that it is the eye that sees, while others that it is consciousness. The Sautrāntika appears towards the end of the dispute, ridiculing that the whole controversy has been in vain, in as much as there is in reality neither the agent of seeing nor any object qua the seen, but merely a play of *dharma-s*, flashing forth momentarily and in accordance with the principle of conditioned co-arising. This controversy, as well as many of the arguments and counter-arguments found therein, is not a new one, being already attested to in the *Kathāvatthu* (XVIII 9), as well as northern sources antedating the AKB.

In the presentation of the dispute, Vasubandhu, the author of the AKB, as is very often the case, is clearly biased against the Vaibhāṣika, giving them little chance to defend themselves properly. Saṃghabhadra, in his Ny (= **Nyāyānusāra*), argues at length in defence of the orthodox Vaibhāṣika position. In addition, he also briefly refutes the other views on "what sees" (see below), as well as the Sautrāntika theory of indirect perception (in this case somewhat indirectly). The AKB provides little information as regards what the Vaibhāṣika really means by the seeing of the eye — visual perception, or what the mechanism of this seeing is, or the reason for the Vaibhāṣika's insistence that the function of seeing belongs uniquely to the eye. In our attempt to form a much better picture of the controversial positions of the main disputants — Vaibhāṣika, the "Vijñānavāda", and the Sautrāntika — we propose here to examine the relevant northern sources, both antedating and postdating the AKB.

The controversy presented below in a dialogue form, is based on material drawn from the AKB, the Vy (= *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*) and the Ny. It hardly needs explaining that, the terms "Vijñānavāda" and "Vijñānavādins" mentioned throughout this paper do not refer to the Yogācāra Vijñānavāda and its followers, respectively. Rather, they stand for the "consciousness sees" theory and its followers. It will be seen that Saṃghabhadra's argumentation

forms the bulk of the dialogue, as it is in the Ny that we find the debate in its most elaborate form. We have decided to incorporate the whole of Saṃghabhadra's arguments, in fairly literal rendering, not only because his Ny is extant only in its Chinese version, but also that it is he who clarifies the Vaibhāṣika position most.

5.2. The debate recorded in the AKB, the Vy and the Ny

Abbreviations:

Vai = Vaibhāṣika; **Vij** = Vijñānavāda (those who hold that consciousness sees)

Vai: Among the eighteen elements (*dhātu*-s), the eye element and eight items coming under the element of mental objects (*dharma-dhātu*) — viz. the five views of defilement, the worldly right view, and the right views of the trainee and the non-trainees — are views.

Among them, the worldly right view refers to the understanding co-nascent with mental consciousness, for view is judgement or decision preceding from reflection, and the understanding co-nascent with the first five forms of consciousness are not of this nature.

In fact, (Ny among the non-material *dharma*-s, only those whose activities are clear and sharp, which make judgement as regards their objects, and which are *prajñā* that operate internally — are views.)[2]

Vij: Why then do you consider the eye as view?

Vai: The eye, though devoid of any ability of making judgement (*saṃtīrakatva*), is classified as a view as opposed to a non-view, in the sense of the seeing of visible objects (*rūpālocanārthena*). (NyWe classify it thus for three reasons: Because it is considered in the world that it sees (*ā-√loc*) visible forms; because it is opposed to darkness; and because its activity is clear and sharp.)[3]

Vij: But if it is the eye that sees, then it should be able to see even when it is occupied with audio and other types of consciousness: It should see since the required conditions, the object, etc., are present. But for us who hold that it is consciousness that sees, there is no such fault, this consciousness being absent.

Vai: No. It is only the *sabhāga-cakṣus* — visual organ participating in the activity of seeing — when being conjoined with visual consciousness,

that sees. (NyIt is not the case that all the organs are simultaneously sustained by their respective consciousnesses. Hence there is no such fault.)[4]

Vij: If so, it is the consciousness, of which the visual organ is the supporting basis (*āśraya*), that sees, not the visual organ; since whether there is seeing or not depends on the presence or otherwise of visual consciousness.

Vai : (NyNo. The eye, sustained by the force of consciousness, gives rise to its specific activity. This is like the arising of the specific activity of fire with the support of the force of fuel.)[5]

In fact, if the activity of seeing visible forms is a *dharma* produced by consciousness, then this activity ought to arise [even] when separated from the visual organ. The co-nascent *mahā-bhūta*-s, nourished by consciousness, are caused to produce the specific organ capable of seeing visible forms. Therefore, it is wrong to say that it is the supporting consciousness that sees.

Will any wise one say: "Whatever causes and conditions give rise to cognition, the resulting cognition is none other than those very causes and conditions"? Consciousness is the cause, not the essence, of seeing,[6] [i.e., it is not seeing in its intrinsic nature].

Vij: How do we know for sure that it is not visual consciousness that sees?

Vai: (NyBecause there is neither valid logical basis nor scriptural authority for it:
First, invalid logical reasoning: Visual consciousness will not be distinguished from other forms of consciousness — what difference is there, between visual and other forms of consciousness so that it alone is designated as view? Accordingly, we cannot assert that consciousness is the essence of view.

Vij: But what if we establish the distinction of visual consciousness from other forms of consciousness on the basis of the different sense organs (*indriya*) which form their respective bases?

Vai: No. On account of the differences among their supporting bases, consciousness may be differentiated only conceptually as visual consciousness. It cannot be legitimately accepted that simply on account of the differences as regards their organ, their inherent nature change accordingly, so that the consciousness associated with the visual organ is

transformed to be of the essence of view. Compare this with the case of fire which is produced using straw, wood, cow-dung, husk, etc. The names may vary — "straw fire", "wood fire", etc. — but the essential heat-nature (*uṣṇatā*) remains the same. As far as their basic nature is concerned, there is no difference among the various forms of consciousness.

Vij: But shouldn't visual consciousness be considered view in as much as it takes visible forms as its objects?

Vai: If this is the case, then mental consciousness which takes visible forms as its object should be view.

Vij: No, because only visual consciousness which takes the present visible form as object can be considered view.

Vai: This again is not logical, for there isn't any distinguishing cause in this case. It is accepted by all (*prasiddha*) that *prajñā* which takes objects of the three periods of time (past, present, future) is view. It follows that consciousness which takes past and future visible forms should also be considered as view. And if there could be any past or future consciousness which takes a present visible form, then we would have to concede that the blind can see present visible forms!

Vij: But mental consciousness is not of the essence of view.

Vai: Then, you should also concede that visual consciousness too is not of the essence of view: It is not logical to assert with regard to one and the same category of a substance, that some are of the essence of view, while others are not. This is as illogical as the assertion that within one and the same category of a substance, one part is wholesome, other unwholesome. The essence of a given *dharma* and its specific content are not the same. While visual and other forms of consciousness belong to the same class as regards essence, they can differ as regards their class of content — wholesome, unwholesome, etc. This is like the case of the essential nature of fire and the specific content of fire.

The various forms of consciousness which cognize objects, while belonging to the same class as regards essential nature, may differ as regards the class of specific type or content — pure or impure — on account of which, they may be called pure or impure consciousness. Now, it is not the case that just because the different forms of consciousness differ as to their specific content, they become different in their essential nature. Take the case of fire.

There may be different types of fire — fierce, feeble, with smoke, without smoke, depending on different conditions. Yet they are identical in their essential nature, all being of the nature of heat, likewise, while all forms of consciousness have the same essential nature of the cognizing of objects, they can be of different types — wholesome, etc. Hence your answer given above is not acceptable.

Vij: What if we say that, while the different forms of consciousness are identical in their essential nature, they can be differentiated as regards their specific types — view, etc.

Vai: No, this is unacceptable. Because, what is observed as the difference in appearance of the essential natures of different *dharma*-s must not be confounded with the difference in their specific type or content. [What pertains to different genuses must not be confounded with what pertains to different species of a given genus]. This is quite unlike the case of wholesomeness, etc., which can be found in all consciousnesses and other *dharma*-s.[7]

Vai: (NyYour thesis also lacks scriptural authority: None of the Buddha's discourses says that visual consciousness sees, giving rise to this kind of understanding. On the other hand, everywhere in the *sūtra*-s, the visual organ and *prajñā* are called views.[8]

(NyThere are other considerations: It contravenes worldly convention to speak of visual consciousness — rather than the visual organ — as view. In the world, only those without their visual organs are said to be blind. That is, one becomes blind on account of the non-possession (*asamanvāgama*) of the visual organ; not on account of the non-possession of visual consciousness. It is not the case that, one born in the sphere of the second *dhyāna* or above, where there is the visual organ but not visual consciousness, can be said to be blind.

Moreover, the blind, while lacking the visual organ, are in possession of visual consciousness. We should then not say that they are blind, or call them those without view!

Vij: But though the blind are in possession of the consciousness for seeing, they are said to be blind on account of the fact that the consciousness for seeing does not arise.

Vai: If so, ordinary people in the world, who have visual organs should also be regarded as blind when the consciousness for seeing does not arise!

Should you say that visual consciousness can be called view, because it has a distinguishing characteristic which distinguishes it from other forms of consciousness; then, this very distinguishing characteristic itself should be view. If, on the other hand, in the absence of any such distinguishing characteristic, you still maintain that visual consciousness alone is view, then it is just like the order issued by an evil king — without any need for justification.)[9]

Moreover if it is consciousness that sees, what is it that cognizes (*vijānāti*)? What is the difference between the two functions — now having to be attributed to the same consciousness — of seeing and cognizing?

Vij: The very cognizing of a visible object is the seeing of it. It is just like the case that a certain *prajñā* is said to "see" as well as to "comprehend". Likewise, a certain consciousness is said to "see" as well as to "cognize": All forms of consciousness have the cognizing of objects as their characteristic; but sometimes they are both view and cognition, sometimes not view but simply cognition.

Vai: (NyThis explanation is very much a case of fallacious analogy (*viṣama*): The very distinguishing characteristic, on account of which *prajñā* is called view, is none other than that which sees. But it is not true that the very distinguishing characteristic, on account of which consciousness is called view, is none other than that which sees. Indeed, if this very distinguishing characteristic itself is none other than that which sees, then it should follow that it is the eye, the very supporting basis, which sees; for it is only on account of the supporting basis that consciousness gets a different name. Otherwise, you must tell us: Apart from the supporting basis, what other *dharma* can there be which definitely constitutes the distinguishing characteristic possessed by visual consciousness alone, and not other forms of consciousness.)[10]

(NyConcerning your assertion that the case of *dṛṣṭi* and *vijñāna* is just like that of *dṛṣṭi* and *prajñā*, conceded as being no different from each other — if this assertion is to be accepted, then one should also concede that the essence of consciousness is none other than *prajñā*; for it is conceded by both you and us that the *saṃprayukta-dṛṣṭi* is none other than *prajñā* in essence.

Moreover, if *dṛṣṭi* and *prajñā* are the same, then all forms of consciousness are *dṛṣṭi*, and *dṛṣṭi* are all forms of consciousness. This being the case, how is it that the blind and those asleep do not see?

Vij: In these circumstances, there is no visual consciousness.

Vai: No because visual consciousness is identical in essence with other forms of consciousness: In what way is visual consciousness different from the other forms of consciousness such that it alone, and not other forms of consciousness, can see?

Or, your arguments would entail that one and the same *dharma* has two essences — one can cognize, the other can see! If you concede that a thing which is not of the essence of view can actually see, then this is a fallacy of over-generalization (*atiprasaṅga*) on your part.

Vij: But as in the case of *prajñā* which can both see and discern, here too there is no contradiction.

Vai: No. There, *dṛṣṭi* and *prajñā* are not different from each other.

Vij: But isn't it also the case that *dṛṣṭi* and *vijñāna* are not different from each other?

Vai: If this is the case, then one with eyes should be no different from a blind person: Why is it that for one without eyes, though in possession of visual consciousness, he is said to be blind; while for one having eyes, when other forms of consciousness other than visual arise, he is not said to be blind?)[11]

Some masters: If it is the visual consciousness that sees, then being not susceptible to obstruction (Vybeing immaterial (*amūrti*))[12] — it should see even objects behind a wall or a screen. Yet this is not the case in our daily experience. This proves that it is the eye that sees, not consciousness .

The AKB author on behalf of Vij: Visual consciousness cannot arise with regard to an object obstructed by a wall or a screen, (Vyas the object is concealed from light)[13]. Where consciousness does not arise, how can there be seeing?

Vai: Then you would have to explain why visual consciousness cannot arise with regard to an obstructed object: (VyConsciousness being not susceptible to obstruction, having penetrated the wall, etc., should arise, just as in the case where the object is not intervened.)[14] For us who hold that the visual organ sees, the explanation is simple: The visual organ being susceptible to obstruction (*sa-pratigha*), cannot exercise its activity with regard to

a screened object. Accordingly, visual consciousness cannot arise with regard to a screened object, since it must do so with regard to the same object as its supporting basis, the visual organ.

(NyBesides, the counter question — "Where consciousness does not arise, how can there be seeing?" — is illogical: Even if visual consciousness could arise in this case, it still cannot see; for, as we have argued above, it is not different from other forms of consciousness — its function is cognition, not seeing.

Moreover, it is logically invalid for you to answer that visual consciousness does not arise with regard to a screened object. For, the meaning of the objection is that if you maintain that visual consciousness has the function of seeing visible forms; then, consciousness being not susceptible to obstruction, should arise even with regard to a screened object.

Vij: We mean that, with regard to a screened object, the type of function like the cognizing of a visual form by consciousness, does not arise.

Vai: No, this too is not acceptable logically. For, this school concedes that both visual consciousness and the eye which is susceptible to obstruction, operate with regard to one and the same object.

Vij: But, are we not saying exactly the same thing as you?

Vai: No. In your case, the assertion is not a valid one; for, given your denial that the eye sees, it is not logically valid to assert that visible forms are objects of the eye.

Moreover, what is the rationale of your counter-question: "Consciousness not arising, how can there be seeing?"? Arising is seeing, and seeing is arising. What you said amount to: consciousness not arising, how can there be arising — a meaningless question!

Shouldn't the objection here be a general one: "Why does it not arise? Why does it not see?"

Some of you might answer: "All causes and conditions arise in the previous moment; none arise simultaneously [with consciousness]. This being the case, whether consciousness arises or not, there can be no seeing." But then, this too, being an inference derived from on your own premises, cannot be a legitimate answer.

Moreover, visual consciousness also arises with regard to screens like glass, cloud, etc... Why do you say that visual consciousness does not arise will regard to a screened visible form?)[15]

Vij: Consciousness arises in this case because there is no obstruction to light. In fact, this is how we would explain why consciousness cannot see a screened object, as here the passage of light is obstructed.

Vai: (NyYou have then thereby conceded that visual consciousness arises with regard to a screened object, and what you have asserted earlier thereby contradicts your own concession.

Moreover, it is observed in the world that visual consciousness can actually arise in the absence of light. Thus, humans can see dark objects, and nocturnal creatures can see visible forms obstructed by darkness — indeed there is no need for light in order to see darkness.

Vij: We consider that objects of perception are so by their intrinsic nature.

Vai: If so, then the visual consciousness of nocturnal creatures should not arise with regard to objects obstructed by darkness, just as in the case of humans. It is not reasonable to say that, depending on whether the perceiver is human or creature, one and the same visible form — darkness — changes its intrinsic nature.

Vij: We shall say then that this is so on account of the intrinsic nature of the various abodes of existence (*gati*).

Vai: No, for an abode of existence is a karmic retribution. Cats, dogs, etc., in darkness give rise to a greedy mind for taking various objects. It is therefore only the eye, a karmic retribution, which belongs to a particular abode of existence. Accordingly, we may say here that this is so by virtue of the intrinsic nature of karmic retribution: Among the various abodes of existence, some can perceive objects obscured by darkness, while others cannot.

Vij: The nocturnal animals can see [in darkness] because there is always light in their eyes.

Vai: This is not acceptable, because this is not observed to be the case.

Vij: This is not observed because of the amount of light being small.

Vai: If this were so, it should be impossible to see distant objects, for visual consciousness ought not arise therein. Thus, your reply — "visual consciousness does not arise with regard to a screened object. Consciousness not arising, how can there be seeing?" — is not a legitimate one. It is only a personal fancy of those who lack proper understanding.[)16]

Vij: How then do you, who hold that the visual organ sees, explain that one does not perceive a screened visible form?

Vai: Because the visual organ is susceptible to obstruction, it cannot give rise to its function of seeing with regard to a screened object. As consciousness operates on one and the same object as its supporting basis, it too cannot arise.[17]

The author of the AKB on behalf of Vij: When you say that the visual organ is susceptible to obstruction and hence cannot see in this situation, do you mean to say that it is like the organ of touch (*kāyendriya*) which can exercise its activity on an object only when in contact with it?: [(Vy]Do you mean that like the tangible organ which, being susceptible to obstruction, cannot move over the screen which is obstructive, to reach the object, and thus cannot exercise its activity on the object: The eye cannot see in this case because it needs to move over the screen which it cannot do, being susceptible to obstruction to reach and see the object?[)18] But then, your school holds that the visual organ sees objects in a distance.

Besides, how would you explain that objects obstructed by glass, crystal, etc., which are susceptible to obstruction, are visible? This in fact disproves your assertion that the visual organ cannot see obstructed objects on account of its being obstructive.

Vai: [(Ny]This is not a valid objection, for it fails to properly understand what is meant by "being susceptible to obstruction". We do not simply mean that the visible form, being susceptible to obstruction on account of hindrance (*āvaraṇa-pratighāta*), can only take objects that are in contact, and hence cannot take objects, which are screened. "Being susceptible to obstruction" here also includes the meaning of being "susceptible to obstruction on account of being confined to a given object (*viṣaya-pratighāta*)": When it is confined to a given object, it cannot exercise its activity on any other object, even if the object is not screened — how much more so if it is screened. This in fact applies to any *dharma*, which takes an object — it cannot simultaneously take all objects.

Vij: But then, visual consciousness too is "susceptible to obstruction". In accordance with your own assertion that this principle applies to all *dharma*-s which take objects, you should not have applied this to the visual organ alone, and say that on account of this, it cannot give rise to its function of seeing with regard to a screened object. Nor should you have asserted that, "consciousness and its supporting basis being operative on one and the same object we may say that visual consciousness does not arise on a screened object".

Vai: You have here committed a fallacy of false analogy, not understanding what we said. What we mean is: Because the eye is also susceptible to being obstructed on account of being confined to a given object, and because a visible form is susceptible to being obstructed on account of hindrance; the eye cannot give rise to its activity with regard to a screened visible form. The mind and visual consciousness, qua the supported and the support, are necessarily related to the same object. But their activities are not necessarily operative on one and the same object. It is not the case that these two can take the same object simultaneously. On the other hand, the object taken by the visual organ, the supporting basis, is the same as that taken by visual consciousness, the supported. In addition, the two must exist simultaneously. Thus, when there is an obstruction to the activity of the eye, the activity of [visual] consciousness is also accordingly obstructed. It is for these reasons that we have asserted: "consciousness and its support, being operative on one and the same object, we may say that visual consciousness does not arise on a screened object."

It remains for you, who hold that it is consciousness that sees, to explain the non-arising of visual consciousness in this case?

Vij: But isn't it true that the eye, which is susceptible to obstruction on account of being confined to a given object, when confined by glass, etc., as object, can still exercise its activity on the screened object? Why then, did you say: "When it is confined to a given object, it cannot exercise its activity on any other object, even if the object is not screened — how much more so if it is screened"?

Vai: Haven't we explained that this is because it cannot perceive both simultaneously: When it perceives the glass as its object, it does not perceive the screened object; when it perceives the screened object, it does not perceive the glass. There is thus no contradiction, by reason of the fact that not both are perceived at once.

Vij: If so, why then does the eye not see visible forms screened by a wall, etc.?

Vai: We do not explain as you do, that it is because there is no light herein, since in the world it is observed that there can be perception in the absence of light. Rather, this is because of the [different] ways accumulated forms (*saṃcita-rūpa*) constitute obstruction. Thus, light and darkness differ in the ways they constitute hindrance: Though darkness and light both belong to the category of material forms (*rūpāyatana*), we can see what is obstructed by light, but not what is obstructed by darkness. Nocturnal creatures, while capable of seeing forms obstructed by darkness as well, cannot see what are obstructed by a wall, etc. In this way, though the visual organ can see forms screened by a glass, etc., it cannot see those screened by a wall, etc. By virtue of the obstructive nature of accumulated forms, the visual organ can only see the wall, etc., and not the objects screened by the wall, etc.

Such is the nature of *dharma*-s; it is not a matter for speculation. There are organs, though capable of taking objects in a distance, fail to take some such objects due to certain obstruction. There are organs, though capable of seeing objects in contact, fail to see some such objects. Thus, as regards the author's question mentioned above — "Do you mean that the visual organ, like the organ of touch, can take an object only when in contact, so that on account of its being susceptible to obstruction, it cannot see a screened object" — we may retort: Your assertion will be futile; unless it is the case that an organ capable of taking objects in contact can actually take all such objects, and one capable of taking objects in a distance can actually take all such objects.)[19]

Vij: What scriptural support do you have for your thesis that the eye sees?

Vai: The *sūtra* clearly says: "Seeing visible forms with the eye (*cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā* ...)".

Vij: What the *sūtra* intends to say here is: "Seeing visible forms with the supporting basis of vision." This is clear when we consider another similar saying of the *sūtra*: "Having cognized mental objects with the mental organ (*manasā dharmān vijñāya*)". Now, the mental organ (*manas*), being always past, cannot cognize mental objects. What actually cognizes is mental consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*). It is only consciousness existing at the present moment that can exercise its activity of cognizing. It is from the point of view that the mental organ forms the supporting basis for mental consciousness, that the *sūtra* says it cognizes.

We may also understand that the *sūtra* here metaphorically attributes the action of that which is supported (i.e. visual consciousness) to that which is the support (i.e. visual organ). It is like saying, "The benches cry", when we actually mean that the people supported on the benches cry.

Other instances of such metaphorical attribution can be found in the *sūtra*. Thus, it says, "Visible objects, agreeable and attractive, cognizable by the visual organ (*cakṣurvijñeyāni rūpāṇiṣṭāni kāntāni*)". Now, as you Vaibhāṣikas hold, it is not the case that visible forms are cognized by the visual organ. This is thus a clear case of a metaphorical attribution of the action of the supported (i.e. *vijñāna*) to the support (i.e. the eye).

Vai: (NyBut this fails to prove your assertion. In the case of the mind, as the mind and mental consciousness belong to the same category, and as it is none other than the characteristic of mental consciousness; there is no contradiction in regard of characteristic when it is said that the mind cognizes. Thus the *sūtra* says. "With an evil mind, what one acts or speaks is always unwholesome." Now, we should not say that it is with a past mind which can give rise to such physical and vocal actions. For, it is from a present evil mind that the two kinds of evil actions, physical and vocal, are produced. The *sūtra* also says,

> The non-arising of cankers produced from craving, is due to the mind being free from taint.

Now, it is not the case that an untainted mind can definitely produce an untainted mental consciousness. One, therefore cannot say that the saying refers to the supporting basis. The *sūtra* also says "The mind leads the world." Now, can it be that it here refers to the mind what is actually the work of the thought concomitant (*caitta*). Hence, you cannot quote the said *sūtra* in support of your assertion that when it says the eye sees, it refers to consciousness of which the eye is the support.

Furthermore, when this *sūtra* says that the eye sees visible forms, it cannot be taken to mean that visual consciousness sees; since whereas it says everywhere that the eye sees, nowhere does it specifically say that visual consciousness sees, and since as mentioned above, some masters hold that it is *prajñā* that sees. When this *sūtra* says: "the mind cognizes *dharma*-s", however, there is no fault in saying that it refers to consciousness by mentioning its supporting basis; because whereas there are places where it specifically says that consciousness cognizes,

nowhere does it specifically say that the mind can cognize; and because there is no dispute as regards this point.

Moreover, why did you insist that "we may also understand that the *sūtra* here metaphorically attributes the action of that which is supported to that which is the support. It is like people in the world saying "The benches cry" when they actually mean the people supported on the benches cry"? To interpret the words differently from the way they are actually found, there must be some reason (*hetu*) for it. If his reason is that consciousness sees visible forms by the force of the supporting eyes, then it is an invalid reason, for the reason, "consciousness sees visible form" is not a commonly accepted one (*prasiddha*): Our position is that consciousness sustains the visual organ, the supporting basis, enabling in to see visible form. Hence, the reason given — "consciousness sees" is not a commonly accepted one. Moreover, there is no *sūtra* anywhere, which specifically says "consciousness sees".

Vij: But, isn't it like the case of saying "the benches make noise"?

Vai: That case is alright, being a commonly accepted one. "Benches that make noise" is commonly accepted elsewhere, so that on hearing these words, one can understand that it is a case of attributing the action of the supported to the support. On the other hand, the thesis that "consciousness sees" is not a proposition commonly accepted by both parties, like the case of the proposition that real entities exist, given which it is universally accepted to speak metaphorically with regard to other unreal things (如有實論, 世間共許於餘假說). Hence, your assertion is not justifiable.

Vij: But then, the proposition that "the eye sees" is also not a commonly accepted one. Why then do you maintain only that the eye, sustained by consciousness sees, and not that consciousness, supported by the eye, sees?

Vai: Because we have already argued that "the eye sees" is a commonly accepted proposition, because visual, auditory and other forms of consciousness are not different, and because an active eye cannot arise apart from consciousness. We therefore maintain that visual organ, sustained by consciousness, sees. The fallacies involved in the thesis that "consciousness sees" have been argued in detailed above by us. As such, you should not maintain that consciousness, supported by the eye, sees.

When the *sūtra* says: "Visible forms cognizable by the eye (*cakṣurvijñeyāni rūpāṇi*)", however, we may attribute the action of that which is supported

to that which is the support. As it is commonly accepted that the eye and consciousness are different from each other. On hearing that the function of consciousness resides in the visual organ, one can understand that it is a case of attributing the action of that which is supported to that which is the support. This also explains what another *sūtra* means when it says: "Longed for by the eye")[20].

(NySome masters explain thus: "Neither visual consciousness nor the visual organ can long for, being non discriminative. Longing is only possible when there is discrimination."

Vai: Concerning this, one should understand thus: The discriminative mental consciousness induced by visual consciousness, is metaphorically called the eye. What the eye gives rise to is like a *manopavicāra*, which is discriminative, and therefore can long for things.

In conclusion, you therefore cannot prove that eye is not view by means of the practice of attributing the action of that which is supported to that which is the support, since the thesis that "the eye sees" is perfect in respect of scriptural support and logical reasoning.)[21]

Vij: The *sūtra* says, "The eye, O brahmin, is a gate just for the seeing visible objects (*cakṣur brāhmaṇa dvāraṃ yāvad eva rūpāṇāṃ darśanāya*)." Thus, it is clear that consciousness sees through the eye which is the gate.

Vai: We would say that here "gate" refers to "seeing (*darśanam*)".

Vij: This is not acceptable, for the *sūtra* would then be saying: "The eye is seeing for the seeing of visible forms (*cakṣur darśanaṃ rūpāṇāṃ darśanāya*)". (VyIf you say: "for the seeing (*darśanāya*)", because *darśana* is *dṛṣṭi*" either in the sense that *darśana* is the instrument of seeing (*darśanaṃ karaṇaṃ dṛṣyate 'neneti*'), or that it is the agent of seeing (*kartari vā lyuṭ paśyatīti darśanam*), or "*darśanāya*" is intended to show the abstract being of seeing (*darśanāyeti ca bhāva-sādhanam*)", it is not acceptable. For there can be no seeing dissociated from the visual organ. Should you argue that seeing is perceiving (*ālocana*), it is also incorrect, since there can be no perceiving dissociated from consciousness. The only acceptable interpretation of the sentence in question is that the eye-gate is the aperture for the seeing, the cognizing, of visible objects (*cakṣur-dvāraṃ vivaraṃ rūpāṇāṃ darśanāya vijñānāyeti*).)[22]

Vai: (NyThis *sūtra* does not constitute a definite proof that it is the visual consciousness that sees, as it does not say: "visual consciousness uses the eye as the gate just for the seeing of visible forms." Besides, there are other masters who hold that it is *prajñā* that sees through the visual organ as the gate.

We should here put aside our personal opinions, and examine together the real purport of this *sūtra*.

This is the interpretation of our school: Those who are blinded by ignorance and without a true guide, generate various false views as regards the conditioning forces (*saṃskāra*). Some hold that these conditioning forces are produced from intrinsic causes such as the atoms, etc., others that they are produced from no cause. Yet others maintain that if these conditioning forces were momentary, then the whole universe would be annihilated. Accordingly they either speculate that the conditioning forces abide temporarily; or that they are eternal. The *Bhagavat* wanted to show that the conditioning forces from beginningless time, form a continuous series of causes and effects; that though momentary, these forces are not annihilated; that neither are all effects produced from a single cause, nor are they arisen from no cause. It is with such an intention that the *Bhagavat* has taught these discourses implicitly.

Here, "gate" signifies "condition (*pratyaya*)". There are two types of conditions — homogeneous and heterogeneous. Let us consider here the homogeneous type. "The eye is a gate just for the seeing visible forms" means: The postnascent eye arises with the prenascent eye as its condition. The rest of the *sūtra*, up to the explanation on the mind, should be understood similarly.

Further, this *sūtra* intends to show that each of the organs has a twofold function: It serves as a gate, and it grasps its object. For the visual organ, the first function of serving as a gate consists in its being the supporting basis, enabling the *citta-caitta* to operate in its specific mode (*ākāra*) on the object. Its [second] function of grasping the object, is as that of the visual organ whch is just for the seeing of visible forms. Understood otherwise, the meaning of "just (*yāvad eva*)" would be contradictory — for, it would mean that all the *citta-caitta*-s should just [have the function of] seeing, while in fact they all have visual organ as the gate. It is your position that the intrinsic nature of view is *citta* alone, and not the *caitta*-s. Moreover, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and other *caitta*-s each has its specific function of sensing, grasping images, etc. Accordingly, [the *caitta*-s], should not be just seeing. Since the *sūtra*

says, "just seeing", it clearly refers to the eye. For this visual organ can just see. Thus, the eye in brief has two functions: serving as a gate, and seeing visible forms. The same applies to all the other organs. Hence, our position does not contravene the *sūtra*.

Furthermore, there is another point intended in this *sūtra*: The expedience for seeing is metaphorically called the gate, on account of expedience being called a gate in the world. Thus, in the world, it is said "Through this gate, I shall definitely accrue the treasure that I aspire for", meaning "I shall use this as the expedience". The *Bhagavat* has also said to Hastaka *upāsaka*: "You should properly command the assembly by means of this gate, i.e. the four *saṃgraha-vastu*-s which are the expedience for commanding". Here, visual consciousness is said to be the expedience for seeing. For, sustained by consciousness, the eye sees visible forms. Because consciousness is the expedience through which the visual organ sees, and because it is the supporting basis for seeing; consciousness is metaphorically called the eye. What is intended by this *sūtra* is: Consciousness is the expedience and the eye is that which sees. It is in a similar manner that in some other *sūtra*-s, at the stage of cognizing visible forms, the eye is metaphorically referred to as cognizing; on account of the eye being the supporting basis and the proximate condition. For this reason, the *sūtra* says, "visible forms cognizable by the eye (*cakṣur-vijñeyāni rūpāṇi...*)". The same is true here: At the stage of seeing (*ālocana*) visible forms, visual consciousness is metaphorically referred to as the eye, on account of consciousness being the eye's proximate condition, and of its being the supporting basis. This does not contradict the *sūtra*. Such a metaphorical attribution is meant for removing the erroneous view of the heretics that it is the Self that sustains the organs enabling them to grasp their objects. It is in order that the brahmin can understand that it is consciousness, not the Self, that sustains the organs enabling them to grasp the respective objects.

Vij: If so, it should say: "Visual consciousness is a gate, just for the seeing of visible forms."

Vai: No, it should not say "consciousness", lest it be mistaken for the heretical view that it is the Self that sees. This is because, the Self upheld by the heretics is referred to as consciousness as people in the world mostly take consciousness to be the Self. If it says "the eye", one understands at once that visual consciousness has the eye as its supporting basis, and it is definitely not the Self: The Self is eternal, and definitely without any supporting basis. When one hears that consciousness has a support, any notion of the Self will vanish.

Furthermore, it should not say "consciousness", in order to avoid other fallacies: The *sūtra* should say: "The mind is a gate, to the extent of cognizing of *dharma*-s". Here, if it uses the word "consciousness", it will have to say here: "Mental consciousness is a gate", which would be illogical. For, it is mental consciousness itself that cognizes the *dharma*-s. It is not that there is some other "mind" that cognizes, with the consciousness as its expedience.

Vij: But even if it says "mind", doesn't that too entail the same fallacy? In the same way that one knows visual consciousness to be the expedience for seeing when it says "the eye is a gate"; similarly one knows mental consciousness to be the expedience for cognizing when it says "The mind is the gate".

Vai: No, though it says "mind", there is no such fallacy. When one hears the word "mind", one understands it to mean only the mind, not mental consciousness. This is because the visual organ becomes active when consciousness co-arises with it. As consciousness serves as the expedience for the visual organ to see, we can refer to this consciousness as the eye. But in the case of the mental organ, it does not possess any activity, being always past. As mental consciousness does not serve as an expedience for the mind, we cannot refer to mental consciousness as the mind. In fact, it is the mind that serves as the expedience for mental consciousness for the cognizing of *dharma*-s, since to be able to cognize *dharma*-s mental consciousness must have the mental organ as its support. Accordingly, when the *sūtra* says "The eye is a gate", the wise should understand that it is for the removal of attachment to the Self that visual consciousness is referred to as the eye. When, on the other hand, it comes to the sixth organ and says, "The mind is a gate", the wise one should understand that the mind referred to is exactly the mind [and not mental consciousness]; for it does not have the function of cognizing, and it is mental consciousness that cognizes with the mind as the expedience.

Furthermore, this *sūtra* [implicitly] refers to two types of eye: the participating eye (*sabhāga-cakṣus*) and the non-participating (*tatsabhāga*) eye. While the non-participating eye cannot see visible forms, it can serve as the gate for inducing the participating eye so that it can arise and see visible forms. For in one existence, one must first acquire the non-participating eye which then induces the arising of the participating eye. The case of the other organs up to the tactile organ (*kāyendriya*) is the same as that of the eye. In the case of the mind, there are two types: one has activity and the other does not. While the mind without activity cannot cognize *dharma*-s,

it can serve as the gate for inducing the arising of the mind with activity for the cognizing of *dharma*-s. Since the mind and mental consciousness are one at the same, there is no fault in saying that the mind cognizes.

We have thus properly interpreted this *sūtra*, and you therefore should not quote this as definite proof that it is not the eye, not consciousness, that sees.)[23]

Some Vijñānavāda exponents [Vātsīputrīya]:[24] If it is the eye that sees; the eye being the agent of seeing, what is its separate function of seeing?

Vai: This objection is not reasonable: Just as a consciousness is accepted as being that which cognizes, without there being any distinction made between the agent and its action. The same should be admitted in the case of our thesis that the visual organ sees.

Other Vijñānavāda exponents, [Dharmagupta]:[25] It is the visual consciousness that sees. But being the supporting basis for seeing, the visual organ is also said to see. Just as the bell, being the supporting basis for sound, is said to ring.

Vai: If so, you would have to say that the visual organ cognizes, since it is the supporting basis for consciousness.

Vij: No. In the world, people agree that the visual consciousness is "seeing": When it arises, it is said that "a visible form is seen", and not that "a visible form is cognized." In fact, in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* too, it says, "That which is attained by the visual organ, that which is experienced by visual consciousness, is said to be the seen" (*cakṣuḥ-samprāptaṃ cakṣur-vijñānānubhūtaṃ dṛṣṭam ity ucyate*). Here, "that which is attained by visual organ" refers to the range of vision. Thus, it is said only that the visual organ sees, and not that it cognizes.

On the other hand, it is the very appearing of consciousness itself — (Vyi.e. not by reason of being a support (*nāśraya-bhāva-yogena*))[26] — that is said to be the seeing of visible forms. Just as, in the world, one says that the sun is the maker of the day (*divasakara*) when it appears — it is the very appearing of the sun that is said to be the making of the day. Likewise, one says that consciousness cognizes, as it is so accepted in the world.

Sautrāntika (Ny, p.367b: **Dārṣṭāntika masters**): Aren't you not devouring the Empty Space here! Conditioned by visual organ and visible objects,

visual consciousness arises. Herein, what is it that sees, and what is it that is seen? It is really devoid of any activity — (Vy without any exertion (*nirīham*))[27]. It is a mere play of *dharma*-s as cause and effect. While there is no independent agent, there is the subject-object reality of cause and effect. Here, in conformity to worldly convention, it is figuratively said that "the eye sees", "consciousness cognizes". But the wise ones should not be attached to such figurative usages. For, the Bhagavat has said, "One should not obstinately cling to regional usages, nor should one over insist with regard to worldly notions."

Vai: (Ny These words do not accord with the Holy Scriptures or valid reasoning. Neither can they refute the nature of the eye as view. For, while all conditioned *dharma*-s are arisen from conditions (*pratītya-samutpanna*), [our doctrine] explains the specific nature and function of the *dharma*-s: While all conditioned *dharma*-s, without exception, are dependently originated, they do not lose their individually unique nature and function. This being the case, the Bhagavat has taught that *dharma*-s are born from conditions, as well as that Earth etc., each has its specific nature and function. Thus, the Earth Element, etc., while being arisen from conditions, has their specific nature (*svalakṣaṇa*), of firmness, etc., as mentioned above, as well as their unique function, sustaining, etc. In this way, while the eye, visible forms, and visual consciousness, etc., are arisen from conditions, they ought to have their variously unique natures and functions. It is on account of these variously unique natures and functions that, only the eye is called eye and not a visible form, or visual consciousness; that the visible form is called visible form and not visual consciousness or eye; that only visual consciousness is called visual consciousness and not eye or visible form.

Herein, while there exists no real collective nature and function, which may be termed the seer, the seen, the cognizer; within the scope of such a principle of the unreality of a collective nature and function, just as we may say that there exist the conditions of the eye and a visible form, etc. which give rise to visual consciousness, likewise we speak of the conditions, the eye and consciousness, etc. which give rise to seeing by the eye.

With regard to *dharma*-s which in truth are devoid of such kinds of real collective functionality, there arises in accordance with worldly notions, the seemingly real collective functionality. It is in order to prevent the wise ones from being attached to the notion of such real collective functionality, that the *Bhagavat* has made the above remarks. That is, we must not obstinately hold on to conventional words resulting from attachment to a real essence

and nature, since there is no such nature. Likewise, we must not insist on conventional notions which result from attachment to a real function of a collective agent of seeing; since there is no such function. Other notions are to be understood in a similar manner as those of the essential nature and function of seeing.

Nevertheless, simply because there exists no real collective nature or function we cannot override conventional terms of the world, and unilaterally (*ekāntena*) conform to the standpoint of absolute truth. Nor can we insist on the non-existence of individual essences and functions. Accordingly, we definitely must designate terms in such a way that we accord with worldly conventions without contravening absolute truth. Hence, the Buddha's teaching in this context prohibits only the firm insistence on the worldly notions of real collective essences and functions. It does not at all prohibit the firm insistence on the individual essences and functions, which are ultimately real, of the *dharma*-s. For, the individual essences and functions of all *dharma*-s, in [the dynamic process of] conditioned co-arising, are truly existent. It is not the case that all effects arise from all conditions. Hence, our position that "the eye sees" is founded on both absolute and relative truths. It is free from fallacies from both standpoints.

Moreover, the Bhagavat has also conceded that the agent of an action and its activity exist. Thus the *sūtra* say, "O *bhikṣu*-s, understand that it is called consciousness because it cognizes." Although it says in *Phalguna sūtra* (*cf. Saṃyutta*, 35. 85 for the *Pāli* discourse to *Phagguna*). " I shall never say that there is the cognizer", it however never completely denies that there are no agent of an action and the activity. It is in order to dispel such wrong notions that the *sūtra* has said so.

Thus, it was on the proper foundation of the noble teachings and logic that we have made an inquiry and concluded that it is the eye, not anything else, that sees. The Sautrāntikas, in this context, however, making unjust criticism, have negated the reasoning of the world and looked down upon what has been established on absolute truth. Surely, it was they who have been trying to grab the empty space!

Besides, what have they proved with their *sūtra* quotations? — Is there any mention at all that the eye is not of the essence of view? Simply by proposing that the eye sees, one does not thereby become an heretic who acknowledges the existence of a real collective nature and activity. Furthermore, what they say amounts to a denial of cause and effect, for they do not acknowledge that

dharma-s have their real individual nature and activity. It is only when the reality of the individual natures and activities of *dharma*-s is acknowledged, that we can speak of the difference between cause and effect. If they concede to the reality of the individual natures and activities of *dharma*-s, then their accusations have been in vain. On the other hand, if they maintain that both the collective and the individual activities are entirety unreal, then they have contravened both Worldly and the absolute truths. Now, given their acknowledgment that cause and effect are not unreal from both levels of truths, they ought to acknowledge that *dharma*-s have unreal as well as real activities. Thus, we have established that it is the organs, not consciousnesses, that take their objects — i.e. the eye sees, the ear hears, the nose smells, the tongue tastes, the body senses and consciousness cognizes.)[28]

Notes

1 AKB, 30 ff.
2 Ny, 364a.
3 *Loc. cit.*
4 *Ibid., loc. cit.*
5 *Ibid.,* 364b.
6 識是見因, 故非見體。
7 *Ibid.,* 364b–c.
8 *Ibid., loc. cit.*
9 *Ibid.,* 364c.
10 *Ibid., loc. cit.*
11 *Ibid.,* 364c–365a
12 Vy, 80.
13 *Ibid., loc. cit.*
14 *Ibid., loc. cit.*
15 Ny, 365a–b.
16 Ny, 365b.
17 AKB, 47.
18 Vy, 80 f: *kiṃ nu vai cakṣuḥ prāpta-viṣayam iti vistaraḥ / yathā kāyendriyaṃ prāpta-viṣayaṃ kuḍy'ādi-vyavahitaṃ viṣayaṃ na gṛhṇāti / kuḍy'ādi-pratighātāt / tataḥ pareṇa pravartitum alabhamānatvāt / kim evaṃ cakṣuḥ prāpta-viṣayaṃ kuḍy'ādi-pratighātena pratihataṃ sat tataḥ pareṇa gantum alabhamānaṃ taṃ kuḍy'ādi-vyavahitaṃ viṣayaṃ na gṛhṇātīti / naitad yujyate / tasmāt sapratighatvāt āvṛtaṃ cakṣur na paśyed iti na vaktavyam /.*
19 Ny, 365c.
20 *Ibid.,* 367a.
21 *Ibid.*, loc. cit.
22 Vy, 82.
23 Ny, 366a–c.
24 According to TA(U-J), 99, the question is from Śrīlāta.
25 According to TA(U-J), 99, the statement is from all the Sautrāntika masters.
26 Vy, 82.
27 *Ibid., loc. cit.*
28 Ny, 367b–368a.

6. Epistemological Tenets Concerning Thought and Thought Concomitants

The epistemological disputation among various schools of thought in the Abhidharma period involve many specific doctrinal categories whose significations are often taken for granted. It is therefore desirable to outline here those doctrines and doctrinal categories which are specifically related to Abhidharma epistemology.

6.1. Thought (*citta*), mind (*manas*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*)

As in the Buddha's discourses, the three terms, thought, mind, and consciousness, stand for the same mental reality in Abhidharma. However, while they are said to have the same intrinsic nature, they are variously distinguished by the Ābhidharmikas in terms of their functional nature.

The MVŚ discusses their differences as follows:

> Question: What is the difference between the three — *citta, manas, vijñāna* — mentioned in the *sūtra*?
>
> [Answer:] There is the explanation that there is no difference — *citta* is none other than *manas*, *manas* is none other than *vijñāna*; for though the three words are different, there is no difference in meaning ... .
>
> There is also the explanation that the three ... are also differentiated: That is, the names themselves are different — they are named "*citta*", "*manas*", "*vijñāna*".
>
> Furthermore, there is a difference with respect of time (*adhvan*): what is past is called *manas*; what is future is called *citta*; what is present is called *vijñāna*.
>
> Furthermore, there is a difference with respect to designation (*prajñapti*): *citta* is designated among the *dhātu*-s; *manas*, among the *āyatana*-s; *vijñāna* among the *skandha*-s.
>
> Furthermore, there is a difference in terms of signification (*artha*): *citta* signifies 'clan (*gotra*)'; *manas*, 'gateway of arising (*āya-dvāra*)', *vijñāna*, agglomeration.

> Furthermore, there is a difference in terms of action (*karma*, *kriyā*): that of *citta* is far-going (*dūragama*) ...; *manas*, fore-running (*pūrvaṅgama*) ...; *vijñāna*, birth-relinking (*saṃdhāna / pratisaṃdhi*) ...[1]
>
> Further, the action of *citta* is being variegated (*citra*) ...; *manas*, going towards (歸趣 *gati* (?)) ...; *vijñāna*, cognition (*vi-√jñā*) ...
>
> Furthermore, the action of *citta* is increasing or nourishing (滋長 *saṃcitatva*); *manas*, thinking; *vijñāna*, cognizing.[2]
>
> According to Venerable Parśva: the action of *citta* is increasing and severing; *manas*, thinking and contemplating, *vijñāna*, distinguishing and comprehending. Herein, it is to be understood that what increases is the *sāsrava-citta*, what severs is the *anāsrava-citta*; what thinks is the *sāsrava-manas*, what contemplates is the *anāsrava-manas*; what distinguishes is the *sāsrava-vijñāna*, what comprehends is the *anāsrava-vijñāna*.[3]

Among the various distinctions given in the above passage, we may note specially the temporal and functional distinctions as regards *manas*: It belongs to the past period (*adhvan*), in contrast to *vijñāna* which is present and *citta* which is future; it serves as a 'gateway of arising'; and it is said to be 'fore-running'. These distinguishing features reflect the Ābhidharmic notions of the mental faculty (*mana-indriya*) and the 'equal-immediate condition' (*samanantara-pratyaya*). In keeping with the Buddha's teaching, the Ābhidharmikas insist that for the arising of a given form of consciousness (e.g. visual consciousness), there are two requisites or necessary conditions — a corresponding faculty (*indriya*) and a corresponding cognitive object (*ālambana*). Thus, when visual consciousness arises in the present moment, it necessarily has the visual faculty as its supporting basis (*āśraya*) and a visual form as the condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya*, one of the four conditions in the Sarvāstivāda theory of causality). This is also a reason for assigning consciousness to the present.

Saṃghabhadra, however, explains that while consciousness that arises in the present necessarily is conscious of an object, it must not be understood that past and future consciousnesses that are not exercising the function of cognizing is not consciousness: The nature of being consciousness uniquely belongs to the species known as consciousness, whether they be past, present or future.[4]

In the case of mental consciousness, the immediately preceding consciousness is said to serve the function of being the necessary mental faculty for the arising of the present consciousness. In the serial continuity

of consciousness flow, the former is equal in nature as, and the *sine qua non* for the arising of — for without it first having ceased, another consciousness having the same nature cannot arise in the same person (no two consciousness of the same nature can co-arise)[5] — the latter. On account of this fact, the immediately preceding moment of consciousness is said to function as the 'equal-immediate' condition for the one that succeeds.

6.2. How a mental state arises

A *citta* that arises is, properly speaking, to be called a *vijñāna*, defined as "that which is conscious of (or cognizes) [an object]. (*vijānātīti vijñānam*)"[6] This is emphasized by the Ābhidharmikas as an important epistemological principle: Where there is a consciousness, there necessarily is a corresponding cognitive object (*ālambana*): Consciousness cannot arise simply by itself. The Sarvāstivādins — and for that matter the Sautrāntika as well as the Yogācāra — in fact make good us of this principle. In the case of the Sarvāstivāda and the Yogācāra, consciousness and its object arise necessarily at the same time. The Sarvāstivāda invokes it to establish that past and future *dharma*-s exist;[7] the Sautrāntika, that external reality exists; the Yogācāra, that nothing exists apart from consciousness. A corollary of this principle is that consciousness necessarily arises with a specific content, determined by the cognitive object.

6.3. Simultaneous arising of thought and thought concomitants

For the Sarvāstivāda, the specific nature of a mental state is also contributed by the mental concomitants (*caitta/caitasika*) that are co-nascent with thought. There is a set of ten such concomitants, called the universals (*mahā-bhūmika*-s) which are always present in every thought that arises. These are: contact (*sparśa*), sensation (*vedanā*), ideation (*saṃjñā*), volition (*cetanā*), predilection (*chanda*), understanding (*prajñā*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), mental application (*manaskāra*), determination/resolve (*adhimukti*) and concentration (*samādhi*). Each of these is a distinct real mental entity — a force — contributing a shade, as it were, of the overall mental content, though one may be operationally more dominant than others at a given time.

In the case of the skillful mental states, in addition to the ten universal *dharma*-s, there is another set of "skillful universal *dharma*-s" (*kuśala*-

mahābhūmika) which are always co-nascent with any skillful *dharma*: faith (*śraddhā*), diligence (*apramāda*), calm (*praśrabdhi*), equanimity (*upekṣā*), modesty (*hrī*), shame (*apatrāpya*), non-greed (*alobha*), non-hatred (*adveṣa*), harmlessness (*avihiṃsā*), vigour (*vīrya*).

Likewise, there are ten universals for the unskillful (*akuśala*) *dharma*-s: delusion (*moha*), non-diligence (*pramāda*), slackness (*kauśīdya*), faithlessness (*āśraddhya*), torpor (*styāna*) and restlessness (*auddhatya*); and two for the defiled (*kliṣṭa*) *dharma*-s: non-modesty (*āhrīkya*) and shamelessness (*anapatrāpya*). Defiled *dharma*-s are of a broader scope in that they include both unskillful and veiled-nondefiled (*nivṛta-avyākṛta*) *dharma*-s. Moreover, whereas unskillful mental states obtain only in the sensulity sphere (*kāma-dhātu*), the defiled ones exist in all the three spheres.

In addition, a group of ten *caitta*-s are classified as small/restricted defilements because they arise separately, being in conjunction with only the ignorance (*avidyā*) pertaining to the mental ground (*manobhūmi*) and abandonable through cultivation (*bhāvanāheya*). These are: anger (*krodha*), enmity (*upanāha*), dissimulation (*śāṭhya*), jealousy (*īrṣyā*), resentful self-opiniatedness (*pradāśa*), concealment (*mrakṣa*), avarice (*mātsarya*), deceptiveness (*māyā*), intoxication (*mada*) and harmfulness (*vihiṃsā*).

Finally, there are some *caitta*-s such as reasoning (*vitarka*), investigation (*vicāra*), remorse (*kaukṛtya*) etc. which are grouped under the "indeterminate (*aniyata*) *dharma*-s", as they cannot be properly fitted into any of the above categories.

The simultaneous arising of thought and thought-concomitants in co-ordination is referred to as the phenomenon of conjunction/association (*saṃprayoga*). In the MVŚ, we see different opinions concerning the notion.[8] Eventually, a fivefold equality or sameness (*pañcadhā samatā*) among the *citta* and *caitta*-s came to be accepted as the standard requirements for them to be regarded as being in conjunction:[9]

I. Sameness in basis — both the *citta* and *caitta*-s must be supported by the same basis (*āśraya*) i.e., the sense organ.
II. Sameness in object (*ālambana*) — they must have the same cognitive object.
III. Sameness in mode of activity (*ākāra*) — the mode of apprehending the percept must be the same; thus, if the *citta* apprehends greenness the *caitta*-s too apprehend likewise.
IV. Sameness in time (*kāla*) — they must be co-nascent.

V. Sameness in substance (*dravya*) — in a given *citta* there is conjoined only one *vedanā* (either pleasurable, unpleasurable or neutral), one *saṃjñā* (either the idea of 'small', or 'big', or 'male' or 'female', etc.), etc.

The conjoined *citta-caitta-dharma*-s arising simultaneously are said to be mutually conjoined causes (*saṃprayuktaka-hetu*) to one another; the absence of any one renders their very co-nascence impossible: either they arise all together, or none of them can come into existence at all. The conjoined cause is a subset of the co-existent cause (*sahabhū-hetu*) which represents a distinctive Sarvāstivāda doctrine, of utmost importance for both their theory of direct perception as well as their fundamental thesis of *sarvāstitva*. While not all simultaneously existing *dharma*-s can be subsumed under this causal category, whatever that are necessarily co-nascent are co-existent causes one to another. The Sarvāstivādins provide two main illustrations of the simultaneity of cause and effect in the empirical world: the mutual causal dependence of the members of a tripod, and the co-nascence of a lamp with its light.

Saṃghabhadra argues at length to establish the validity of this type of causality.[10] He claims that the Buddha teaches two types of cause: those which precede their effects (前生因, *agraja*, *pūrvaja*) and those which are co-nascent with their effects (俱生因, *sahaja*, *sahajāta*).[11] The co-existent causes come under the second type.[12] This, he further claims, accords with the Buddha's statement of the principle of conditionality:

> This being, that exists. From the arising of this, that arises (*asmin satī'daṃ bhavati / asyo'tpādād idam utpadyate /*).[13]

Saṃghabhadra explains:

> Contrary to this are non-existence, non-arising. This is the general characteristic of causality. In [the Buddha's statement above], The first [sentence] illustrates the case of the co-existent cause; the second further illustrates that of the previously-produced cause.

6.4. Successive arising

Not all Sarvāstivādins, however, share the view of simultaneous arising. In the MVŚ, we find the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta and other early Dārṣṭāntikas asserting that *citta-caitta*-s arise successively:

> The *citta-caitta-dharma*-s arise successively in dependence on causes and conditions. This is like the case of a group of merchants passing through a risky path: they go through one at a time; no two moving together. Likewise, where an assemblage (*sāmagrī*) of conditions obtains, *citta-caitta-dharma*-s arise one at a time, the conditions on which [their arising] depends being different in each case.[14]

Elsewhere in the MVŚ, Bhadanta Dharmatrāta is said to assert that *citta-caitta-dharma*-s are specific types of *cetanā*.[15] Another prominent Dārṣṭāntika master figuring in the MVŚ, Buddhadeva, holds that there are no *caitta*-s apart from *citta*:[16] a *caitta* is simply a particular mode or state (*avasthā-viśeṣa*)[17] of the mind at a given time. For these masters then, there cannot be conjoined *citta-caitta*-s; or, as some of them may concede, conjunction can only mean their being in correspondence when arsing in a successive sequence.[18]

The Sautrāntika rejects the Sarvāstivāda category of the co-existent cause. For them, a cause necessarily precedes an effect — a principle that has great significance for their theory of perception. The Sautrāntika being a liberal movement of Buddhists united through their common emphasis on the *sūtra*-s, however, tolerates different views on the *caitta*-s. Thus, some, following Buddhadeva, assert that there is none.[19] Others, like Śrīlāta, expound a theory that is essentially a modified version of Dharmatrāta's.

6.5. Śrīlāta's *anudhātu* theory

Śrīlāta was one of the most important Sautrāntika leaders around the early part of the 5th century A.D. In Saṃghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra* (= Ny), an orthodox Vaibhāṣika polemic refuting the critique of the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntika in general, and of Vasubandhu in particular, Śrīlāta is conspicuously a major target for the author's attack. His *citta-caitta* doctrine, alongside with that of Dharmatrāta, will be examined in detail in the next chapter. Here, we shall outline Śrīlāta's *anudhātu* doctrine which, as we shall see (chapter 8), is involved in his theory of perception.

The *anudhātu* theory is a form of the better known seed (*bīja*) theory. As Vibhajyavādins, all Sautrāntika explanations of the preservation of causal efficacies must be in terms of the present *dharma*-s. The *bīja* theory is fundamentally a doctrine for this purpose. The Sautrāntikas explain 'seed'[20] as "all the efficacies, successive and immediate, of the psycho-

physical complex (*nāma-rūpa*), in generating their own effects ('fruit')." There are distinctive efficacies within the person's serial continuity which continuously undergoes a progressive transformation. The seed cannot be said to be a whole or differentiated; they in fact do not exist as distinctive ontological entities (別體, *dravyāntara*).[21] It is (/they are) neither identical with nor different from the serial continuity.

The *anudhātu* theory contains all the essential elements of the seed theory described above. Saṃghabhadra certainly understands the *anudhātu* as a particular name for *bīja* (種子名差別),[22] and uses *anudhātu* and *dhātu* — a term standing for causal efficacy and having the same signification as *bīja*[23] — interchangeably.[24] Śrīlāta himself too explains *anudhātu* in terms of *dhātu*:

> What is the characteristic of this [*anudhātu*]?
> It has, as its characteristic, the *dhātu* formed from the perfuming of the various *dharma*-s.[25]
>
> The one *citta* is possessed of various *dhātu*-s.[26]

Also, its essential nature (體) is ineffable, just as *bīja* qua efficacy is said to be non-predicable as being either a unity or differentiated:

> The nature (體) of this *pūrva-anudhātu* is ineffable. It can only be stated to be the six *āyatana*-s which, perfumed by *karma* and defilement, project the effect of another life.
>
> … this [present] six *āyatana*-s having been perfumed by *karma* and defilement, generate the retribution fruits of the future six *āyatana*-s.[27]

As is well known, this perfuming is certainly *bīja* from both the general Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra perspectives.

The term *anudhātu* may be rendered as "pursuing element". The prefix *anu-* signifies 'following'/'pursuing' 隨逐,[28] **anu-√gam*/**anu-√bandh*; or 'accompanying' 隨俱行, *anu-saha-√gam*. The *anudhātu* is also sometimes called **pūrva-anudhātu* (舊隨界); the component "**pūrva*" signifying the fact that these causal efficacies have been transmitted within the serial continuity from previous time: they have always been 'accompanying' the serial continuity. Śrīlāta's explanation, in the context of explaining the nature of 'condition qua cause' (*hetu-pratyaya*), brings out this signification of 'accompanying' efficacies as **pūrva-anudhātu*:

> The nature of *hetu-pratyaya* (因緣性 **hetu-pratyayatā*) is the **pūrvānudhātu*: the nature of serving as cause, successively, in the serial continuities of sentient beings.[29]
>
> ... The Fortunate One says in the *sūtra*: "It should be understood that in such a person (*pudgala*), the skillful *dharma*-s are concealed (*antarhita*) and the unskillful *dharma*-s become manifest (*saṃmukhībhūta*). There exist the accompanying roots of skillfulness which have not yet been cut off. On account of their not having yet been cut off, there is still the possibility of other roots of skillfulness arising from these roots of skillfulness.[30]
>
> The accompanying roots of skillfulness are the *pūrva-anudhātu*, the nature of being the cause successively in the serial continuity (展轉相續能為因性). Such kinds of [causal efficacy] are known as 'condition qua cause'.

One point to be noted is that the *anudhātu* theory may be said to be a more generalized form of the *bīja* theory as expounded in the AKB. It is a theory that accounts for the continuous manifestation of the totality of a sentient being's existence — the six *āyatana*-s — from one present moment to next. The *anudhātu* is the causal efficacy within the sentient being's present serial continuity, and the next moment of the serial continuity is the effect.

In this connection, we see an important difference in the understanding of the term 'retribution-born' (*vipākaja*) between the Sarvāstivāda and Śrīlāta's school of thought. According to the Sarvāstivada, *dharma*-s can be categorized as 'retribution-born (*vipākaja*)', 'accumulative (*aupacayika*)', or 'emanative (*naiḥṣyandika*)', etc.[31] "Retribution-born' is defined as 'that which is born of retribution-cause' or 'that born from the *karma* which has become matured.' [32] The eye, etc. (except sound) are both 'accumulative' and 'retribution-born'. For the Sarvāstivāda, whereas a karmic cause is either skillful or unskillful, a retribution is always undefined[33] and nonveiled (*nivṛtāvyākṛta*) which, being weak like rotten seeds, cannot serve as a karmic cause in turn.[34] Saṃghabhadra also explains that, being projected by the force of previous *karma* and not by an effort, a retribution-born *dharma* is necessarily weak and hence incapable of generating a skillful (or unskillful) *citta* of effort.[35]

Sthavira Śrīlāta, however, asserts that 'retribution-born' signifies whatever that is born of retribution; "all are induced by the force of retribution alone."[36] This then does not contradict his *anudhātu* doctrine that the 12 *āyatana*-s are causally efficacious. For him, the whole of the 12 *āyatana*-s are retribution-born:

> Herein, with regard to the twelve *āyatana*-s, the Sthavira (= Śrīlāta) claims that they are retribution-born (*vipākaja*) in all cases.[37]

Śrīlāta also holds that all *dharma*-s arise immediately (*samanantaram*). There is a difference between the force of immediacy (等無間力) and the force of a generative cause; in the process of generating a *dharma*, both are efficacious.[38]

When Śrīlāta states explicitly that every moment in the serial continuity is 'retribution-born', Saṃghabhadra questions him as to whether this does not amount to the denial of the general Buddhist doctrine that there are *karma*-s to be retributed in a future existence. Moreover, does this position not align with the view of the heretics that everything is the result of the past life as its cause (past *karma*)? Śrīlāta answers in the negative:

> [Saṃghabhadra:] If it is the case that the six *āyatana*-s, which can immediately generate a retribution, serves as the cause capable of producing an effect, then there would not be *karma* which is to be retributed in a subsequent existence (*apara-paryāya-vedanīya-karma*). This is because only an immediately preceding cause generates a retribution.
>
> [Śrīlāta:] There is no such fallacy, because an effect can be projected immediately [or] through a succession. This is like the case of a flower and a seed which [respectively] project the effect immediately and through a succession.[39]

Elsewhere, while repudiating the Sarvāstivada thesis of tri-temporal existence (*sarvāstitva*), Śrilāta states that past *karma*, though non-existent, can still be said to have its fruit

> because the condition qua cause exists, because the *anudhātu* exists, because there is not yet that which prevents its serial continuity, because its retribution fruit is not yet matured, because it is only in the final moment [of its serial continuity] that it is capable of inducing the retribution.[40]

From these statements of Śrīlāta, it is sufficiently clear that he makes a distinction between what is retribution-born and what is properly termed the retribution of past *karma*, and that the former can serve as a cause generating *dharma*-s of different moral species.

The Yogācāra also makes a similar distinction, though with doctrinally different signification. YBŚ[41] speaks of two types of retribution-born:

1. A 'retribution-born' refers to the arising of the retribution entity (異熟體生). 2. A 'retribution-born' is what is born from a retribution (從異熟生). Thus, as in Śrīlāta's conception, 'retribution-born' signifies a bigger set than 'retribution fruit'. The first YBŚ definition is acceptable to all — Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra — while the second is shared by both Śrīlāta and YBŚ. For the Yogācāra, only the *ālaya-vijñāna* is categorized as 'retribution fruit'.[42] Thus, the *Abhidharmasammucaya* states:

> By retribution is meant the *ālayavijñāna* and its conjoined *dharma*-s. The rest are only retribution-born, not retribution.[43]

To summarize: Śrīlāta's theory entails the following:

(1) All pertaining to the sentient serial continuity (the six *āyatana*-s) arise in each moment from the *anudhātu* (= *bīja*) within the being. These *anudhātu*-s have been possessed by the being since previous times. Their nature is effable, and is neither unitary nor differentiated — neither identical with nor different from the serial continuity.

(2) All *dharma*-s are arisen immediately in the present moment.

(3) The totality of empirical existence — the twelve *āyatana*-s — are *vipākaja*, which is to be distinguished from *vipāka* of the *karma* of a sentient being.

These doctrines, although not amounting to *vijñāptimātratā*, are nevertheless very close to the general Yogācāra tradition.

6.6. Functional differences between thought and thought-concomitants

Skandhila's *Abhidharmāvatāra*, a post-AKB Vaibhāṣika work,[44] explains the function of consciousness, as distinct from that of the co-nascent thought-concomitants — in the single moment of a visual perception — as follows:

> The generic discernment [without any particular detail] of an object-substance (*viṣaya-vastu*), such as a visual form, is called consciousness. That is: the functions which arise in the present moment, with the accompanying assistance of the visual organs, etc. (*indriyasahakāra*), with regard to the six forms of objects, and which cognize visual and other objects only generically, are called consciousness. That which is capable of cognizing the distinguishing characteristic (*viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇa*) [of an object] is called a thought-concomitant, such as sensation (*vedanā*). Consciousness does not

have this function; it serves only as a support [for the thought-concomitants]. The function of consciousness exists only in the present within which single moment cognizing takes place. This is also called 'mind' (*manas*) and 'thought' (*citta*); and is also that by which the fundamental essence of a sentient being is designated (*mūla-sattva-dravya*).[45]

Thus, with the co-ordination of the corresponding faculty, a consciousness arises in the present moment and becomes conscious of an object generically as a specific category. The five sensory consciousnesses are said to have the specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*), and not the common characteristic (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) as its object. The latter entails abstract universals. But this specific characteristic refers to that as a distinct perceptual category (*āyatana-svalakṣaṇa*) — e.g. a visual object as a *rūpāyatana*, a sound as a *śabdāyatana* — not to that as an entity or thing in itself (*dravya-svalakṣaṇa*). Nevertheless, it is a direct grasping of the entity (*dravya, vastu*) itself, and not a conceptualization of it. However, from the point of view of *dravya-svalakṣaṇa*, since a sensory consciousness bears on the totality of the cognitive object, it may also be said to have as its object the common characteristic[46] in the sense of a discernment of a multiplicity of entities.[47] This illustrates the relativity of the concept of *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, which allows the MVŚ also to explain in these terms: Visual consciousness can also arise taking the 20 entities subsumed under *rūpāyatana* as its cognitive object; accordingly a sensory consciousness can perceive collectively or individually, and yet it does not amount to taking *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* as its cognitive objects: "a single consciousness can perceive the *svalakṣaṇa* of numerous entities, but not with clarity".[48]

It is note-worthy that in the above passage, this functional nature of cognizing an object generically as a whole is common to all the six forms of consciousness, not just the five sensory ones. The distinguishing aspects of the object can only be grasped by the thought-concomitants. Yaśomitra describes this functional difference succinctly:

> *Vijñāna* cognizes (*vijānāti*) — that is, apperceives (*upalabhate*) — a blue or yellow entity (*vastu*). Likewise, *vedanā* feels that very object [as being pleasurable, etc.]; *saṃjñā* categorizes it; *cetanā* acts on it volitionally; etc. Or rather, *vijñāna* grasps that very object in a generic manner (*sāmānya-rūpeṇa*) as a perceptible. On the other hand, in a specific manner (*viśeṣa-rūpeṇa*), *vedanā* grasps it as a sensible; *saṃjñā* grasps it as a categorizable; etc.[49]

While thought and concomitants are always co-nascent, thought is to be considered the 'chief substance (*pradhāna-dravya*). This is because it is

thought that grasps the very object-entity; and it is only when it is so grasped that the simultaneous functioning of the concomitants come into play. Moreover, in each case of such co-nascence, thought is indispensable whereas some of the concomitants may be absent. Accordingly, the thought-concomitants may be considered as being functionally subordinate to and dependent on thought which is like the king (*rājasthānīya*) in relation to his retinue.[50] According to Pu Guang, there were four ancient views on the functional relationship between thought and thought-concomitants.[51]

6.7. Functional differences between the first five sensory consciousnesses and mental consciousness

While all the six forms of consciousness are said to have the same intrinsic nature of being conscious, and all grasp in each case the object-substance generically, the Sarvāstivāda sees distinct differences as regards the functional nature between the five sensory consciousnesses on the one hand and mental consciousness on the other. Some of these differences are also acknowledged by the Sautrāntika and others. To begin with, each sensory consciousness is confined to its specific object at the present moment only: visual consciousness can cognize only a single present visual object, auditory consciousness, only a single present sound; etc. Its object is always external; the sense faculties and the consciousnesses cannot become its objects. However, there are some Ābhidharmika masters who allow that a sensory consciousness can also arise taking multiple objects of the same kind at once, as in the case of a non-discriminative or non-distinct visual perception.[52] In contrast, mental consciousness can at once take multiple objects, including those of the five sensory consciousnesses, and its objects need not be confined to a single species or time period.[53]

Moreover, in addition to grasping the mere object-substance, thanks to contribution from the co-nascent concomitants — particularly understanding (*prajñā*) and recollection (*smṛti*) and ideation (*saṃjñā*) which can function strongly therein — mental consciousness can also interpret a given perceptual data, and even abstractize and conceptualize on it. In *Abhidharma* terms, it can perceive both the specific as well as the common characteristics. This interpretive capability of mental consciousness is generically indicated by the term *vikalpa*, 'discrimination'. The Sarvāstivāda speaks of three types of *vikalpa*:

(i) *svabhāva-vikalpa* 'simple or intrinsic discrimination', equated with the two indeterminate thought-concomitants *vitarka*, 'reasoning' and *vicāra*, 'investigation';
(ii) *anusmaraṇa-vikalpa*, 'discrimination by way of recollection' — the universal concomitant *smṛti*;
(iii) *abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa*, 'discrimination by way of determination' — the non-concentrated (*asamāhita*) *prajñā*.

In the Sarvāstivāda explanation, the *smṛti* and *prajñā* — identified with the second and third *vikalpa*, respectively — conjoined with the five sensory consciousnesses are weak, and hence the latter two types of *vikalpa*-s are not operative. They are thus said to be without *vikalpa*, 'non-discriminative' (*avikalpaka*), even though the simple type of discrimination *svabhāva-vikalpa*, is present.[54] In contrast, because mental consciousness possesses all the three types of *vikalpa*, it is said to be *vikalpaka*, 'discriminative'; with the exception of that of one in meditation wherein *abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa* is not operative.[55] We may take this to mean that when a sensory consciousness cognizes generically an entity as a particular category of *dharma*, this simple type of discrimination is involved; but there is no mental interpretation or conceptualization.

Saṃghabhadra explains why mental consciousness is said to be discriminative (*vikalpaka*):

> If a consciousness can, within a single moment grasp objects belonging to numerous species, and can, with regard to one given cognitive object generate a stream of thoughts — a consciousness of such a nature is said to be discriminative. The five groups of *vijñāna*, on the other hand, grasp only present objects. No two moments [of thought] have the same cognitive object, for when the previous grasping of a cognitive object has ceased, there cannot be the arising of a repeated grasping [of the same object] by the consciousness in the second moment. Mental consciousness can take objects belonging to the three periods of time. [In this case,] a *dharma*, though having ceased, can still be its object, and a stream of thoughts can be generated with regard to the same object. For these reasons, only this [consciousness] is said to be discriminative. However, since the five *vijñāna-kāya* are always conjoined with *svabhāva-vikalpa*, they are also discriminative. The *sūtra*-s speak of them as being non-discriminative [only] in the sense of being without *anusmaraṇa*- and *abhirūpaṇa-vikalpa*-s.[56]

With regard to *abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa*, it is particularly the aspect of judgemental investigation of *prajñā*, represented by *saṃtīraṇa*,

that characterizes its function. In this connection, we may note that in the *Dharma-saṃgraha*,[57] the three *vikalpa*-s are given as *anusmaraṇa-*, *saṃtīraṇa-* and *sahaja-*; with *saṃtīraṇa-* obviously corresponding to *abhinirūpaṇā*. When understanding displays its judgemental nature, *saṃtīraṇatva*, it is called a view (*dṛṣṭi*).[58] The MVŚ gives the following reasons as to why the understanding conjoined with mental consciousness can function as views, while that conjoined with a sensory consciousness is not view, though it can be knowledge (*jñāna*):

(1) it does not have a keen or sharp (*tīkṣṇa*, *paṭu*) mode of activity (*ākāra*) and cannot penetrate deeply into the cognitive object;
(2) it cannot discriminate;
(3) it can have as their cognitive object only the *svalakṣaṇa*, but not the *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*;
(4) it has only present objects, whereas a view can have as objects *dharma*-s of all the three temporal periods as well as the unconditioned;
(5) a view can grasp an object repeatedly, but this *prajñā* can only grasp an object in a single moment;
(6) unlike a view, it cannot cogitate and examine a cognitive object.[59]

These explanations define, in a clear and important way, how a sensory consciousness perceives an object: it perceives only a present object, and only the *svalakṣaṇa*; because its mode of activity (= conjoined *prajñā*) is not strong, it makes only rudimentary discrimination, examination, judgement or conceptualization — to the extent that one can speak of their absence, even though the universal thought-concomitants that perform these functions are always conjoined with any consciousness. This is essentially the same as stating that it does not have the functions of *anusmaraṇa* and *abhinirūpaṇā*. *Anusmaraṇa* presupposes the ability to examine the object (more correctly, object-series) clearly and for more than one moment. There must also be a clear mental noting of the object in the form "it is such and such" (see below) — a kind of mental speech (*abhilapanā*)[60]. This means that the prominent functioning of *smṛti* here requires the assistance of *prajñā*, *vitarka* (and *vicāra*), and *saṃjñā*.

The functional difference between the five sensory consciousnesses and mental consciousness is also contributed by the two thought-concomitants, *vitarka* and *vicāra*. These two are classified by the Sarvāstivādins as indeterminate (*aniyata*) thought-concomitants since two, being of opposing nature, cannot exercise their dominant functions. The *Avatāra* defines them as follows:

> *Vitarka* has the characteristic of causing thought to be gross with regard to an object (*cittaudāryalakṣaṇa*). It is also named discriminative reflection (*saṃkalpadvitīyanāmā*). Struck by the wind of ideation (*saṃjñāpavanoddhata*), it operates (*vartate*) in a gross manner. It is this *dharma* which serves as the projecting cause (*pañcavijñāna-pravṛtti-hetu*) of the five consciousnesses.
>
> *Vicāra* has the characteristic of causing thought to be subtle. It is this *dharma* which serves as the cause that accords with the operation of mental consciousness on its object (*manovijñānapravṛttyanukūla-hetu*).[61]

Thus, whereas *vitarka* is the projecting cause of a sensory consciousness, *vicāra* accords with the arising of mental consciousness. We can now appreciate why Saṃghabhadra defines *svabhāva-vikalpa* as *vitarka* only. (See *supra*) In a sensory consciousness, it receives a contribution from *saṃjñā* — and hence called 'conception' (*saṃkalpa*) — and operates grossly with regard to the object, discriminating as to its type of appearance (*nimitta-prakāra*). To this extent, there is also a rudimentary discrimination in a sensory consciousness — a generic grasping of the object as a specific species. However, it is not to the extent where there is the prominent functioning of the judgemental aspect of *prajñā* and the conceptualization of *samjñā* via naming, which takes place only in a mental consciousness where *vicāra* becomes properly operative. It is also for this reason that *abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa* is said to be absent; this is in fact not possible when comparison and association, presupposing the ability to remember previous experience of the same object and to reflect on more than one objects at a given time, are not properly operative.

The Sautrāntika has a different conception of *vitarka* and *vicāra*. Sthiramati tells us that this school does not acknowledge the *svabhāva-vikalpa*, since from their point of view *vitarka* is nothing more than the searching of the mind.[62] In his own explanation,

> It is with reference to the *svabhāva-vikalpa* which is the gross state of the mind that *vitarka* is so called.[63]

The "ancient masters" (*pūrvācārya*) among the Sautrāntika — whose views are esteemed in the AKB — define the two *caitta*-s as follows:

> What is *vitarka*? It is a mental murmur of a searching nature (*paryeṣako mano-jalpa*), supported by either *cetanā* or *prajñā*, accordingly as it is in a non-deductive or deductive state (*anabhyūhābhyūhāvasthayor yathā-kramam*). It is the gross state of the thought.
>
> What is *vicāra*? It is a mental murmur of an investigative nature (*paryavekṣako mano-jalpa*), supported by either *cetanā* or *prajñā*, accordingly as it is in a non-deductive or deductive state. It is the subtle state of the thought.[64]

Very similar definitions are given in the Yogācāra texts.[65] In the TVB, Sthiramati comments that:
"searching" is the operation having the mode of activity of determination in the form "what is it?" (*kim etad iti nirūpaṇākāra-pravṛttiḥ*). This searching state of mind is called a murmur on account of it being like a murmur (*jalpa iva jalpaḥ*).
"Investigative", on the other hand, refers to the determination, in the form "it is that", on what has previously been known (*idaṃ tad iti pūrvādhigata-nirūpaṇāt*).

Accordingly, whether *vitarka* and *vicāra* are distinct entities as asserted by the Sarvāstivāda or are mere states of mind as conceived by the Sautrāntika, both schools — and for that matter, the Yogācāra as well — would agree that in a sensory consciousness, *vitarka* makes possible a grasping of the mere object (*vastu-mātra*), grossly determined as such, without really knowing the nature of the object. Evidently for this reason, *vitarka* is considered by the Sarvāstivāda as the cause for only a sensory consciousness which is said to be without the capacity of determination. It is in the case of mental consciousness, and at the stage represented by *vicāra*, when thinking is sufficiently subtle, that the object is properly determined as "it is that". (See below)

That besides *prajñā*, *saṃjñā* also is a contributing factor for the *abhinirūpaṇā* is clear from the fact that its functioning is said to involve a synthetic comprehension of appearance (*nimitta*), name (*nāma*) and signification (*artha*). Thus, the *Avatāra* defines it as:

> That which understands, by combining conceptually (*saṃ-√jñā*) the appearance, name and signification [of a *dharma*]. That is, with regard to matter like blue, yellow, long and short [figures], etc. ... *dharma*-s like males and females, etc. — it understands them, [in each case], by conceptually combining together (*eka-√jñā*) their appearances, names and signification. It is the cause of *vitarka*.[66]

It is on account of the contribution from *saṃjñā* that mental consciousness is able to operate by means of name (= *adhivacana*) which is therefore said to

be the additional cognitive object (*adhikam ālambanam*) of mental contact (*manaḥ-saṃsparśa*).[67] Saṃghabhadra comments that it is 'additional' because mental consciousness takes both *nāma* and *artha* as its object, whereas the five sensory consciousnesses do not take nāma as their cognitive objects.[68] The functional difference that results from this factor of name is explained in the *Vijñāna-kāya-śāstra* as follows:

> The visual consciousness can only apprehend a blue colour (*nīlam*), but not "it is blue" (*no tu nīlam iti*). Mental consciousness can also apprehend a blue colour. [But] so long as it is not yet able to apprehend its name, it cannot apprehend "it is blue". When it can apprehend its name, then it can also apprehend "it is blue".[69]

We have already seen above that, for both the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika, at the stage where only *vitarka* is operative, the consciousness cannot determine the actual nature of the object which therefore fails to be named. Here in the above passage, the necessary role of name in making a judgmental determination is further clarified. That is: at the initial stage of the perceptual process —whether sensory or mental — so long as the consciousness does not take name as its object, it cannot make a judgement or determine in the form "it is blue". In his commentary on the AKB's description on the three *vikalpa*, Sthiramati too, explains that it is on account of their not having names as cognitive objects that the sensory consciousnesses are said to without *abhirūpaṇā-vikalpa*. For, this *vikalpa*, identified with the non-concentrated *prajñā*, derives its name from the fact that it "operates by way of determining (計度而轉 **abhinirūpaṇayā pravartate*) the names of the corresponding [cognitive objects] — the names of *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra*, etc."[70] The connection between *abhinirūpaṇā* and *saṃjñā* is also conspicuous in the Yogācāra definition on *saṃjñā* given by Sthiramati:

> *Saṃjñā* is the grasping of the appearance of an object. The object is the cognitive object. [Its] appearance is its distinctiveness — the cause for establishing the cognitive object as a blue colour, a yellow colour, etc. The grasping of [this appearance] is the determination (*nirūpaṇā*) that "this is blue, not yellow".[71]

Summarizing from the above discussion, we see that according to the Sarvāstivāda, *saṃjñā* is the cause of *vitarka*, and *vitarka* is in turn the cause for the arising of a sensory consciousness. At this stage, there is a simple inquiry or searching on the mere object grasped, in the form "what is it?". Both schools and Sautrāntika would agree that some kind of inarticulate

mental inquiry is involved here. The Sarvāstivāda perspective may be understood to conceive of this as a contribution coming from the co-nascent thought-concomitants, *saṃjñā*, *prajñā* and *smṛti* — which all operate weakly — and *vitarka*. For the Sautrāntika, it is the thought itself operating in its gross state, represented by *vitarka* which makes the inquiry in the form of an inarticulate murmur. At the same time, a sensory consciousness is said to be distinguished from mental consciousness by its lack of *abinirūpaṇā-vikalpa* on account of its not taking name as is object. This must then mean that, for the Sarvāstivāda, in a sensory perception, the "wind of *saṃjñā*" is strong enough only for a rudimentary determination, in a generic manner, of the object as a thing in itself, but not for conceptualization based on judgement and association. In other words, *saṃjñā* could be considered as the cause of the intrinsic discrimination (= *vitarka*) that is present in all acts of consciousness, but when *prajñā* and *smṛti* operate prominently in a mental consciousness, it also functions to assist in the conceptualizing act involving name. *Vitarka*, though not subsumed as a universal thought-concomitant, is nonetheless always present at the arising of a sensory perception. It is in fact considered the latter's cause, evidently in the sense that it makes the main contribution in such a rudimentary discrimination as regards the object's appearance (*nimitta*) that constitutes the grasping of an object by a sensory consciousness.[72] We shall see below that some fundamental differences not withstanding, the Sautrāntika theory of perception shares much with the Sarvāstivāda as regards the notion of *vikalpa*. (See *supra*)

6.8. The question of reflexive knowledge

For the Sarvāstivāda, *citta* or *caitta* cannot know itself. More generally, an intrinsic nature (an entity in itself) cannot have any function, any operation, on itself. Moreover, a mental *dharma* also cannot know the *citta-caitta-dharma*-s with which it is conjoined or with which it is conascent (i.e. its co-existent, the *viprayukta-saṃskāra*-s, etc.). It is for this reason that according to the Sarvāstivāda, omniscience (*sarvajñā*) can only be accomplished in two moments, since in the first moment, the *prajñā* must exclude itself, its conjoined *citta-caitta*-s and its co-existents. It is only in the subsequent moment that these excluded objects of knowledge can be cognized.[73] The MVŚ distinguishes this Sarvāstivāda position from those of other schools:

> There are some who hold that the *citta-caitta-dharma*-s can cognize their own intrinsic natures (i.e., themselves), like the Mahāsāṃghikas who assert:

> "Because knowledge, etc., has cognition as its intrinsic nature, it can cognize both itself and others. This is just like the case of a lamp; because it has illumination as its intrinsic nature, it can illuminate both itself and others."
>
> There are some, like the Dharmaguptakas who hold that the *citta-caitta-dharma*-s can cognize what are conjoined with them. They assert thus: "*Prajñā* can cognize the sensation conjoined with it."
>
> There are some, like the Mahīśāsakas, who hold that the *citta-caitta-dharma*-s can cognize what are co-existent with them. They assert thus: "There are two types of *prajñā* which arise simultaneously: one is conjoined [with thought], the other not conjoined. The conjoined *prajñā* knows the unconjoined one; the unconjoined *prajñā* knows the conjoined one."
>
> There are some, like the Vatsīputrīyas, who hold that the *pudgala* can cognize *dharma*-s. They assert thus: "It is the *pudgala* that knows *dharma*-s, not knowledge (*jñāna*)…"

In later Indian treatises, the Sautrāntikas are described as holding the view of reflexive knowledge, denoted by the term *svasaṃvedana/svasaṃvitti* (also, *ātmasaṃvedana*) which means 'self-awareness'.[74] In the MVŚ, as we have seen, the doctrine is attributed to the Mahāsāṃghikas, but not to the Dārṣṭāntikas who were the forerunners of the Sautrāntikas. In the Ny, although there is no explicit attribution of such a theory under this term to the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntikas, in a discussion on the latter's doctrine of direct perception, it is mentioned that they assert the simultaneous occurrence of 'sensation as direct perception' (*anubhava-pratyakṣa*) and 'awareness as direct perception' (*buddhi-pratyakṣa*). That is to say, one has awareness of what one is directly sensing: "One has the awareness of a direct perception (現量覺; **pratyakṣa-buddhi*) with regard to one's own sensation."[75] This is clearly a doctrine of reflexive awareness. (see *infra*, § 9.3.)

Notes

1 *Cf.* DhsA, 112, on the description on *citta.*
2 *Cf.* explanation in AKB cited above.
3 MVŚ, 371a–b.
4 Ny, 484b–c. Here Saṃghabhadra is arguing against Śrīlāta who asserts that the *sūtra* definition — *vijānātīti vijñānam* —is not *paramārtha*; since if it were then when it is not exercising this function of being conscious of an object it would have to be regarded as "non-consciousness".
5 *Cf.* Ny, 446b.
6 *Cf.* AKB, 61: *cinotīti cittam/ manuta iti manaḥ/ vijānātīti vijñānam/*
7 See, for e.g., Ny, 622b, 628b; SPrŚ, 901b.
8 MVŚ, 79c–81b, 270a–b.
9 *Cf.* AKB, 62; MVŚ, 80c.
10 Ny, 417c ff. For a full discussion on the *sahabhū-hetu*, see Dhammajoti, KL, "The Sarvāstivāda Doctrine of Simultaneous Causality", in *Journal of Buddhist Studies*, Vol. I (Colombo, May, 2003), 17 ff.
11 Ny, 417a.
12 Contra. Kato, J. *Kyōryōbu no Kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1989), 309 f.
13 Xuan Zang's rendering here is : 依此有彼有，此生故彼生 'Depending on this, that exists. Because of the arising of this, that arises.'
14 MVŚ, 79c, 270a, 493c.
15 Since *cetanā* is derived from *cetas* meaning 'thought/mind', it seems probable that for Dharmatrāta, a mental state that arises is to be called *cetanā*. Understood in this way, his view may not be very different from Buddhadeva's. It may also be noted that in a discussion in MVŚ (8c) on the *laukikāgra-dharma*-s, the two views are first mentioned together. Both masters are then said to assert that the five *indriya*-s, *śraddhā*, etc., being in their intrinsic nature *cetanā/citta*, cannot be conjoined (*saṃprayukta*) ... : "彼二尊者作如是言, 信等思心前後各異, 無一並用......信等思心雖復自體無相應義 ......" The Sautrāntika master Sthavira Śrīlāta holds that there are only three co-nascent *caitta*-s (*vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā*); all the other so-called *caitta*-s, subsumable under the *saṃskāra-skandha*, are just different modes of *cetanā* (Ny, 388b, 339b). This is ostensibly a view partly derived from the five-*skandha* classification of all *dharma*-s; but in some way also possibly reflecting the influence from Dharmatrāta.
16 MVŚ, 8c, 661c.
17 *Cf.* ADV, 76: *nārthānatabhūtaś caitasikā iti bhadanta-buddhadevaḥ/* AKB, 440, also mentions this view without specifically naming Buddhadeva . Also *cf.* MVŚ, 228c.
18 *Cf.* MVŚ, 564b.
19 Ny, 395a.
20 A clear explanation on the doctrine, more specifically with reference to karmic efficacy, is given in chapter nine of the AKB, 477: "We do not say that the future fruit arises from the karma that has perished (*vinaṣṭāt karmaṇaḥ*). ... It is from the distinctive [last moment] in the serial transformation (*santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa* 相續轉變差別) of that [*karma*]; like the seed [generating] the fruit. ...Why then is it said to be the fruit of that seed? Because the efficacy

[for generating the fruit] existing in the flower was induced by it through a succession from it. ... It is thus that the fruit is said to arise from the *karma*. and it is not the case that it arises from the karma that has perished, nor [does it arise] immediately [after the *karma*]. … It is from the distinctive [last moment] in the serial transformation of that [*karma*]"

21 Ny, 397b–c.

22 Ny, 440b, 398b.

23 Ny, 398b. Also *cf.* MVŚ, 367c (種種因義). In Sthiramati's commentary on the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, *dhātu* is explicitly glossed as *bīja* (T 31, no.1606, 704b: 一切法種子義).

24 Ny, 440b: 此舊隨界 ... 此界 .... Ny, 441c: 多品類心界隨逐 ... 從此多心隨界 ...

25 Ny, 440b: ... 是種種法所薰成界 ...

26 Ny, 442b.

27 Ny, 440b.

28 See Ny, 597c: 功能隨逐心心所.

29 Ny, 440b: 諸有情展轉相續能為因性.

30 Ny, 440b. This *sūtra* is also cited in ADV, 166 f. Both Saṃghabhadra (Ny, 416c) and Yaśomitra (Vy, 188 f) cites a similar passage to illustrate *sabhāga-hetu*. Vy, *loc. cit.*: *samanvāgato'yaṃ pudgalaḥ kuśalair api dharmair akuśalair api yāvad asti cāsyāṇusahagataṃ kuśala-mūlam asamucchinnaṃ yato 'sya kuśala-mūlād anyat kuśala-mūlam utpatsyate / evam ayaṃ pudgala āyatyāṃ viśuddhi-dharmā bhaviṣyati /*

31 *Cf.* AKB, 25 f; MVŚ, 63a, 72b, 681a, 765a, 785b, etc.

32 AKB 25: *vipākahetor jātā vipākajāḥ / … phalakālaprāptaṃ vā karma vipāka ity ucyate / vipacyata iti kṛtvā / tāsmāj jātā vipākajāḥ /*

33 AKB, 95.

34 AKB, 89.

35 Ny, 454b.

36 Ny, 359b, 359c.

37 Ny, 359a.

38 Ny, 441c.

39 Ny, 441a.

40 Ny, 627b.

41 T30, 290c.

42 T30, 664c; T31, 7b–c,672b, 716c; etc.

43 T31, 672b. Also *cf.* T31, 716c; and *Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya, 44: akuśalasya kuśala-sāsravasya cāyatyā sasaṃprayogam ālayavijñānaṃ vipākaḥ / atas tena vipākena tadubhayaṃ savipākam ity ucyate /… ālayavijñānāt tadanyattu cakṣurādikaṃ ca sukhaduḥkhādikaṃ ca tadvipā(ka)jam ity ākhyāṃ labhate tato jātam iti kṛtvā /*

44 For the problems of date, authorship and doctrinal affiliation of this work, *cf. Entrance*, 65 ff.

45 T1554, 988a.

46 MVŚ, 65a.

47 MVŚ, 217a. See also, MVŚ, 405b.

48 MVŚ, 665b.

49 Vy, 142; *cf.* SPrŚ, 783b.

50 *Cf.* ADV, 78. See also Ny, 395b

51 T41, 26a–b. See also Dhammajoti, KL, *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma*, 3rd edition, 295.

52 MVŚ, 64a ff. Also AKB, 7: *yad etad bahuvidhaṃ rūpam uktaṃ tatra kadācid ekena dravyeṇ*

cakṣur-vijñānam utpadyate yadā tatprakāra-vyavacchedo bhavati / kadācid bahubhir yadā na vyavacchedaḥ / tadyathā senāvyūham aneka-varṇa-saṃsthānaṃ maṇi-samūhaṃ ca dūrāt paśyataḥ / evaṃ śrotrādivijñānaṃ veditavyam/

53 MVŚ, 65b, 449a. The Dārṣṭāntika hold that (i) the perceptual objects of mental consciousness exclude those of the five sensory consciousnesses; and that (ii) the six consciousnesses perceive only external objects, not the internal sense faculties or the consciousnesses (449a).

54 MVŚ, 219b; Ny, 350b; AKB, 22; ADV, 19 f. Saṃghabhadra (Ny, 349a, 350b) identifies *svabhāva-vikalpa* with *vitarka* only.

55 MVŚ, 374b.

56 Ny, 349a

57 Müller, M, ed., *Dharma-saṃgraha* (Oxford, 1885), §135.

58 *Cf. Supra*, § 1.4; AKB, 29; Vy, 80.

59 MVŚ, 490c.

60 *Cf.* ADV, 69: *cittavyāpārarūpā smṛtiḥ/ cittasyārthābhilapanā kṛtakartavya-kriyamāna-karmāntāvipramoṣa-lakṣaṇ aḥ* / Also *cf. Entrance*, 92.

61 *Cf.* ADV, 81: *kaḥ punarayaṃ vitarkaḥ ko vā vicāraḥ / vitarko nāma cittaudāryalakṣaṇaḥ saṃkalpadvitīyanāmā viṣayanimittaprakāravikalpī saṃjñāpavanoddhatavṛttiḥ audārikapañca vijñānakāyapravṛttihetuḥ / vicārastu cittasaukṣmyalakṣaṇo manovijñāna-pravṛttyanukūlaḥ /*

62 ZW, 235 f.

63 ZW, 236. Sthiramati criticizes Saṃghabhadra's identification of *svabhāva-vikalpa* with *vitarka*: "Since the *caitta-dharma*-s are equal in terms of their *āśraya, ālambana, ākāra, kāla* and *vastu* (see *supra*), they operate together with regard to an object, and are difficult to be separated; how can one single out *vitarka* alone and call it the *svabhāva-vikalpa*?" (*ibid*, 237).

64 Vy, 140: *atra pūrvācāryā āhuḥ / vitarkaḥ katamaḥ / cetanāṃ vā niśritya prajñāṃ vā paryekṣako mano-jalpo 'nabhyūhābhyūhāvasthayor yathākramaṃ/ sā ca cittasya' audārikatā/ vicāraḥ katamaḥ/ cetanāṃ vā niśritya prajñāṃ vā pratyavekṣako mano-jalpo 'nabhyūhābhyūhāvasthayor yathākramaṃ/ sā ca cittasya' sūkṣmateti /*

65 E.g., Pradhan, P. (ed.), *Abhidharma-samuccaya* (*Santiniketan*, 1950), 10; Tatia, N (ed.), *Abhidharma-samuccayabhāṣyam* (Patna, 1976), 9f; TVB, 32.

66 *Avatāra*, 981c. The Chinese passage has "cause of *vitarka* and *vicāra*". However, the Tibetan version gives only "cause of *vicāra*": *rnam par rtog pa'I rgyu*. Likewise, the very similar definiton in the ADV, 69: *nimitta-nāmārthaikyajñā saṃjñā vitarkayoniḥ /*

67 AKB, 144.

68 Ny, 506c.

69 T26, 559b–c. *Cf.* Ny, 342a. This is in fact cited in part in the AKB, 144, in this very connection: *adhivacanam ucyate nāma / tat kilāsyādhikam ālambanam ... / yathoktaṃ cakṣur-vijñānena nīlaṃ vijānāti no tu nīlam [iti]/ mano-vijñānena nīlaṃ vijānāti nīlam iti ca vijānātīti /*

70 *Tattvārthā*, in ZW, 236.

71 TVB, 21.

72 Saṃghabhadra (Ny, 349a) stresses that it is because a visual consciousness is also capable of grasping the appearance of a *rūpa* that it is also capable of generating defilements.

73 *Cf.* Ny, 742a–c.

74 E.g., Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 167; also see La Vallee Poussin (1925), 182, n. 2.

75 Ny, 374c.

7. The *Citta-caitta* Doctrine of Dharmatrāta and Śrīlāta

We have seen (§ 2) that the later Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntikas evolved from the early Sarvāstivādin Dārṣṭāntikas around the period of the compilation of the MVŚ. In this line of development, Dharmatrāta, and a little later on Kumāralāta, must be considered as among the early Dārṣṭāntikas who had provided the most significant inspiration for the Sautrāntika school of thought.

It has been known by many scholars that Śrīlāta's doctrine on the *citta-caitta*-s was essentially inherited from the early Dārṣṭāntika master Dharmatrāta. Very little, however, could be gathered from the extant Sanskrit sources to adequately demonstrate this inheritance. Fortunately, there are considerably more material preserved in the Chinese translations, particularly the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā* (MVŚ), the **Nyāyānusāra* and the **Ārya-vasumitra-bodhisattva-saṃgṛhīta* (= AVS), from which we can derive a better picture of Dharmatrāta's and Śrīlāta's doctrines, and hence a clearer perspective of the doctrinal relationship of the two masters.

In this chapter, we shall look into these Chinese sources, besides the extant Sanskrit texts, to first examine Dharmatrāta's doctrines, and then compare them to those of Śrīlāta. In doing so, it is hoped that we can derive a sufficiently clear picture of the *citta-caitta* doctrines of the two great masters and understand more on their doctrinal relationship.

7.1. The *citta-caitta* doctrine of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta

7.1.1. Dharmatrāta, as we have seen, agrees with the general standpoint of the Dārṣṭāntikas that the *citta-caitta-dharma*-s arise successively. The following two passages from the MVŚ illustrate this agreement:

(a) The Dārṣṭāntikas assert that the *citta-caitta-dharma*-s arise successively. The Bhadanta (= Dharmatrāta) says (彼大德言):[1] the *citta-caitta-dharma*-s arise one by one. It is like [people] passing through a narrow path; not even two can [pass through] together, how much less still, a number of them.[2]

(b) The Bhadanta also says: the *citta-caitta-dharma*-s arise successively, not at one and the same time, like a company of many merchants passing

> through a narrow road. ... Likewise are the *caitta-dharma*-s. ... It is definitely impossible for them to arise simultaneously in an assemblage (必無一時和合生義).[3]

In this same context as (a), another notion of conjunction — probably another Dārṣṭāntika doctrine — is also mentioned: If *y* comes into existence by virtue of *x*, then *y* is said to be conjoined with *x*. There is no requirement of simultaneity:

> (c) According to some others: If a *dharma* is arisen by the force of that, [this *dharma*] is then said to be conjoined with that, and not with other [*dharma*-s]. That is, because a *citta* can generate *citta* and *caitta*-s, *citta-caitta*-s are conjoined with *citta*. Because a *caitta* can only generate *caitta*-s, the *caitta*-s are therefore mutually conjoined. [But,] because *caitta*-s cannot generate a *citta*, it is not said that a *citta* is conjoined with *caitta*-s.[4]

Note that a *citta* is said to be able to generate another *citta*, and the latter *citta* is then said to be conjoined with the former one. Since no two *citta*-s can arise simultaneously, this also amounts to the notion of conjunction in the sense of immediate succession.

7.1.2. Another interesting passage in the MVŚ mentions Dharmatrāta's notion of companionship as conjunction:

> The Bhadanta says: the meaning of conjunction is companionship — consciousness (*vijñāna*) and the *caitta*-s are mutually accommodative, they are born at the same time (俱時而生; *sahaja*, *sahajāta*?) and grasp the same object domain.[5]

7.1.3. Dharmatrāta differs from Buddhadeva in recognizing the existence of *caitta*-s apart from *citta* itself.[6] Concerning these *caitta*-s recognized by Dharmatrāta, we can see only two mentioned by name: *vedanā* and *cetanā*, as in the following passages:

> (a) The Bhadanta (大德) says: *citta* and *vedanā*, etc. arise in an assemblage (一和合生). Just as *citta* is a single [entity in this assemblage], likewise, *vedanā*, etc., is [in each case] a single [entity]. Hence there is no fallacy [of two *citta*-s arising simultaneously].[7]
>
> (b) The Venerable (尊者) Dharmatrāta asserts thus: the *citta-caitta*-s are specific [modes of] *cetanā*.[8]

Although Dharmatrāta speaks of *vedanā*, etc., he states at the same time that *citta-caitta*-s are specific [modes of] *cetanā*. Such brief, scattered statements

are not so helpful for determining exactly what *caitta*-s are accepted by Dharmatrāta as distinct mental forces. But one point seems clear enough: They suggest that, for Dharmatrāta, *cetanā* is the main terminology for the mind in activity, of which *citta* as well as *caitta*-s are specific modes. That is to say, *cetanā* in statement (b) does not seem to mean volition in the specific sense of the same term for one of the ten *mahābhūmika dharma*-s of the Ābhidharmikas. Rather, being derived from the same root (√*cit*) as *citta*, it seems to be taken to denote the sense of "consciousness", "awareness" or "activity of thinking". Accordingly, given Dharmatrāta's position that the *citta-caitta-dharma*-s arise successively, the statement that *citta-caitta*-s are specific [modes of] *cetanā*, coupled with the doctrine that *caitta*-s are not identical with *citta*, seems to mean: *citta* as it arises in the present moment is consciousness (*vijñāna*), and the *caitta*-s which arise subsequently in a succession are not identical with the consciousness in the first moment, but are distinct modes — just as consciousness/thought is a distinct mode — of the mental flow. However, given the general outlook of the Dārṣṭāntikas — of whom Dharmatrāta is a prominent member — it is probable that Dharmatrāta accepts *vedanā* and *saṃjñā* too as such distinct modes, since these two mental *dharma*-s are usually mentioned together with *cetanā* in the *sūtra*-s whose authority the Dārṣṭāntikas uphold.

Yin Shun has pointed out that the passage in § 7.1.2. which speaks of *citta-caitta*-s as being born at the same time, and that in § 7.1.3.(a) which speaks of *citta-caitta*-s arising in an assemblage, are contradictory to the explicit statements in § 7.1.1.(a) and (b) that *citta-caitta*-s arise successively and not in an assemblage.[9] He further opines that such contradictory phrases were added subsequently in Xuan Zang's version (MVŚ) and they are absent in the corresponding passage of the earlier translation of the *Vibhāṣā* (T28, no.1546).[10] A translation of this earlier version goes as follows:

> The Venerable Buddhadeva says: The meaning of conjunction is companionship. In accordance with the particular cognition of consciousness, there come to be different names of the *caitta*-s (為諸數名), which are not born simultaneously (離於俱生). This is the meaning of conjunction.[11]

The above passage poses some problem since it gives "Venerable Buddhadeva" where MVŚ has simply Bhadanta whom we have taken to refer to Dharmatrāta. But "Buddhadeva" must have been added by the translator, since in both this and Xuan Zang's versions of the Vibhāṣā, it is clear that Buddhadeva denies the reality of any *caitta* apart from *citta*, and it is therefore

quite unlikely that he has any notion of *citta-caitta* conjunction.[12] Moreover, Yin Shun has shown that where MVŚ has "Bhadanta", this older version almost invariably gives "Venerable Buddhadeva", thus reflecting the translator's assumption at that time that "Bhadanta" refers to "Bhadanta Buddhadeva".[13] If our interpretation of this passage is correct, then we have a notion of conjunction by Dharmatrāta which is in terms of companionship and which does not require the *citta* and *caitta*-s involved being "born together" in the sense of arising at one and the same time.

Another problem here is that the passage speaks of "not born simultaneously" (or: "apart from simultaneously arising) whereas MVŚ has apparently the opposite: "born together". We shall return to this issue after examining another early work, which records Dharmatrāta's teachings in more details.

7.1.4. Dharmatrāta's doctrine in the **Ārya-vasumitra-bodhisattva-saṃgṛhīta*

The AVS (T28, no.1549) is a valuable work in that it is the only extant work that was composed before the Vibhāṣā, but after the *Jñānaprasthāna* and the *Prakaraṇa-pāda*.[14] The author, Vasumitra, is believed to be the Vasumitra mentioned in Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa* (T31, no.1609) as the author of **Vasumitra-paripṛcchā*.[15] According to Yin Shun, this work advocates the standpoint of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, and its author is most probably a follower of Dharmatrāta's school of thought.[16]

7.1.4.1. In this work, the explanation that we have seen in the MVŚ, attributed to the Bhadanta, that conjunction means companionship, is given as follows:

(a) It is also explained thus: the meaning of conjunction is companionship. Where consciousness goes, there is a mutual giving way, and the mental *dharma*-s come to be categorized accordingly.
或作是說:千(伴)[17]義是相應義。識所適處,各相開避;心所念法則有算數[18]
(*Cf.* T28, no.1546, 66b: 同伴義是相應義。如識隨所緣事, 為諸數名, 離於俱生, 是相應義.)

The following passage is apparently another explanation by the Bhadanta (尊) concerning the arising of the *caitasika*-s:

(b) What is the difference between *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *cetanā* and *vijñāna*? The Venerable explains thus: Conditioned by the *cakṣus* and *rūpa*-s,

> *cakṣur-vijñāna* arises; it is a *vijñāna* that grasps intrinsic characteristic. *Vijñāna* flows [in correspondence with] these *dharma*-s, and goes further downwards. There are three *dharma*-s that are thought concomitants (意, *caitasika*); they cognize both specifically and generically (意有三法, 識別與識共俱): [i] [*vedanā*], that by which *duḥkha* and *sukha* are obtained (experienced); [ii] *saṃjñā*, by which ideations are made and also previous deeds are recollected; [iii] *cetanā* (心), that *dharma* which is the activity of thought.[19]

7.1.4.2. Yin Shun comments on the above passage as follows:

> This is Bhadanta's (尊) explanations on *citta-caitta-dharma*-s. Although the translation is very much of an inferior quality, it is nonetheless still intelligible. The 痛, 想, 心 besides *vijñāna* are [older] renderings for *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā*. Bhadanta explains thus: For instance, visual consciousness arises with eyes as the support and *rūpa* as the *ālambana*. This visual consciousness is a consciousness which grasps only intrinsic nature (*svalakṣaṇa*). Because consciousness flows on the *dharma*-s, it moves downwards — successively evolving to generate mentals (意), i.e., mentals in the sense of mental activity (意行); this is a synonym for *caitasika dharma*-s.
>
> That 'mentals' (意) stands for all *caitasika dharma*-s is illustrated in the following passage:
>
>> For what reasons, [among] the *saṃprayukta-dharma*-s, *saṃjñā* and *vedanā* are [said to be] mental activities (意行), not other *saṃprayukta-dharma*-s? Some explain thus: All these are originated from mental activities; these are the Bhagavat's words of admonition. When these (*saṃjñā* and *vedanā*) are mentioned at the beginning, all mentals (意) come to be mentioned.[20]
>
> Accordingly, "all mentals" means all *caitasika*-s. The mentals (*caitasika dharma*-s) projected from consciousness comprise three *dharma*-s: "that by which *duḥkha* and *sukha* are obtained" is *vedanā* (痛). "That by which ideations are made" is the construction of names and marks; "that by which previous deeds are recollected" is the recollection of past objection domains — these are all *saṃjñā*. The "*dharma* which is the activity of thought" is the volitional force within thought; this is 心, a variant rendering for *cetanā*.[21] The successive arising of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā* is in actual fact nothing more than the distinctive modes of the mentals (意的差別). These *caitasika*-s that arise successively "cognize both specifically and generically"; i.e., they are capable of cognizing specifically the specific characteristic (別別相) as well as specifically the general characteristic (別總相).

> [Thus], regarding *citta-caitta-dharma*-s, the Bhadanta's doctrine is that *vijñāna*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā* arise successively. This is on a par with the Dārṣṭāntikas. Dharmatrāta's doctrine in the MVŚ that "the *citta-caitta-dharma*-s are *cetanā-viśeṣa*" matches extremely well with what we see above. As to his doctrine that "the *caitta-dharma*-s are not identical with *citta*" — it is also correct. This is because *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā* arise successively — from the moving downward of *vijñāna* — and hence not identical with *vijñāna* that precedes.[22]

If Yin Shun's interpretation is correct, then we have here evidence that Bhadanta Dharmatrāta accepts three *caitasika*-s, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā*, each with a function distinct from that of *vijñāna*.

7.1.4.3. Yin Shun's explanations are undoubtedly brilliant, and make good sense. However, since the Chinese translation is very abstruse, some other way of deciphering it is possible. Moreover, the translator does not seem consistent in his rendering. For instance, in the definition of *samanantara-pratyaya*, he gives:

> The *samanantara-pratyaya* (次第緣) is the past 心所念法. ... Some explain thus: *samanantara-pratyaya* is all the 心心法.[23]

Thus, 心所念法 is probably the same as 心心法.[24] Moreover, comparing this definition to the standard Sarvāstivādin one in such texts as the MVŚ, AKB, etc.,[25] it would also suggest that 心所念法 corresponds to *citta-caitasika* (/*caitta*)-*dharma*. This is different from what we saw in § 7.1.4.2. where 意 seems to stand for *caitta-dharma*-s.

As another instance, in the translator's rendering of the well-known sūtra statement, *sahajātā vedanā saṃjñā cetanā*, we get 俱生痛想念,[26] showing unambiguously that 念 (rather than 心) corresponds to *cetanā*. On the other hand, elsewhere, on the same *sūtra* passage, we have:

> Conditioned by *cakṣus* and *rūpa*-s, *cakṣurvijñāna* arises. [When there is] the coming together of the three, there is *sparśa*. *Vedanā* is then born, existing together (等有, *sahajātā* ?) with that *vijñāna*. From *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* is then born. Conditioned by *saṃjñā*, *cetanā* (意) is then born. (眼緣色生眼識。此三集聚有更樂。彼識等有便生痛。由痛便生想。緣想便生意).[27]

This is clearly an interpretive rendering of a passage which corresponds to the following Sanskrit:

cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam / trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ / sahajātā vedanā saṃjñācetaneti / [28]

Accordingly, 意 here definitely translates *cetanā*. Although, as Yin Shun points out, 心 is one of the old Chinese renderings for *cetana* and *cetanā*, in passage 7.1.4.1.(b) above, 心 could also be an ideographic corruption of 意 or 念, both ideographs containing the 心 radical. If this possibility is acceptable, then it seems possible to interpret 7.1.4.1.(b) as follows:

(i) All mental activities (*citta* in activity) are *cetanā* (心所行法是心/意).
(ii) *cetanā* as the generic term standing for *citta* in activity comprises three mental *dharma*-s: *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā* (itself). From MVŚ (*supra,* § 7.1.3.(b)), we may add that other so-called *caitta*-ṣ proposed by other Sarvāstivādins — such as *sparśa, prajñā, smṛti*, etc. — are nothing but modalities of *cetanā.*
(iii) These *caitta*-s should not be treated as being identical with *citta*/ *vijñāna* itself, since they occur at different temporal positions from the initial occurrence of consciousness, and since each has a distinct function, not-withstanding that there is only one single mental stream.
(iv) *vijñāna*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā* arise sequentially, even though in the generic sense as being mental activity, they are all subsumable as *cetanā*.
(v) When the mental stream is functioning as *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* or *cetanā*, there is also the element of cognition in the generic sense. Hence it is said that at the temporal position when any of these *caitta*-s occurs, there is both the generic and specific discernment of the object: when, for instance, *vedanā* is sensing a blue color, there is also the generic grasping of the object as a *rūpa*. (See also § 7.2.2.)

One further point concerns the interpretation of the clause 識別與識共俱. Although we have here rendered it according to Yin Shun's comments, we shall propose another way of understanding it below. (§ 7.2.2.)

7.2. The *citta-caitta* doctrine of Śrīlāta

Śrīlāta's doctrine is explicitly explained in Saṃghabhadra's Ny. In the AKB, there is no explicit mention of his name; but his doctrine is alluded to, and attributed to him by the commentators. In the third chapter of the AKB, when discussing conditioned co-arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*), the following explanation is given:

> According to others: *vedanā* [arises] subsequently to *sparśa*. For, the faculty and the object precede *vijñāna*. The coming together of the three is *sparśa*. *Vedanā* [arises] after *sparśa* as the condition in the third moment.[29]

All commentarial sources agree that the word "others" refers to Sthavira Śrīlāta.[30] Accordingly, like Dharmatrāta, Śrīlāta too, holds that *citta-caitta*-s arise sequentially: *vijñāna* arises in the second moment, and *vedanā* in the third. *Sparśa* is not a *caitta*; it is not a real existent, but rather, the mere coming together, in the second moment, of the faculty, the object and *vijñāna*.

In the Ny, Śrīlāta explicitly argues that *sparśa* is a *citta*, i.e., *vijñāna*, not a *caitta*.

> From *cakṣus* and *rūpa*-s, *vijñāna-sparśa* arises. From this, there further arise the *caitta*-s. *Vedanā*, etc, which are born together (*sahajāta*), are called *caitta-dharma*-s. *Sparśa* is not a *caitta*; [but simply the coming together of the three — *cakṣus*, *rūpa* and *vijñāna*]. ... It is a *citta* (= *vijñāna*). ... There can be *sparśa* which is not apart from *vijñāna*; for, prior to *vijñāna*, there cannot be "the coming together (*saṃnipāta*)" (和合義). Thus [*sparśa*] is designated as a *caitta*; it is not a distinct entity.[31]

This is the same doctrine in the AKB as we have seen above that the *caitta*-s are not identical with *citta/vijñāna*, and that the first *caitta*, *vedanā*, arises in the third moment.[32] Śrīlāta states that only these three — *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā* — are to be considered as *caitta*-s.[33] In fact, *vedanā*, etc. must not be co-existent in the same moment with *vijñāna*; if they do, they would be none other than *citta* itself.[34] (But on the meaning of this point, see *infra*, § 7.2.1)

Śrīlāta further holds that, because the *sūtra* says, "born together are *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā*", only these three *caitta*-s can be considered universal (*mahābhūmika*) *dharma*-s.[35] His interpretation of 'universal', of course, necessarily differs from that of the Sarvāstivāda: these three *caitta*-s, though not arising simultaneously, are always found in the sets of three *bhūmi*-s — *savitarkā savicārā bhūmi, avitarkā vicāramātrā bhūmi, avitarkā 'vicārā bhūmi*; *kuśalā bhūmi, akuśalā bhūmi, avyākṛtā bhūmi; śaikṣī bhūmi, aśaikṣī bhūmi,* neither-*śaikṣī*-nor-*aśaikī bhūmi*. Hence they are said to be universal.[36] Other mental factors, such as *jñāna*, [37] *avidyā*,[38] etc., are just a particular modalities of *cetanā*. In fact, according to him:

> The whole of the *saṃskāra skandha* is just *cetanā*. The other [so-called *caitta*-s] such as *manaskāra*, etc., are specific modalities of *cetanā* (*cetanā-viśeṣa*). ...

> *Manaskāra*, etc., cannot be known to be distinct entities apart from *cetanā*. Nor can any *cetanā* as an entity be apperceived (*upalabhyate*) apart from the other *saṃskāra*.[39]

In arguing against the other *dharma*-s claimed by the Vaibhāṣikas as *caitta*-s, Śrīlāta states:

> The *caitta*-s are directly visible as entities, and as *dharma*-s, their efficacies are not dependent on other *dharma*-s.[40]

7.2.1. Does *vedanā* arise alone without *vijñāna*?

7.2.1.1. Controversy in the AKB[41]

In the AKB, the Vaibhāṣika criticizes Śrīlāta's proposition mentioned above that *vedanā* arises subsequently to *sparśa*:


> [(a)Vaibhāṣika:] If so, there would not be *vedanā* in every *vijñāna*; and all *vijñāna* is not *sparśa*.
>
> [(b) Śrīlāta:] There is no such fault. A *vedanā*, having an earlier *sparśa* as its cause, exists in a subsequent *sparśa*. And [so] all *sparśa* has a *vedanā*, and all *vijñāna* is *sparśa*.
>
> [(c) Vaibhāṣika:] This is not logical.
>
> [(d) Śrīlāta:] What is here not logical?
>
> [(e) Vaibhāṣika:] That is: even though two *sparśa*-s have different cognitive objects (*bhinnālambana*), a subsequent *vedanā* comes to be, with an earlier *sparśa* as its cause — [a *vedanā* generated by an earlier *sparśa* taking a *rūpa* as *ālambana* would exist in the following moment when a *sparśa* having *śabda* as *ālambana* comes to be]. How indeed can a *vedanā* taking one type of (lit: a different) *ālambana* arise from a *sparśa* having another different type of *ālambana*?
>
> Or rather, [you would have to accept this inadmissible consequence: A *vedanā*] takes an *ālambana* differently from that *citta* with which it is conjoined.
>
> [(f) Śrīlāta:] In that case, let there be at that time a *vijñāna* qua *sparśa* (*sparśa-bhūtaṃ vijñānam*) which is without *vedanā*. And the *vijñāna*, which is prior to that, has *vedanā*, [but] is not *sparśa* — on accocunt of the non-favorabilty of conditions (*pratyaya-vaidhuryāt*) — this being so, what is the fault?

[(g) Vaibhāṣika:] This breaks the rule for the *mahābhūmika*-s. It [specifies] that the ten *mahābhūmika*-s exist in every *citta*.

[(h) Śrīlāta: We do not accept this rule which is based on the *śāstra* and not the *sūtra* as the authority. We would interpret *mahābhūmika* differently (*cf.* § 7.2.)]


The following diagrams illustrate Śrīlāta's explanations above:

Diagram I, for (b):



This is the case when the subsequent moments of the *rūpa* object continues to be apprehended. Conditioned by *rūpa*, R_1 and *cakṣus* C_1, both in the first moment t_1, *cakṣurvijñāna* Vj(r1) which is *sparśabhūta* (Sp_1) arises at time moment t_2. At this moment of time t_2, the eye C_2 continues to apprehend the second moment of the *rūpa* R_2, generating the *cakṣurvijñāna* Vj(r2) at time t_3. In this way, all *sparśa* (= *vijñāna*) is accompanied by *vedanā*; and all *vijñāna* is *sparśa*.

Diagram II, for (f):



This is the case when, after a moment of apprehending the *rūpa* object, at some following moment t_3, a different type of object, e.g., *śabda* (Śd$_1$), comes to be apprehended. Conditioned by Śd$_1$ and *śrotra* Śr$_1$ at t_3, *śrotra-vijñāna* Vj(śd$_1$) which is *sparśabhūta* arises at t_4. At t_3, because the *rūpa* object is lacking (*pratyaya-vaidhurya*), since the object now is *śabda*, the *vedanā* that would have been generated from Vj(r2) is not generated; we thus have a *śrotra-vijñāna* Vj(śd$_1$) at t_4 which is without *vedanā*. That is, as is reasonably expected, when the *śrotra-vijñāna* arises, there does not exist a sensation of *rūpa*; the sensing of its object proper, *śabda*, arises in the following moment, t_5. Vj(r2) does not constitute *sparśa*, not being able to serve as the condition for generating *vedanā* in the next moment in accordance with the principle "*sparśa-pratyayā vedanā*".

Yaśomitra elaborates on the Vaibhāṣika objection here:

> The objects of the two are different ... The object of the preceding one is *rūpa*; the succeeding, *śabda*. In these two taking different objects, it is illogical to say that '*vedanā* arises' in the succeeding *sparśa* taking *śabda* as object, having the preceding *sparśa* as the cause, i.e., having as the cause a *sparśa* taking *rūpa* as object. ...
>
> How ... derived from a *sparśa* taking an object of the *rūpa* species, a *vedanā* ... will come to take *śabda* as its object? ... For, when a *vedanā* derived from a *sparśa* taking *rūpa* as object will only be a *vedanā* taking *rūpa* as object; then it is logical to assert that 'a *vedanā* in the succeeding *sparśa* has a preceding *sparśa* as its cause'. But how will it be logical when a *vedanā* taking *śabda* as object arises from a *sparśa* taking *rūpa* as object? For, in the world, an effect is observed to conform to the cause.[42]

Yaśomitra represents Śrīlāta's answer below, supplementing with his own elaboration:

> If such is the fault, let there be then ... at the time of taking *śabda* as object ... a *vijñāna* qua *sparśa* (*sparśa-bhūtaṃ vijñāna*m) which is without *vedanā*; and the *vijñāna* which preceded that [*vijñāna*] taking *śabda* as object, which was accompanied by *vedanā* (*savedanaka*), was not *sparśa*. In this way, it becomes free of fault.
>
> For, otherwise, if the previously arisen *vijñāna*, which was accompanied by *vedanā*, were *sparśa*, then in this way, there would be the fault, as mentioned: "*vedanā* has *sparśa* as condition." (*sparśa-pratyayā vedaneti*)
>
> For what reason some *vijñāna*-s are without *vedanā*, and some [*vijñāna*] are not *sparśa*?

> This is due to the non-favorability/want of conditions (*pratyaya-vaidhurya*). For, the wanting conditions remain as obstruction. All immediate condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*) is not capable of generating a *vijñāna* qua *sparśa*, the condition for *vedanā*. So, in this way for him, a *vijñāna* taking a different object is always without *vedanā*, and [the *vijñāna*] that generates it does not constitute *sparśa* (*aparśa-bhūta*).
>
> However, if immediately after the *cakṣurvijñāna* taking *rūpa* as object, a *cakṣurvijñāna* or a *manovijñāna* likewise taking *rūpa* as object arises,[43] then that previously arisen [*vijñāna*] accompanied by *vedanā* is a *sparśa*.[44]

It is clear from the above controversy that in Śrīlāta's doctrine, *vijñāna* may or may not be acompanied by *vedanā*. However, the existential status of the two mental *dharma*-s — where *vijñāna* is accompanied by *vedanā*, and where the distinct function of sensation is being exercised — remains obscure.

7.2.1.2. Saṃghabhadra's criticism in the Ny

Concerning this Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntika model of successive arising, Saṃghabhadra asks an interesting and pertinent question:[45]

> According to the theory that *citta-caitta*-s arise successively, how is the successive arising to be construed: When the *vedanā*, etc., generated from the visual contact, arises immediately after the visual consciousness, [i] does it arise together with another consciousness? Or, [ii] does *vedanā*, etc., arise alone?
>
> [i] If there is another consciousness which arises together with the *vedanā*, etc.: (a) Is it that mental consciousness arises taking the very same object domain (*viṣaya*)? Or, (b) is this other consciousness another [consciousness] which arises taking another object domain?
>
> (a) Now, it is not the case that mental consciousness arises taking the very same object domain. This is because, the visual faculty that was the supporting basis for the *vedanā* generated by the visual contact existed at a time different from that of the object domain of this mental consciousness. It is not the case that the *vedanā*, etc., which is generated with the visual faculty as support can take a past [*dharma*] as its cognitive object (*ālambana*). Nor is it the case that the *vedanā*, etc., generated from visual contact, can arise with *manas* and *dharma* as conditions; for it is said [in the *sūtra*] that conditioned by *manas* and *dharma*, mental consciousness arises. If it arises with *manas* and *dharma* as conditions, then it cannot be said to be generated from visual contact.
>
> (b) It is also not the case that another [sensory] consciousness arises taking another object domain as cognitive object. If [a consciousness]

having a different support and object domain could arise at the same time, then it ought to be possible to attain all object domains at once.

[ii] [On the other hand,] if *vedanā*, etc., arises alone without any consciousness, then a subsequent consciousness would arise without any support. There has never been any situation in the lower sphere where the flow of mental consciousness, having been interrupted, could be relinked. This is completely unacceptable to them, since according to their tenet, when one enters into the cessation meditation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) etc., consciousness continues to arise without having ever been interrupted.[46]

Saṃghabhadra has brought out the point that in the *citta-caitta* doctrine of Śrīlāta — and for that matter, of any one advocating sequential arising of *citta-caitta*-s — when *vedanā* or *saṃjñā* or *cetanā* arises, there must also logically be *vijñāna* simultaneously. But yet Śrīlāta does not seem to concur with the Ābhidharmikas that there is a distinct *dharma* named *vijñāna* conjoined with a conascent *dharma* called *vedanā*. He in fact maintains that when the *sūtra* speaks of *vedanā saṃjñā* and *cetanā* as being 'born together' (*sahajāta*), it does not mean that they co-arise simultaneously. In the AKB, there is, in this very connection, the interpretation that being born together means being born together among themselves, one immediately after another (*samanantara*).[47] We have seen above that, this is in fact one interpretation of conjunction proposed by the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ. In this AKB context, this interpretation of *saha* no doubt belongs to Śrīlāta as well.[48]

How then are we to understand his doctrinal position in this regard?

In Śrīlāta's denial of the separate existence of the *mahābhūmika dharma*-s (excepting *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā*) of the Sarvāstivāda, we gain a clearer picture of his position. For instance, he rejects samādhi as a distinct *caitta* in these words:

> Apart from *citta*, *samādhi* does not exist as a distinct entity in itself (無別三摩地體). This is because; it is the entity, *citta* itself, not being dispersed when taking a cognitive object. ... The efficacy of a *dharma* does not depend on other *dharma*-s. Thus, the *citta* stays on the object by its own power, not [through that of] others.[49]

Saṃghabhadra repudiates this immediately, arguing that *cetanā*, said to be the specific conditioning of *citta* (*cittābhisaṃskāra*),[50] responsible for making *citta* volitionally active, would also not be a distinct universal *dharma*, since the same reasoning of Śrīlāta should apply here as much as in the case of *samādhi*.[51] Yet, in Śrīlāta's doctrine, *cetanā* is distinct from

vijñāna. Moreover, Śrīlāta cannot even claim that there are three *caitta*-s, since, according to this way of understanding, *vedanā* would be none other than the experiencing (*anubhava*) of the cognitive object by the *citta*; *saṃjñā* would be none other than the grasping of name and mark (*nimitta*) by the *citta*; *cetanā* would be none other than the volitional activity, skilful or unskillful, of the *citta*.[52]

This pesrpective of Śrīlāta is also discernible in his explanation on improper mental application (*ayoniśo manaskāra*) as the cause of ignorance (*avidyā*). He argues that improper mental application is not so specified in the *Pratītya-samutpāda-sūtra* because there is no need to separately establish it as a distinct factor of *pratītya-samutpāda*: The improper mental application is generated at the time of contact, and ignorance, co-existing with sensation (*vedanā-sahavarttin*), is generated from this improper mental application.[53] Returning to his argument on *samādhi,* since Śrīlāta would say that *samādhi,* etc., are just *cetanā*; to say that the former is nothing but an activity of *citta* itself amounts to saying that *cetanā* — and likewise, *vedanā* and *saṃjñā* — is nothing but an activity of *citta*. Yet, this is not an acceptable position of Śrīlāta. This leads us to the very kernel of his *citta-caitta* doctrine: On the one hand, *vijñāna*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *cetanā* are distinct from one another; onthe other hand, the flow of *vijñāna* is uninterrupted, and *vedanā*, etc., is to be considered an activity of the *citta* itself. Such a doctrine is then very close to Dharmatrāta's which we have gathered above, from the MVŚ and the AVS. Firstly, in both his and Śrīlāta's doctrines, there is one continuous mental flow. Secondly, both masters acknowledge only three *caitta*-s: *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā*; all other so-called *caitta*-s are considered as nothing more than the different modalities of *cetanā*.

Dharmatrāta calls this mental flow generically *cetanā*, apparently in the sense of "thought in activity"; for him, therefore, all *citta-caitta-dharma*-s are just specific modalities of *cetanā*. But *citta* and the three *caitta*-s are each distinct, not mutually identical, since each exercises a distinctly different function at different temporal positions.

7.2.2. The element of cognition in a mental act

In contrast, Śrīlāta, probably being a more rigorous *sūtra-prāmāṇika*, prefers to follow the *sūtra* in enumerating *cetanā* together with, and subsequently to, *vedanā* and *saṃjñā*; *sparśa* is not treated on a par with these three *caitta*-s, but taken as the mere coming together of the object, the sense faculty and the sensory consciousness.[54] He, further, has no problem with the notion of

"universal *dharma*-s", albeit with an interpretation different from that of the Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas. At the initial stage of this mental flow, there is only the function of cognizing, hence it is called *vijñāna*. When the function of the *citta* changes to be distinctly that of sensation or of ideation or of conditioning in a specific manner (i.e., when *citta* comes to be specifically shaped — other than in the manner of functioning as *vijñāna*, *vedanā* and *saṃjñā*), it acquires the name of *cetanā*.

But it would seem that in Śrīlāta's model, there is always an element of *vijñāna* — however indistinct — even when *citta* is distinctively functioning in the manner of *vedanā*, etc. Otherwise, as highlighted in Saṃghabhadra's criticism above, there cannot be the re-arising of *vijñāna*. Moreover, Śrīlāta's position that in the cessation meditation a subtle *vijñāna*, without any *caitta*, still remains, would be difficult to comprehend. Pu Guang's interpretation of Śrīlāta's response in the AKB (See § 7.2.1.1.(f)) also suggests this: "[At t_3], since there is cognition of the [*rūpa*] object, there is *vijñāna*; since [the *vedanā*] is generated from a *sparśa* pertaining to its own species (i.e., *rūpa*) in the preceding thought-moment, there is *vedanā*." Our understanding of Śrīlāta's doctrine as implying an element of cognition in every mental act becomes all the more plausible in the light of the following explantion of his on *vijñāna*:

> When the *sūtra* says that *vijñāna* is that which cognizes (*vijānātīti vijñānam*), it is not a *paramārtha*, but a *saṃvṛti* teaching. If that which cognizes is *vijñāna*, it also ought to be called non-*vijñāna*. That is, if what can cognize is called *vijñāna*, then it ought to become non-*vijñāna* at the times when it cannot cognize.[55]

This statement in the Ny is made in the same context of the exposition of conditioned co-arising in which the AKB alludes to Śrīlāta's doctrine of *citta-caitta*-s. Saṃghabhadra objects to this: Śrīlāta cannot say that there is any state in which *vijñāna* does not exercise its function of cognizing. It cannot be in the state when it is not yet arisen or when it has become past, since for Śrīlāta, the future and past *dharma*-s are absolutely non-existent. It is also not possible to say that in the present time period, there exists a *vijñāna* that may or may not be able to cognize, since a present *vijñāna* is necessarily one that cognizes an object domain.[56]

To this criticism, Śrīlāta's answers as follows:

> In this context, it is not asserted that *vijñāna* is so called only at the state when it cognizes. It is only asserted that whenever an assemblage of conditions obtains, it is only *vijñāna* that can cognize.[57]

This is clearly an epistemological, rather than an ontological standpoint; and this solves the problem of the re-arising of *vijñāna* after *vedanā*, etc. This standpoint implies that in the serial continuity of flow of *citta*, there is always the potentiality of the distinctive function of cognition (as opposed to sensation, etc.). Given the corresponding favorability of conditions, the corresponding type of *vijñāna* (e.g. *cakṣurvijñāna*) will arise.

We can also understand Śrīlāta's position thus: In every mental act, such as sensation, there is always an element of cognition. In fact sensation will not even be possible without the simultaneous grasping of the object in a generic manner — i.e., cognizing. As a matter of fact, this is essentially also the position of the Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas. We can even go so far as to say that this is in fact the general import of the *sūtra* teaching in this connection. The important difference between Śrīlāta and the Ābhidharmikas is that, the latter would ontologize *vijñāna* and the *caitta*-s as real entities each having an intrinsic function, and hold that they arise simultaneously as distinct *dharma*-s and are mutually conjoined. Śrīlāta, on the other hand, would apparently acknowledge them only as epistemological realities; conjunction can only be in the sense of mutual correspondence in the fact of their successive arising.

Thus, according to Śrīlāta: the specific function of cognizing is not necessarily the defining characteristic of *vijñāna*. Cognizing is not an intrinsic function of *vijñāna* in the Sarvāstivāda sense. Even at the times when this function is not being exercised, or distinctly exercised — that is when for instance *citta* is exercising the distinctive function of *vedanā* — one can still legitimately say that *vijñāna* also exists.[58] Putting this consideration together with what we have gathered from the AKB and Vy debate above (§ 7.2.1.1.), we may understand Śrīlāta's position thus: there can be *vijñāna* without *vedanā*, etc.; but there cannot be *vedanā*, etc. without *vijñāna*. Understood in this way, the aforementioned difficulties dissolve themselves.

This must be the position of Dharmatrāta as well, since we know from the MVŚ that like Śrīlāta, all the early Dārṣṭāntikas hold that a subtle mental consciousness exists in the cessation meditation without any *caitta*, and that Dharmatrāta asserts the successive arising of *vijñāna*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā*. (*supra*, § 7.). Moreover, in (§ 7.1.4.3.) above, we have remarked that in Bhadanta's explanation in the AVS, the clause 識別與識共俱 admits of other interpretations. In the light of our understanding above, we may now also render 意有三法, 識別與識共俱 as follows:

> There are three *caitta*-s (/mentals). They are distinct from *vijñāna* (識別), [while] co-existing with *vijñāna* (與識共俱).

Alternatively, following Yin Shun's interpretation that the three *caitta*-s "cognize both specifically and generically", we may further understand thus: When *citta* exercises its distinctive (specific) function of sensation qua *vedanā*, for instance, there is also its function of cognizing the object generically — and to that extent, *vijñāna* also exists.

7.3. Dharmatrāta's notion of conjunction revisited

In § 7.1.3. above, we saw that Yin Shun raised some questions concerning Dharmatrāta's doctrine of conjunction as recorded in Xuan Zang's version of the MVŚ: It states that Dharmatrāta asserts the successive arising of *citta-caitta*-s; at the same time, he is also said to assert that they are born together (§ 7.1.2: 俱時而生) and that they arise in an assemblage (§ 7.1.3.(a): 一和合生). Yin Shin thinks that this is a contradiction introduced in Xuan Zang's MVŚ.

However, from our discussion above, Śrīlāta and his followers do not seem to have any problem with the notion of conjunction in the sense of being in an assemblage: In his explanation, the coming together of the sense faculty and the sense object, both of the immediately preceding moment, and the sensory consciousness of the immediately succeeding moment, are also said to be in an assemblage (the same Chinese words 和合); and this assemblage is the contact (*sparśa*) between the three *dharma*-s. Moreover, Śrīlāta and the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntikas interpret '*saha*' in *sahajāta* ('born together') in the sense of the succeeding immediately following the preceding.

We saw that in the MVŚ, there already is the interpretation of conjunction in the sense of immediate succession, and also another interpretation that when a *citta* generates a *citta* or *caitta* then the *citta* is said to be conjoined with the *citta*/*caitta*. (§ 7.1.1.(c)).

Now, while Śrīlāta's doctrine on *citta-caitta*-s cannot be said to be completely identical with Dharmatrāta's, the former's inheritance from the latter should be a historical fact. From this perspective, there need not be contradiction when MVŚ records that Dharmatrāta while holding the doctrine of successive arising, at the same time asserts that *citta-caitta*-s can be said to be conjoined and even 'born together' — since being together or born together can also mean being in immediate mutual succession. Furthermore, as we have seen

above (§ 7.1.4.1.), in the AVS, the Bhadanta, when explaining the sense of conjunction as companionship, also states that "where consciousness goes, there is a mutual giving way": that is, companionship (being together), in the context of Dharmatrāta's notion of conjunction, means one mental state immediately succeeding another. In this way, the conjoined *citta-caitta*-s are not "in an assemblage at one and the same time" (§ 7.1.1.(b)), but can nonetheless be said to "arise in assemblage" (§ 7.1.3.(a)) in the sense of immediate succession. They can further be said to grasp the same object (§ 7.1.2.), even though arising successively, since this could mean the different moments of the serial continuity of the same object. The typically terse statement itself, however, does not allow us to be absolutely decisive on the sense intended here. But if we can accept that Dharmtrāta's notion of conjunction is one of mutual correspondence of two or more mentals arising in succession, then conjunction in this sense should primarily include the correspondence in the mental act of perceiving and sensing, etc., the same serial continuity of the object. Bhadanta's explanation in the AVS too, speaks of *vijñāna* flowing down on the (same) object domain in the perceptual process.[59]

7.4. Conclusion

The MVŚ, Ny and AVS, all extent only in Chinese translations, have provided valuable information on the *citta-caitta* doctrines of Dharmatrāta and Śrīlāta. If Yin Shun's interpretations are correct, we have found in the AVS that Dharmatrāta too, some three centuries before Śrīlāta, had held that there were only three *caitta*-s — *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā*, and these arise sequentially, subsequent to the arising of *vijñāna*. Both masters also seem to have held the notion of immediate succession as the meaning of conjunction. In addition, both seem to explain that there is an element of cognition in each mental act, and to that extent the flow of *vijñāna* is never interrupted. All these add more substance to the surmise that Śrīlāta's doctrine in this regard is, in its essential, an inheritance from Dharmatrāta. Once this doctrinal inheritance becomes acceptable, we may, within reasonable limit, complement our understanding of the doctrine of one with that of the other. Śrīlāta's doctrine as gathered from the AKB and Ny could throw light on the apparent contradictory statements attributed to Dharmatrāta in the MVŚ. We have accordingly proposed above that there need not be contradiction when he says in one place that *citta-caitta-dharma*-s arise successively; and in another, that they are 'born together' and grasp the same object: Śrīlāta interprets 'being born together' to mean being born

successively among themselves, and not 'born at one and the same time'. We have further suggested that 'grasping the same object' could mean, 'grasping the same serial continuity of the object' (which is closer to the common sense standpoint — a standpoint often seen to be adopted by the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ).

We have sufficient information indicating that Śrīlāta treats *vijñāna* and the *caitta*-s as epistemological realities. We may understand his position thus: In every mental act, there is an element of *vijñāna*, both in the sense that there is always the potentiality of cognition — pending the favorability of conditions — and also that even in a mental act other than cognition (e.g. sensation), there is always a generic cognition of the object.

However, Dharmatrāta seems to have used the term *cetanā* in its more general sense of 'activity of thinking' which therefore includes *citta*/*vijñāna* itself besides the *caitta*-s. Śrīlāta, on the other hand, treats *cetanā* as being distinct from *vijñāna* and the three *caitta*-s. Moreover, Śrīlāta asserts that the three *caitta*-s are the only *mahābhūmika dharma*-s the sense of which is interpreted differently from that of the Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas. We have, unfortunately, no information on Dharmatrāta's view in this regard.

Notes

1 It should, however, be noted that the four Chinese characters, 彼大德言, cannot decisively be determined to mean (as we have rendered them) "the Bhadanta says"; it could also just mean: "those Venerables say" (i.e. referring to the Dārṣṭāntikas making such an assertion). If the latter is indeed the case, then we cannot claim the statement that immediately follows as that of Dharmatrāta. Nevertheless, a comparison of this statement with the next that we have quoted seems to justify our rendering here.

2 MVŚ, 745a.

3 MVŚ, 493c–494a.

4 MVŚ, 745a.

5 MVŚ, 81a.

6 T27, 661c, 662b.

7 T27, 50a.

8 MVŚ, 8c.

9 *Study*, 254 f.

10 *Study*, 255–257.

11 T28, 66b: 尊者佛陀提婆(=大德)說曰:同伴義是相應義。如識隨所緣事, 為諸數名, 離於俱生, 是相應義。

12 Although MVŚ does mention some who hold that *dharma*-s are conjoined with *dharma*-s of the same intrinsic nature. *Cf.* MVŚ, 79c.

13 *Cf. Study*, 296.

14 See *Study*, 380 ff.

15 *Study*, 379.

16 *Study*, 385 ff.

17 The original Chinese is quite abstruse. This is a somewhat tentative translation. Yin Shun (*Study*, 258) thinks that 千 is probably a corruption of 伴 (companion, companionship). So also, 國譯一切經, 毗曇部, vol. 6, 158, n.37. This is possible. However, it is also possible the translator was reading a Prakritic form similar to the Pāli *sahassa/sāhassa* corresponding to *sāhāyya*(?).

18 T28, 738c–739a.

19 痛及想及心及識, 有何差別?尊作是說:眼緣色, 生眼識, 自相受識。識流馳此諸法, 還更以此差降, 意有三法, 識別與識共俱:彼所得苦樂;造諸想, 追本所作亦是想; 心所行法是心. I have translated this passage in accordance with the commentary by Yin Shun that follows.

20 T28, 742c.

21 The translator was likely taking *cetanā* (< *cit*) to mean "thought in activity" or just "thinking".

22 *Study*, 256.

23 T28, 725a.

24 Although 心所念法 might also be his rendering for *manas*.

25 E.g., AKB, 98: *arhataḥ paścimān apāsyotpannāś citta-caittāḥ samanantarapratyayaḥ* / *Pakaraṇa-pāda*, T no.1542, 719a: ... 過去現在心心所法; MVŚ, 28c: ... 次彼前心心所法.

26 T28, 739a.

27 T28, 743a.

28 *Cf.* AKB, 146; *Saṃyuktāgama*, T no.99, 72c, 87c.

29 AKB, 145: *sparśād uttarakālaṃ vedanety apare / indriyārthau hi pūrvānto vijñānam / so'sau trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ sparśapratyayāt paścād vedanā tṛtīya-kṣaṇa iti /*

30 Vy, 307: ... *apara iti bhadanta-Śrīlātaḥ* / Pūrṇavardhana's *Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi 'grel bshad mtshan nyid kyi rjes su 'brang ba zhes bya ba*, Peking, vol. 117, 232, 366a: *gzhan dag na re ... zhe zer ba ni slob dpon dpal len* / Ny, 386b, 387c; Pu Guang, T41, 176c: ... 經部中上座.

31 Ny, 385b.

32 Also *cf.* Ny, 385b, 386b.

33 See also, Saṃghabhara's remarks on Śrīlāta's three *caitta*-s in Ny, 391a.

34 Ny, 385c: 識不離受等心所, 應即受等但假名心.

35 Ny, 384b.

36 AKB, 146. It is noteworthy that in this context of arguing on the three *caitta*-s being *mahā-bhūmika*, there is the following statement which cannot but indicates the Sautrāntika standpoint: *sūtra-pramāṇakā vayaṃ na śāstra-pramāṇakāḥ / uktaṃ hi bhagavatā sūtrānta-pratiśaraṇair bhavitavyam iti /*

37 Ny, 486c.

38 Ny, 495b.

39 Ny, 339b.

40 Ny, 390c.

41 This whole controversy is also found, and is elaborated upon, in other commentarial sources: Vy, 307 ff; Pu Guang's 俱舍論記, T41, 176c; Pūrṇavardhana's *Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi 'grel bshad mtshan nyid kyi rjes su 'brang ba zhes bya ba*, Peking, vol. 117, 232, 366a ff; etc.

42 Vy, 307 f: *pūrvasya rūpam ālambanam uttarasya śabdaḥ tayor bhinna'ālambanayoḥ pūrva-sparśa-hetukā rūp'ālambana-sparśa-hetukā uttaratra sparśe śabd'ālambane yad vedanotpadyate / ity etad ayuktam / ... katham hi ... rūpa-prakār'ālambananāt sparśāt saṃbhūtā vedanā ... śabd'ālambanā bhaviṣsyati / ... yadā hi rūp'ālambanāt sparśāt saṃbhūtā vedanā rūp'ālambanaiva vedanā bhaviṣyati / tadā pūrva-sparśa-hetukottaratra sparśe vedaneti yuktam / yadā tu rūp'ālambanāt sparśāc chabd'ālambanā vedanotpadyate / tadā katham etad yokṣyate | kāraṇānurūpaṃ hi loke kāryaṃ dṛṣyate /*

43 Note that such a manner of explanation, as conveyed through Yaśomitra, a professed Sautrāntika, reinforces the understanding that in Śrīlāta's theory, no two *vijñāna* of a different species can co-exist. Pu Guang's explanations (T41, 177a) suggest likewise: 若緣聲已, 後更緣色, ... Pūrṇavardhana, *op.cit.*: *gal te gzugs la dmigs pa'i mig gi rnam par shes pa'i mjug thogs su mig gi rnam par shes pa'am | yid kyi rnam par shes pa gzugs la dmigs pa kho na 'byung na ni ...* / The Dārṣṭāntika position of the author, Harivarman, of the **Satyasiddhiśāstra* (成實論T32, 276b), is likewise that several *citta*-s co-arising necessarily implies the existence correspondingly of several persons.

44 Vy, 308: *yady evaṃ doṣo 'stu tarhi ... śabd'ālaṃbana-kāle / sparśa-bhūtaṃ vijñānam avedanakaṃ / tasmāc ca śabd'ālambanād yat pūrvaṃ vijñānaṃ savedanakaṃ tan na sparśaḥ / evaṃ hi nirdoṣaṃ bhavatīi / anyathā hi yadi pūrvotpannaṃ savedanakaṃ vijñānaṃ sparśaḥ syāt / tadaivaṃ sparśa-pratyayā vedaneti yathokto doṣaḥ syāt /* [*kiṃ*] *punaḥ kāraṇam / kiṃcid vijñānam avedanakaṃ kiṃcic ca na sparśaḥ / pratyaya-vaidhuryāt / vidhurā hi pratyayā*

vipratibandhenaivasthitāḥ / na hi sarvaḥ samanantara-pratyayo vedanā-pratyayaṃ sparśa-bhūtaṃ vijñānaṃ janayituṃ samartha iti / tad evaṃ tasya bhinn'ālambanaṃ vijñānam ekāntenāvedanakam / tad-utpādakaṃ cāsparśa-bhūtam / yadi tu rūp'ālambanāc cakṣur-vijñānād anantaraṃ rūp'ālambanam eva cakṣur-vijñānam utpadyate / mano-vijñānaṃ vā / tat savedanakaṃ pūrvotpannaṃ sparśa iti //

45 Ny, 504a–b.

46 See MVŚ, 774a; Ny, 403a, 420b: 彼許滅定中有心現行.

47 AKB, 146: *samanantare'pi cāyaṃ sahaśabdo dṛṣṭaḥ /*

48 In Ny, 403b, it is ascribed to the Dārṣṭāntikas. Elsewhere, the interpretation of *saha* as 'immediate' is also ascribed simply to "some" (E.g., Ny, 705b).

49 Ny, 390b–c.

50 *Cf.* AKB, 54: *cetanā cittābhisaṃskāro manaskarma/*

51 Ny, 390c.

52 Ny, 391a.

53 AKB, 135: *anyaḥ* (Ny, 497b: "The Sthavira"; Vy, 289: *bhadanta-śrīlātaḥ*) *punar āha / ayoniśo manaskāro hetur avidyāyā uktaḥ sūtrāntare / sa cāpi sparśakāle nirdiṣṭa ... vedanā kāle cāvaśyam avidyayā bhavitavyam ... ataḥ sparśakāle bhavann ayoniśo manaskāro vedanā-sahavarttinyā avidyāyāḥ pratyaya-bhāvena siddhi ... /*

54 In Ny, 384a ff, Saṃghabhadra refutes Śrīlāta at great length on the unreality of *sparśa*.

55 Ny, 484b.

56 Ny, 484b. Saṃghabhadra (Ny, 484c) also points out that where the Buddha declares that He would not state that there is a cognizer, it is because He does not want to suggest the existence of any totally independent, absolute Self which is a cognizer in and by itself.

57 Ny, 484c.

58 We might compare this to the Ābhidharmika understanding of sensory perception. Although a sensory perception is said to be devoid of conceptualization (*avikalpaka*), it is conceded that there is in actual fact an element of rudimentary conceptualization, called 'intrinsic conceptualization' (*svabhāva-vikalpa*) which is intrinsic to every cognitive act. (*Cf.* Ny, 349a, 350b; AKB, 22; etc.). In the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra understanding of *pratyakṣa* too, it is acknowledged that there is an element of *kalpanā* operating in the background, as it were (*Cf. Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā* (*Bibliotheca Buddhica* VII), 16: *sva-vyāpāraṃ tiraskṛtya pratyakṣa-vyāpāram ādarśayati ... /*), even though *pratyakṣa* is at the same time said to be devoid of *kalpanā* (*kalpanāpoḍha*).

Also *cf.* Dharmottara's answer to the question as to whether *pratyakṣa* becomes a *pramāṇa* only when conjoined with a conceptual judgement (*adhyavasāya* = *kalpanā*):

This is not so. Because through a judgement produced by the power of *pratyakṣa*, the object is ascertained (*avasīyate*) as seen, not as imagined. And seeing, called the direct realization of the object, is the function of *pratyakṣa*. Imagining, on the other hand, is the function of *vikalpa*. (*Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, *loc. cit.*)

59 Moreover, while it is true that the MVŚ does not record such a Dārṣṭāntika doctrine; for the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntika tradition, and certainly for Śrīlāta, such a position is not at all a problem. See, Dhammajoti, KL, '*Ākāra* and Direct Perception', in *Bukkyō Kenkyū*, vol. XXXV, 5 ff.

8. The Vaibhāṣika Theory of Direct or Presentational Perception

Both the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika are realists in as much as they accept the existence of external reality apart from consciousness. The former maintains that this is perceived directly, while the latter says that perception is always indirect (*apratyakṣa*)[1], though external reality can be confirmed through inference. In the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, Mādhavācārya describes their standpoints respectively as *bāhyārtha-pratyakṣavāda*, 'doctrine of the direct perception of external objects', and *bāhyārthānumeyavāda*, 'doctrine of the inferability of external objects'.[2]

The different doctrinal assumptions or premises, underlying the dispute between the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika as to whether an external object can be directly perceived or not, are clear enough from the available data. This dispute partly results from the fact that while both are Kṣaṇikavādins[3] — holding that *dharma*-s are strictly momentary — they differ as to whether the cause-effect relationship can be a simultaneous one.

8.1. Simultaneous causality in sensory perception

Concerning the Vaibhāṣika's explanation on the process of visual perception, the ADV describes as follows: The seeing (*ālocana*) by the eye–substance (*cakṣur-dravyam*), which is of the nature (*svabhāva*) of that which sees, has its function — a mere function of seeing visible forms (*rūpadarśana-kriyā-mātra*) — awakened (*prabodhita*) in a single moment when the complex of causes and conditions (*hetu-pratyaya-sāmagrī*) obtains, and in which the eye co-ordinates with consciousness in inducing its function.[4] Thus, the three factors involved in visual perception come into being simultaneously: the eye and the object as the two causes, and visual consciousness as the effect. This is in conformity with the distinctive Sarvāstivada doctrine of simultaneous causality.

In the Ny, Saṃghabhadra puts forward various arguments for this doctrine. One of them pertains to the process of sensory perception:

> It contradicts the principle of conditioned co-arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*) [to hold that there are no co-existent causes].

> Thus the *sūtra* says, "Conditioned by the visual faculty and the visual object, there arises visual consciousness". [If the visual faculty, the visual object and the visual consciousness were not simultaneous,] then the visual faculty and visual object produced in the preceding moment ought not be the supporting basis and the cognitive object, [respectively,] for the visual consciousness of the succeeding moment; for [in that case, the latter] exists and [the former are] non-existent. One cannot call an absolute non-existent (*atyantābhāva*) a supporting basis or a cognitive object.
>
> The same applies here: At the time when the visual consciousness arises, the visual faculty and the visual object have already ceased. This would mean that without any conditions assisting, the visual consciousness arises by itself! This is due to the fact that non-existent *dharma*-s cannot serve as supporting basis, and that visual consciousness can only take a present object. If the visual faculty, the visual object and the visual consciousness do not arise simultaneously, it would entail that the visual faculty and visual objects do not serve as conditions for visual consciousness. Or, the auditory faculty and sound, etc would also serve as conditions for visual consciousness, being equally unrelated to visual consciousness ... [5]

Thus, from the Vaibhāṣika perspective, the sense faculty serving as the supporting basis (*āśraya*) and the object serving as the object qua condition (*ālambana-pratyaya*), necessarily exist in one and the same moment as the sensory consciousness; or the principle of these two requisites stated by the Buddha for the arising of consciousness would be violated. And thanks to the operation of simultaneous causality, the external object can be directly grasped, in spite of universal law of momentariness. In the very same single moment that the eye sees, the co-nascent visual consciousness cognizes. As we have seen above, the eye's seeing, however, is non-epistemic, not amounting to knowledge. It is the corresponding visual consciousness that becomes conscious of the object — albeit only in a generic manner and with a simple element of the determination of the object as a mere species (*supra*, chapter 4). It is this generic, non-discriminative sensory consciousness that constitutes *pratyakṣa*, 'direct perception'. But properly speaking, even such a consciousness is not knowledge *per se*; it is the *prajñā* conjoined with this consciousness that constitutes knowledge. [6]

8.2. The three types of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*)

Saṃghabhadra distinguishes three types of *pratyakṣa*-s:

(1) that which is dependent on the sense faculty (依根現量, *indriyāśrita*);

(2) that which is experience (領納現量, *anubhava*),
(3) that which is discernment (覺了(/覺慧)現量, **buddhi*).

The first refers to direct grasping (*pratyakṣaṃ √grah*?), supported by the five sense faculties, of the five types of external objects, *rūpa*, etc. The second refers to the coming into the present of the *citta-caitta-dhamma*-s, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, etc. The third refers to the direct realization (*sākṣāt-√kṛ*) of the specific or common characteristic (*sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) — accordingly as the cases may be — of *dharma*-s.[7]

From this, it is clear that it is the visual consciousness, not the seeing by the eye, that is *indriya-pratyakṣa*. The second type of *pratyakṣa* is intrinsically linked up with the first in as much as these *caitta*-s become present at the first moment of the perceptual process together with visual consciousness, sensing and categorizing, etc., on the very same object that is being grasped generically by visual consciousness. The third type is mental consciousness that follows immediately from the first moment. It is at the stage of recollection that one properly acquires the knowledge of the previous *pratyakṣa* experience. It can still be considered a type of direct perception since it is a clear vivid perception directly induced by the immediately preceding sensory perception.[8]

Saṃghabhadra argues that simultaneous causality obtains in a sensory perception; the sensory faculty and the object as the causes and the sensory consciousness as the effect all arise in the same first moment. Moreover, *vedanā*, the instrumental force for *anubhava*,[9] must be 'conjoined with' consciousness — which entails not only simultaneity, but also that both take the same object, etc.[10] In fact, a sensory consciousness necessarily has a present perceptual object, or it will not be possible for one to have the *pratyakṣa* experience. For, with regard to what is personally sensed, one experiences it and discerns it at different times. That is, the *anubhava-pratyakṣa* and *buddhi-pratyakṣa* are not simultaneous. Discernment occurs at the state of recollection, taking the experience — the *vedanā* — that has just ceased as its object. Accordingly, "a sensation — pleasurable, etc., — must first be experienced by the *anubhava-pratyakṣa* before a *pratyakṣa* discernment can arise having it as its perceptual object. Likewise, an external object must first be experienced by *indriyāśrita-pratyakṣa* before a *pratyakṣa* discernment can arise having it as the perceptual object, by virtue of the thrust of presentness."[11] This is consistent with the Sarvāstivāda view that the *citta-caitta-dharma*-s cannot discern themselves or those conjoined or coexistent with them[12] (*Cf. supra*, § 6.8).

In brief, the Abhidharma texts shed considerable light on the perceptual theories of the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntikas — and even to some extent the Yogācāra. Already in MVŚ, we come across an articulated conception of *pratyakṣa*, even though no formal definition as such is found.[13] From Ny, we learn that on account of its theory of simultaneous causality, the Sarvāstivāda school holds that a sensory perception as a *pratyakṣa* experience is fully accomplished only in the second moment on recollection. The external object must have been first cognized and experienced by the *indriyāśrita- pratyakṣa* before a *buddhi* — the *buddhi-pratyakṣa* — having that *pratyakṣa* experience as its *ālambana* can arise.

Saṃghabhadra's articulation above, that the **buddhi-pratyakṣa* is the direct realization of either *svalakṣaṇa* or *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* accordingly as the case may be, can be comprehended as follows: So long as the contribution from the co-nascent *caitta*-s are still weak, it too, like the preceding consciousness, can only apprehend the mere object, e.g., a blue colour; it is therefore a grasping of *svalakṣaṇa*. But when the contribution is strong enough and it can apprehend, using name, "it is blue", etc., it is apprehending universals — i.e. *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*.[14] This is then not a case of *pratyakṣa*. The mode of activity (*ākāra* = *prajñā*) that functions at this time can be erroneous.

However, in the case of spiritual realization — 'realization-knowledge' (證智, *pratyakṣa-buddhi, *pratyakṣa-jñāna, adhigama-jñāna*) — the meditator apprehends directly, truly as they are, the universal characteristics of all *dhamma*-s — unsatisfactoriness, impermanence, etc. The modes of activity in this case differ not the slightest from the true nature of the *dharma*-s being examined. This is a case of direct seeing *par excellence* (真現量 **bhūta-pratyakṣa, *tattva-pratyakṣa*)[15] — without any conceptualization — and therefore a case of *pratyakṣa* even though *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is involved. For this reason the Sarvāstivāda identifies the 16 modes of activity pertaining to the four noble truth[16] with *prajñā* — i.e. *prajñā* in the sense of spiritual insight.[17] The MVŚ states that "outside the 16 modes of activity, there is no other outflow-free *prajñā*". "The *prajñā*-s not subsumed under the 16 modes of activities mostly discern *svalakṣaṇa*-s; the *prajñā*-s subsumed under 16 modes of activities discern only *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*-s"[18] (see below).

8.3. Sensory consciousness cannot have a past object

Saṃghabhadra rejects the claim by the Sautrāntika and others that the objects (*viṣaya*) of the five sensory consciousnesses are all past.[19] For, if this be true, then:

(i) since only what are previously arisen can serve as their supporting conditions (*pratyaya*), what are co-nascent with the consciousness are devoid of this function.
(ii) It would also entail that the *rūpa*-s which have ceased, held by them to be non-existent, are merely perceived as objects by an imaginary thought (*vikalpaka-citta*).
(iii) It must equally be conceded that the sense-faculty functioning as the supporting basis for the consciousness, though past, can generate the present consciousness.

All these are declared illogical by Saṃghabhadra.

There are other problems: If the objects of visual consciousness are exclusively past, why does it perceive only that which immediately precedes and not all past *rūpa*-s, there being no valid differentiation among all past *rūpa*-s — all are equally non-existents, and *ipso facto* equally unrelated to the present visual consciousness?

It might be argued that the one that immediately precedes is distinguished as the specific cause for the visual consciousness in as much as it is this *rūpa* that serves as the condition at the very time when the visual consciousness is about to arise. But this would mean that the object of visual consciousness is not past, contrary to their claim — since it amounts to a consciousness which is future taking a present object.

Neither is it right to say that the *rūpa* performs the functions of being the condition and being the object at different times — apart from functioning as the object for visual consciousness, what kind of supporting condition can it function as?

Furthermore, one would ask: There being no difference between a *rūpa* that has ceased long ago and one that has just ceased — both being non-entities — why can't the former likewise function as the supporting condition?[20]

Saṃghabhadra further argues that a sensory consciousness necessarily has present cognitive objects, or it will not be possible for one to have the *pratyakṣa* experience. For, with regard to what is personal sensed, one experiences it and discerns it at different times. That is the *anubhava-pratyakṣa* and *buddhi-pratyakṣa* are not simultaneous. Discernment occurs at the state of recollection, taking the experience — the *vedanā* — that has just ceased as its object. Accordingly, "a sensation — pleasurable, etc. —

must first be experienced by the *anubhava-pratyakṣa* before a *pratyakṣa* discernment can arise having it as its cognitive object. Likewise, an external object first must be experienced by *indriyāśrita-pratyakṣa* before a *pratyakṣa* discernment can arise having it as its cognitive object, by virtue of the thrust of presentness."[21] Since the Sautrāntika concedes that an external object in the preceding moment has not been experienced directly (*pratyakṣam*), there can be no possibility of a subsequent discernment that is of the nature of *pratyakṣa*.

The Sarvāstivāda does not accept the Sautrāntika[22] doctrine of *sva-saṃvedana* ('self-cognition') — that every consciousness is self conscious, like a lamp that reveals itself while revealing other objects.[23] The Sautrāntika argues that unless one is self-aware of what one is presently cognizing or knowing — i.e. unless *sva-saṃvedana* is a fact — mere recollection cannot account for such an experience. The advantage of such a doctrine, therefore, cannot be enjoyed by Sarvāstivāda in explaining the feeling of a direct personal experience as that implied by *pratyakṣa*. On the other hand, the Sarvāstivāda finds no difficulty in its explanation, since from its perspective, *vedanā*, the function of experiencing, is co-nascent with the faculty, all occur in the same moment so that in the subsequent moment one can vividly recollect what one has directly seen, etc.[24]

This epistemological dispute is also narrated at Vasubandhu's VVS. The Sarvāstivādins claim that the very fact of *pratyakṣa*, the *pramāṇa* par excellence (*pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇānāṃ gariṣṭham*), proves the existence of external objects — If these objects do not exist as they are immediately perceived, there cannot be such an awareness: "This is directly experienced by me" (*idaṃ me pratyakṣam iti*).

The Yogācārins, however, argue that this is just like the type of feeling that one has in a dream even though nothing real exists therein. Moreover, when one has a *pratyakṣa* awareness, the object is not seen — it is not at the state of visual perception — for determination (*pariccheda*) is possible through mental consciousness alone, and visual consciousness has already ceased. How then can it be claimed as a *pratyakṣa* experience? This is specially so from the perspective of the Kṣanikavādins for whom the sensory object has necessarily ceased. In reply, the Sarvāstivādins maintain that mental consciousness can only recollect what has already been immediately experienced; hence there must have been an object which has been so experienced. And this is what is called 'seeing' (*darśana*), and it is in this way that one speaks of the *pratyakṣa* of the object.[25]

8.4. The object of sensory perception is an assemblage, not a unified complex, of atoms

For the Sarvāstivādins, in a *pratyakṣa* experience, whether sensory or mental, the cognitive object as the *ālambana-pratyaya* (See *supra*) is actually the object out there existing at the very moment when the corresponding consciousness arises. It is a real entity, just as a single atom is a real. Saṃghabhadra argues that a sensory consciousness necessarily takes a physical assemblage or agglomeration of atoms (和集 **saṃcaya*, **saṃghāta*,[26] **samasta*) as its object. What is directly perceived is just these atoms assembled together in a certain manner, not a conceptualized object such as a jar, etc. The jug *per se* is never perceived by the visual consciousness; only the *rūpa* as agglomerated atoms of colour and shapes. This is direct perception. It is the succeeding mental consciousness, with its *abhirūpaṇā* capability and using names, that determines that the object is a 'jug'. At this stage — as opposed to the initial stage immediately following the visual perception — it is no more an experience of *pratyakṣa*, but an inference.

Saṃghabhadra rejects Śrīlāta's theory that the object of visual perception is a unified complex (和合[27] **sāmagrī*, **saṃghāta*) of atoms.

In return, Śrīlāta ridicules the Vaibhāṣika notion of assembled atoms as a cognitive object, comparing it to the case of a group of blind persons who, like an individual member, is incapable of vision.

Saṃghabhadra answers this, and states that even an individual atom is in actual fact visible, even though its visibility is almost nil, on account of its being very subtle for visual consciousness which can grasp only a gross object (取境麤故). In fact, it is conceded that each individual atom, in its own right, actually serves as a cognitive object (*ālambana*) or a supporting basis (*āśraya*). He argues that such a superimposed unity as proposed by Śrīlāta can only be grasped by *abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa*. A sensory consciousness, lacking this capacity, can only take an existent — not a conceptualized unity — as its object.[28] He further explains that a unified complex obtains where speech operates, as a result of the arising of an appellation (*adhivacana*) with regard to a multiplicity of *dharma*-s.[29] It is on account of its non-discriminative nature that visual consciousness is incapable of discerning the extremely subtle form of an atom; only those endowed with the power of excellent wisdom can do so. In any case, he says, atoms are always found assembled, and thus are visible[30] (See also *supra*).

As a matter of fact, Saṃghabhadra does not seem to be entirely alone or innovative in the way he considers the efficacy of the atoms. In the AKB, Vasubandhu argues for the reality of the *āyatana* (a dissent here from the Sautrāntika) by saying that an aggregate of atoms, constituting an *āyatana*, together serve as the cause for cognition, each individual atom contributing to the causal efficacy (*ekaśaḥ samagrāṇāṃ kāraṇabhāva*).[31]

On this, Yaśomitra comments that it is like the case of many people gathering sufficient strength to drag a log, each contributing his share of strength; and again like the case of many strands of hairs becoming sufficiently visible, each single piece of hair contributing to the visibility.[32]

Surprisingly, such explanations coming from a professed Sautrāntika do not seem very different from what Saṃghabhadra says above. The common factor in this case, uniting these three masters of different sectarian affiliation, appears to be the criterion of causal efficacy being identified with reality. As far as Saṃghabhadra is concerned, he is being true to the Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy in maintaining that if an atom as well as an agglomeration of them constituting an object of perception are real substances, they must in each case be causally efficient.

Within the Sarvāstivāda system itself, the distinction between a physical assemblage of atoms capable of being seen by the eye cognised by visual consciousness, and a mentally imposed unified complex, is also not necessarily a "neo-Sarvāstivāda" doctrine. If there is any thing new in Saṃghabhadra's explanation, it is simply that he tries to make the contrast clearer with the two terms, 和集 and 和合[33] — an agglomeration of atoms is a set of entities of the same species, and therefore making a collective and accumulative contribution of the same kind; a unified complex, on the other hand, is a mentally derived set of entities of different species.

In the Sarvāstivāda perspective, the whole universe consists of agglomerated atoms in multiples of 7 — 7 atoms form an *aṇu*, the finest matter actually perceivable by the eyes; 7 *aṇu*-s form a *tāmra-rajas*; 7 *tāmra-rajas* form an *ap-rajas*; etc.[34]

The Vaibhāṣika speaks summarily of two types of atoms, real (*dravyatas*) and conceptual (*prajñaptitas*).

> The real are the *svalakṣaṇa*-s of *rūpa*, etc. which are universally acknowledged (*prasiddha*); they are perceived through *pratyakṣa* at the assembled state (和集位 **saṃcitāvasthā*, **samastāvasthā*). The conceptual ones are those [arrived at] through analysis, and known through inference (*anumāna*).[35]

In a similar manner, Vasubandhu too, in his AKB, when refuting the Vaiśeṣika, explains the Buddhist view that "in spite of the atoms being imperceptible by the senses [individually], there is the direct perception (*samastānāṃ pratyakṣatva*) of them in agglomeration."[36] Moreover, it is also the doctrine of the MVŚ that the first five consciousnesses have, for their supporting bases and objects, an agglomeration of atoms, not the atoms singly:

> Question: Is there a case where a sensory consciousness, visual, etc., is generated with a single atom as the supporting basis and a single atom as the cognitive object?
>
> Answer: No. Why? Because the five consciousnesses, visual, etc., have accumulated supports (依積聚 *saṃcitāśraya*), accumulated objects (緣積聚 *saṃcitālambana*); have resistant supports (*sapratighāśraya*), resistant objects (*sapratighālambana*), have conglomerated (和合) supports, conglomerated objects.[37]

It is not clear what the original is for the same Chinese term '*he he*', rendered here as 'conglomerated', that distinguishes the Sautrāntika view from the Vaibhāṣika. But the general Sarvāstivāda notion of an accumulation or agglomeration of atoms constituting the *āśraya* and *ālambana* seems clear enough in this context, particularly as indicated by the word 積聚 (*saṃcita*).

8.5. Yogācāra critique of the Vaibhāṣika view

The Vaibhāṣika view that a sensory consciousness takes a present external object comprising a physical assemblage of atoms seemed to have become quite thought-provoking since the time of Saṃghabhadra. Sthiramati, in his *Triṃśatikā Vijñapti-bhāṣya* (= TVB), rejects this view. He argues that such an accumulated (*saṃcita*) form is nothing more than the collected (*saṃhata*) parts:

> And it is not [as asserted by some Sarvāstivādins] that the very atoms, when agglomerated (*saṃcita*) become its cognitive object, since these atoms do not have the form of that [object]. For, [when they pass] from the state of not being agglomerated to the state of being agglomerated, the atoms do not acquire any surplus in themselves (*ātmātiśaya*). Hence, even the agglomerated atoms too, like the non-agglomerated ones, definitely do not become the cognitive object.[3]

In the Cheng Wei Shi Lun (= The Siddhi(C)) there is also a passage corresponding to this criticism,[39] and according to Kuei Ji[40] this is directed at the so-called 'old Sarvāstivāda' view.

While the MVŚ certainly states that an atom "cannot be seen by the eye,"[41] it also explains, much like Saṃghabhadra, that this is not in the sense of an object not being of the intrinsic nature of an object. That is, in principle, even an atom, being a *rūpa*, necessarily posses the character of visibility, *sa-nidarśana*, the *svalakṣaṇa* of *rūpa* as real:[42] it is expediently described as invisible (*anidarśana*) only in terms of its extreme minuteness. Thus, with regard to an atom of colour or shape, the MVŚ says:

> There exist [an atom of green]; it is only that it is not grasped by visual consciousness. If a single atom is not green, an accumulation of numerous atoms cannot be green; likewise for yellow etc...there exist [an atom of a long shape, etc.]; it is only that it is not grasped by visual consciousness. If a single atom is not long, etc., in shape, an accumulation of numerous atoms cannot be long, etc., in shape. Furthermore, there exist *rūpa*-s which are not visible on account of being extremely fine, not on account of being non-objects (*aviṣaya*). [43]

Saṃghabhadra's claim that the object of the sensory perception consists of nothing more than the very atoms assembled seems to find echo in some Buddhist logical works. Thus, citing Dharmakīrti, Mokṣākaragupta states in his *Tarka-bhāṣā*:

> When a jar, etc ..., is being seen, we do not perceive a single entity (*dravya*) which is a whole, other than the parts – front, hind, etc. As the Supreme Lord of logic (= Dharmakīrti) says:
>
>> Only the components assembled together in a certain manner become evident (*bhāsante*). No any other distinct part possessing these [components] is apprehended.[44]

That a multitude of atoms constitutes the object for visual perception is one of the doctrines refuted in the VVS. Unfortunately, neither the scanty description there nor Xuan Zang's rendering of *saṃhatāḥ* (Tibetan also has only *ḥdus pa*) collectively helps much.[45] Kuei Ji tells us in his commentary that Vasubandhu wrote this treatise at an advanced age, after Saṃghabhadra had composed the Ny. While the earlier translator Paramārtha had rendered *saṃhata* by one single term, Xuan Zang's new translation rendered it by the two terms intended to contrast the respective views of the Sautrāntika

and the "Neo-Sarvāstivāda".[46] However, the author refutes the possibility of seven supposedly dimensionless atoms combining to form a molecule: This entails either that an atom has six spatial dimensions, or that each *rūpa* occurring in such a supposedly combined form would have the same size as that of a single atom.[47] Judging from this refutation, the refuted doctrine could very well be that of Saṃghabhadra.

The Siddhi (C) contains a view which is refuted as follows:

> According to some, individual atoms of *rūpa*, etc, when not assembled, do not become the object of the five consciousnesses. At the stage when they are assembled together, they assist mutually (*parasparāpekṣa*?) to generate a gross form, which becomes the object of these consciousnesses. This [gross] form exists truly (*dravyasat*). This view is not correct [for the following] reasons:
> [i.] their nature and form are the same before and after they are assembled;
> [ii.] the consciousnesses that have as objects the forms of a jar and a bowl, etc., having the number of atoms, would not be different;
> [iii.] in the assembled stage, each atom would lose its form of being minute and spherical, [since they have now acquired a gross form];
> [iv.] it cannot be that the consciousness that perceives a gross form takes as its object a minute form, lest [there be the fallacy] that any consciousness that takes one type of object [can] also take another type of object;
> [v.] if as they assert the consciousness can perceive at once two opposing forms, one gross and one minute,] then one [type of] consciousness should [be able to simultaneously] perceive all [type of] object.[48]

Kuei Ji, in his commentary, identifies this view as Saṃghabhadra's "Neo-Sarvāstivāda view". He explains this supposedly Sarvāstivāda notion of a distinct "gross form as follows:

> There is also the form of atom in the five consciousnesses. Although *rūpa*, etc [each] has many form, [among these various forms], some are objects for *pratyakṣa*. These atoms at the assembled stage mutually assist one another to generate for each a gross form ... The Sarvāstivāda asserts that such [a unified complex as held by the Sautrāntika], being a unified complex, is not the object of the five consciousnesses, for the arising of the five types of consciousness necessarily depends on real *dharma*-s. This [gross] form being spoken of here mutually assisting, each atom comes to be capable of generating the five [types of] consciousnesses. The word '*he*' refers to their being mutually close to one another in one place, and the word '*ji*' refers to their not being a single entity [apart from the component atoms]. That is, ['*he ji*'] signifies their being close together as distinct entities. Being real *dharma*-s, they have the power

of generating consciousness. Because the form is gross, consciousness [arises] with this form. Thus the principle pertaining to the condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya-nīti*) is completely conformed to.[49]

The source for both the Siddhi(C) here as well as Kuei Ji's comments seems to be Diṅnāga's * , which Kuei Ji quotes liberally in support of his explanation. The following description in the **Ālambana-parīkṣā* shows an almost identical wording:

According, to some, *rūpa*, etc. ... each has many forms; among them, some are objects of *pratyakṣa*. Thus, the atoms in mutual assistance each has an assembled form (*ḥdus pahi rnam pa *saṃhatākāra*/ *saṃcitākāra*). These forms exist truly; each being capable of generating a consciousness with a form similar to itself, serves as the *ālambana* for a sensory consciousness (lit: for the five consciousness).[50]

However, this does not seem to be a fair representation of the Vaibhāṣika view. The atoms are said in the above passage to assemble together to generate a 'gross form' which is a real, distinct existent. As we have seen, although Saṃghabhadra does hold that a sensory consciousness grasps a gross object comprising assembled atoms, he does not speak of their acquiring another distinct, gross form in this assembled stage. In the Vaibhāṣika epistemology, this existent gross body capable of generating a consciousness is a *paramārtha-sat* and not a *prajñāpti-sat* (see *supra*), since it is not a superimposition on the real atoms but the 'form' which is none other than the very atoms themselves — each atoms is contributing in its own right and the collective contribution comes to be strong enough to generate a sensory consciousness. This is essentially the same as saying that a visible *rūpa* is as much a real entity (*dravya*) as an individual atom. But the assembled atoms directly perceived by a sensory consciousness — and only directly by a sensory consciousness — are not anything in the form of a jar etc. which can only be perceived by mental consciousness when superimposition takes place. It is to be noted that in his commentary on the same work of Vasubandhu, the *Triṃśikāvijñaptimātra*, Sthiramati also criticizes this view, but without speaking of any distinct 'gross form' being generated:

Others, however, content that the individual atoms, independent of one another, is outside the scope of a sense faculty (*atīndriya*). But a multitude of them, mutually dependent, are graspable by a sense faculty. But since there is no surplus in substance (*ātmātiśaya*), between the states when they are

independent and they are mutually dependent [— the atoms remain the same when passing from the one state to the other —] they are categorically (*ekāntena*) either graspable or beyond the scope of the sense faculties. Moreover, if the atoms themselves in mutual dependence become the object of the consciousness, this being so, there would not be any difference in the form (*ākāra*) of what is a pot, a wall, etc. in the consciousness, since the atoms do not have those forms.[51]

Notes

1 ADV, 47: *dārṣṭāntikasya hi sarvamapratyakṣam.*

2 SDS, 19, describes the respective doctrines of the four major Buddhist schools as follows: *te ca mādhyamika-yogācāra-sautrāntika-vaibhāṣika-saṃjñābhiḥ prasiddhā bauddhā yathā-kramaṃ sarvaśūnyatva-bāhyārthaśūnyatva-bāhyārthānumeyatva-bāhyārthapratyakṣatva-vādān ātiṣṭhante/* See also, *ibid.,* 46. In a footnote in his *Central Conception of Buddhism*, Stcherbatsky remarks that "the information about the Sautrāntika theory of cognition, contained in the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* and similar works (*bāhyārthānumeyatva*), reposes on a confusion by Brahmanical authors between Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda, not seldom to be met with." Amar Singh (*The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy — Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti*, (Delhi, 1984), 88) cites this remark and objects to Mādhava's identification of the Sautrāntika view as *bāhyārthānumeya-vāda*. However, as our discussion will show, Mādhava's information is undoubtedly correct.

3 It is interesting to note that while the Sarvāstivādins themselves are described by others as kṣaṇikavādins in the context of the epistemological dispute (see T31, 76b), they in turn give the same label to the Sautrāntika-s in the dispute on *sarvāstitva* (see Ny, 630c–631a).

4 Cf ADV, 32

5 Ny, 420c–421a.

6 An opinion equating *vijñāna* with *jñāna*, asserting that the two differ only in the prefix 'vi', is refuted in the MVŚ, 44b.

7 T29, 736a.

8 *Cf.* Pu Guang'explanation in T41, 135b.

9 *Cf.* AKB, 229: One making present a feeling is said to experience it — *saṃmukhīkurvaṃs tu tāṃ vedayata ity ucyate* /

10 The two in conjunction satisfying the five-fold equality (*samatā*): *āśraya, ālambana, ākāra, kāla, dravya* (see AKB, 62). In this case of a sensory perception of course, the *ākāra* does not function prominently.

11 Ny, 374c.

12 MVS, 42c; Ny, 742a-b.

13 See Dhammajoti, KL, "Logic in the *Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā*" in *Journal of Buddhist Studies*, Vol II (Colombo, January, 2004), 180 ff.

14 Besides *prajñā*, *saṃjñā* is also a contributing factor for *abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa*. See *supra*, § 6.6.

15 Saṃghabhadra (Ny, 684a) speaks of the insight arising in *satyābhisamaya* as the 真現量證智.

16 Four for each Truth: Thus *duḥkha-satya* — impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, emptiness and soullessness (See AKB, 343).

17 *Cf.* AKB, 401.

18 MVŚ, 217a.

19 *Cf.* ADV, 47, which ascribes this view to the Dārṣṭāntika: *dārṣṭāntikasya hi sarvam apratyakṣam / pañcānāṃ vijñāna-kāyānām atīta-viṣayatvād yadā khalu cakṣūrūpe vidyete tadā vijñānam asat / yadā vijñānaṃ sac cakṣūrūpe tadā 'satī / vijñāna-kṣaṇa-sthity-abhāve svārthopalabdhy-anupapatteś ca /*

20 Ny, 374b.

21 T29, 374c.

22 Candrakīrti criticizes this as a Sautrāntika doctrine — See Poussin (ed.)*Madhyāntāvatāra*, 167 f (Lu Cheng, 366).

23 MVŚ, 42c ff; Ny, 742a–b. MVŚ gives this as Mahāsāṃghika view.

24 *Cf.* AKB, 229: One making present a feeling is said to experience it — *saṃmukhīkurvaṃs tu tāṃ vedayata ity ucyate/*

25 TVB, 9: *nānanubhutaṃ manovijnānena smaryata ity avaśyam arthānubhavena bhavitavyaṃ tac ca darśanam ity evaṃ tadviṣayasya ṛupasya rupādeḥ pratyakṣatvaṃ matam* / T31, 76b.

26 For the possibility of this correspondence, see AKB, 176.

27 *Cf.* VVS, 6, stanza 11: *na ca te saṃhatāḥ...*, Xuan Zang (T31, 75c) has here: 非和合.

28 Ny, 351a–b.

29 T29, 788c.

30 Ny, 350c–351c.

31 AKB, 14.

32 Vy, 46: *tad-yathā dārv-ākarṣaṇe bahūnām ākraṣṭṝnāṃ pratyekam asāmarthyaṃ, samuditānāṃ tu parasparam apekṣyamāṇānāṃ sāmarthyam. yathā vā keśāḥ pṛthak-pṛthag avasthitā na samarthās taimirika-cakṣur-vijñāna-karaṇe. samuditās tv asaṃyuktā api samarthāḥ / tadvac cakṣur-ādīndriya-paramāṇavo rūp'ādi-viṣaya-paramāṇavaś ca cakṣur-ādi-vijñānotpādane pratyekam asamarthāḥ. samuditās tu samarthāḥ /*

33 See also *Study*, 704fg.

34 See MVŚ, 702a–b; AKB, 176; Ny, 521c.

35 Ny, 522a.

36 AKB, 189: *paramāṇvatīndriyatve 'pi samastānāṃ pratyakṣatvam* /

37 MVŚ, 63c. Also cf. AKB, 34: *na caika indriya-pramāṇur viṣaya-pamāṇur vā vijñānaṃ janayati/ saṃcittāśrayālambanatvāt pañcānāṃ vijñāna-kāyānām / ata evānidarśanaḥ paramāṇur adśyatvāt* /

38 TVB, 16: *na ca paramāṇava eva saṃcitās tasyālambanaṃ paramāṇūnām atad-ākāratvāt / na hy asaṃcitāvasthātaḥ saṃcitāvasthāyāṃ paramāṇūnāṃ kaścid ātmātiśayaḥ / tasmād asaṃcitavat saṃcitā api paramāṇavo naivālambanam* /

39 T31, 4b.

40 T43, 270c.

41 MVŚ, 702a.

42 *Cf.* AKB, 2: *svalakṣaṇa-dhāraṇād dharmaḥ/*

43 MVŚ, 64a.

44 Singh, BN (ed), *Bauddha-tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta* (Varanasi, 1985), 26: *ghaṭādau paridṛśyamāne pūrvāparādi-bhāgaṃ vihāya nānyat kiñcid ekam avayavidravyam upalabhāmahe/* (unfortunately, this text is not critically edited, and it is the only version I can access at present).

45 VVS, 6; T31, 75c.

46 T43, 993a.

47 VVS, 6f; T31, 75c–76a.

48 T31, 4b.

49 T43 (no. 1830), 271a.

50 T31 (no. 1624), 888a. The objection to this theory is also basically identical with those in Siddhi (C) here.

51 TVB, 16: *anyas tu manyate/ ekaikaparamāṇur anya-nirapekṣo 'tīndriyo bahavas tu parasparāpekṣā indriya-grāhyāḥ/teṣām api sāpekṣa-nirapekṣāvasthayor ātmātiśayābhāvād ekāntenendriyagrāhyatvam atīndriyatvaṃ vā / yadi ca paramāṇava eva parasparāpekṣā vijñānasya viṣayībhavanty evaṃ sati yo 'yaṃ ghaṭa-kuḍy-ādy-ākāra-bhedo vijñāne sa na syāt paramāṇūnām atad-ākāratvāt /*

9. The Sautrāntika Theory of Representational Perception

9.1. Sautrāntika objection to simultaneous causality and the Vaibhāṣika reply

While both the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika share the premise that all *dharma*-s are momentary (*kṣaṇika*), the Sautrāntika maintains that in the causal process, a cause necessarily precedes the corresponding effect. These two premises — momentariness and the necessary posteriority of effect — when taken together, lead the Sautrāntika to the logical conclusion that all our knowledge of the external world is necessarily indirect. In the second moment when the sensory consciousness arises as the effect, the cause has become past, and therefore is no more existent.

In the Ny, Śrīlāta raises four objections to the doctrine of simultaneous causality:

I. Causality among co-nascent *dharma*-s cannot be established since before they arise, they have not yet come into existence; one cannot specify which *dharma*-s give rise (cause) to which (effect). This would also mean that the present *dharma*-s are without cause, and that we need to seek two other *dharma*-s for the two co-nascent *dharma*-s.

II. It is taught that where there is a cause, there is an effect. If *dharma*-s in the future period can function as causes for other *dharma*-s to arise, there would be the fallacy of *dharma*-s arising perpetually.

III. Among two co-nascent *dharma*-s — as in the case of the two horns of an ox — one cannot prove legitimately which is the cause which is the effect.

IV. In the world, among cases where a cause-effect relationship is universally acknowledged — such as the production of sprout from a seed — such a simultaneous causality has never been observed.[1]

As we have seen above, Śrīlāta clearly depicts sensory perception as a successive process. Saṃghabhadra argues that such a perceptual model

would lead to the *Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika* position that the external object for the perceptual process is necessarily different from the condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya*) — that is, from what actually serves to generate the sensory consciousness:

> Why? Because they assert that where the *rūpa*, etc, can serve as the condition for the arising of visual consciousness, etc; such *rūpa*, etc, are necessarily arisen previously (*agraja*). At the time when the *rūpa* exists, the visual consciousness has not yet come into existence; consciousness not yet existing, what then takes the object (*ā-√lamb*)? At the time when visual consciousness exists, the *rūpa* has already become non-existent; the *rūpa* not existing, what serves as the cognitive object (*ālambana*)?
>
> Visual consciousness ought not take a non-existent as object, because they assert that the five consciousnesses take present objects, and because their school holds that the present is not non-existent. The *rūpa* that is being perceived in the present moment is not the condition qua object, since it co-arises with the present visual consciousness.[2]

What Saṃghabhadra means in his critique is that:

(i) As the Sautrāntika too would agree, a sensory perception — and for that matter any perception — necessarily arises with a cognitive object, *O-c* (*ālambana*). There can be no consciousness as such without an object. In the case of a sensory perception, it is also agreed that *O-c* is necessarily in the present moment.

(ii) But since it holds that the perception as the effect must be in the second moment, *O-c* cannot be the same as the external object, *O-e*, existing in the previous (first) moment. Moreover, as the school, holding Vibhajyavādin standpoint, must concede that the present *dharma*, *O-c*, is existent, and that *O-e* is no more; *O-c* and *O-e* are necessarily different *dharma*-s. Hence, it amounts to not only that a sensory perception has no *ālambana-pratyaya*, but also the very impossibility of knowing an external object. Since the past and future *dharma*-s as well as the *asaṃskṛta*-s are all held by the school to be non-existent, there equally cannot be *ālambana-pratyaya*-s for the mental perception of these *dharma*-s; for otherwise one would commit the fallacy of over-generalization (*ati-prasaṅga*) by conceding that non-existent entities can serve as conditions.[3] This would then lead to the untenable position that consciousness can arise without any object serving as one of the two requisite conditions.

9.2. Perception is possible even though the cognitive object is non-existent

However, as we have seen (chapter 4), since the time of the early Dārṣṭāntikas, the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntikas have held that cognitive objects need not be real existents. Śrīlāta maintains this position, and answers the Vaibhāṣika criticism as follows:

> Those mental consciousnesses that have the past, etc, as objects are not without the cognitive objects; [though] they do not exclusively have existents as objects. Why is that so? Because we say that the mental consciousnesses arisen with the five groups of [sensory] consciousness as the equal-immediate [conditions] (*samanantara-pratyaya*) are [in each case] capable of experiencing (*anu-√bhū*) the [corresponding] object grasped by the preceding *manas* [— i.e. the corresponding sensory consciousness that serves as the *samanantara-pratyaya* for the present mental consciousness].
>
> Such a mental consciousness has as its cause (*hetu*), the **anudhātu*, and its *ālambana-pratyaya* is none other than the [external] object (*viṣaya*) of the [corresponding] sensory consciousness. [The preceding *manas* (= the sensory consciousness) is the cause] because it must have existed first in order that this [mental consciousness] can arise; and [the sensory object is the *ālambana-pratyaya* of this mental consciousness] because the existence or non-existence of this [consciousness] follows the existence or non-existence of that [object]. However, this mental consciousness does not exclusively have an existent as its object, since at this time [of its arising] that object has already perished. Neither is it without a cognitive object, since the existence or non-existence of this mental consciousness follows the existence or non-existence of that [object].
>
> Furthermore, when one recollects (*anu-√smṛ*) an object that has long perished, the arising of [the recollection] in the present moment has as its condition the former consciousness that perceived that object, for this consciousness of recollection belongs to the same series [of which this former consciousness is a member] and is arisen in a serial succession. Although there are other conditions that generate the consciousness of recollection, its arising must be preceded by the perception of that former object.[4]

There are two main points in Śrīlāta's explanations:
(a) Their standpoints of Vibhajyavāda and successive causation do not entail that consciousness can arise without a *O-c* serving as a necessary condition — the *ālambana-pratyaya*. But *O-c* need not be an existent. In fact, at the time when the mental consciousness (he clarifies particularly the case of mental

consciousness) immediately succeeding a sensory consciousness arises, *O-e*, though having become past and therefore non-existent, can nevertheless be 'experienced' by the mental consciousness as its *O-c*. This, as we shall see (*infra*) is in the form of an exact copy of *O-e*.

(b) However, *O-c* is only a supporting condition; the generative cause (*janana-hetu*) for the mental consciousness is the preceding moment of consciousness in the mental series. These two points are inter-connected via Śrīlāta doctrine of the *anudhātu* (*supra,* § 6.5). The *anudhātu* is the fact of causal efficacy manifested in each moment of the person's psycho-physical series. Each present moment — and the Vibhajyavādins can work with only this present moment — subsuming and transmitting all that have been previously experienced, is the generative cause of the succeeding moment of the series. And in this way, all experiences, including *karma* and memory, are preserved and passed down in the series.

Thus in the case of visual perception, the visual object exists in the first moment, conditioning the arising of the visual consciousness of that object (now past) in the second moment. This same object is also experienced as the *O-c* of the immediately succeeding mental consciousness in the third moment. This is because the arising of the mental consciousness is necessarily conditioned by the preceding sensory consciousness as its *samanantara-pratyaya* functioning as the mental faculty (*mana-indriya* = *manas*); and the arising of this sensory consciousness is in turn necessarily conditioned by the sensory object.

The causal necessity is justified by Śrīlāta with the Buddha's doctrine of conditionality: "this being, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises" (*asmin satīdaṃ bhavati / asyo 'tpādād idam utpadyate*). But whereas Saṃghabhadra would interpret the first part of this dictum as referring to simultaneous causality (*sahabhū-hetu*) in contrast to the second part, Śrīlāta takes the whole dictum as referring to the successive cause-effect sequence.[5] The causal relationship may also be justified by the logician (*haituka*) criterion: When A exists or does not exist, B necessarily exists or does not exist; then A constitutes the cause of B. Such a criterion is also used by the Vaibhāṣika as well as the Yogācāra to establish simultaneous causality.[6]

Saṃghabhadra objects to the above explanations by Śrīlāta in details, showing the contradictions and fallacies that result from the latter's Vibhajyavāda standpoint and doctrine of successive causality:

(I) Given the denial that the *O-e* can co-exist with a sensory consciousness, the latter can arise only in the second moment after the ceasing of the *O-e* which it therefore cannot experience; how then can it be experienced by the mental consciousness arising in the third moment? To concede that this mental consciousness can experience the object of the past sensory consciousness, and at the same time that it is not without an *O-c*, is to acknowledge that this *O-c* though ceased is still existent in part. On the other hand, if the *O-c* is held to be completely non-existent, then it amounts to stating that the arisen mental consciousness is absolutely (*atyantam*) without an *O-c*. This then renders nonsensical his assertion: "However, this mental consciousness does not exclusively have an existent as its object", etc. — He must admit the fallacy of this consciousness being without an *O-c*:

> Since he does not acknowledge that the object of a sensory consciousness[7] can be co-nascent with the sensory consciousnesses; it entails that even the sensory consciousness arises only after the object has ceased, how much more so the mental consciousness — [asserted to be] able to experience that object — which is generated immediately after the sensory consciousness? For, it is in the third moment[8] that the mental consciousness arises. If the mental consciousness generated immediately after the sensory consciousness could experience the object of the past sensory consciousness, and yet it is acknowledged that the *ālambana* is not non-existent; then it is clearly an acknowledgement that the object of the mental consciousness, though said to have ceased, still exists in part. If it is held to be totally non-existent; then it clearly amounts to stating that the generated mental consciousness is absolutely without any *ālambana*, and it would be futile to state: "However, this mental consciousness does not exclusively have an existent as its object, since at this time [of its arising] that object has already perished. Neither is it without a perceptual object, since the existence or non-existence of this mental consciousness follows the existence or non-existence of that [object].[9]

(II) To say that it "does not exclusively have an existent as its object, since at this time [of its arising] that object has already perished." is illogical: A perished *dharma* cannot be said to be both existent and non-existent — unless, of course, Śrīlāta adopts the Sarvāstivāda standpoint that a past *dharma* is on the one hand not absolutely non-existent like a sky-flower, and on the other not existent in the same manner as a present *dharma* which alone has activity (*kāritra*).[10] Otherwise, he must state either that the *O-c* of this consciousness is definitely existent, or that it is definitely non-existent.

(III) The proposition that 'the existence of consciousness is dependent on that of the object' implies that the past exists as an entity. If the past object does not exist and yet a present consciousness arises, then it should not be stated that the latter's existence or non-existence depends that of the object. Moreover, it is also meaningless to assert that it is not without an *O-c*: it is on account of the existence of the object that it is said to have an *O-c*; the object not existing as an entity, how can there be an *O-c*?

(IV) When one recollects a long perished object, how can a previously arisen consciousness that perceived that object serve as the condition for the arising of this present consciousness? When the previous consciousness existed, the present consciousness has not come into existence; when the latter exists, the former is no more — how can a non-existent be a condition for a non-existent? How can it be true that the present consciousness arises with a long perished object as the preceding condition? In the long interval that has preceded, a non-existent could not have served as a condition for another non-existent not belonging to the same series — granting such a possibility that a non-existent can be a condition for another non-existent amounts to saying that a hare's horn can generate a hare's horn! Neither can it be argued that the case here is different because of the existence of the *anudhātu* in the consciousness: The present *anudhātu* consciousness has never been generated with regard to the former object, how can it be said that the consciousness that perceived the former object domain, having served as the condition, generates the present consciousness? It cannot be said that the *anudhātu* and the consciousness take their cognitive objects at different times, lest it be that two times exist in a single times! Neither can Śrīlāta say that the *anudhātu* is a different entity distinct from the present consciousness, for it would entail that two consciousnesses arise together within a single serial continuity.[11]

(V) Finally, with the Vibhajyavāda standpoint, Śrīlāta cannot validly speak of a causal succession in his explanations; since what immediately precedes, a non-existent, cannot be causally related to the present, an existent, and — further back in the line — a non-existent likewise cannot be causally related to another non-existent.[12] More generally, even the notion of a progressive serial continuity cannot be valid unless past *dharma*-s are accepted as being continuously existent: serial variation can only be asserted of a continuous existent, not on a *dharma* that exists for a mere moment.[13]

9.3. Sautrāntika explanation of direct perception

Elsewhere in the Ny, Saṃghabhadra refutes the Sautrāntika and maintains that according to the Buddha's teaching, both the *O-c* and the mental faculty are the indispensable causes for generating a consciousness.[14] Śrīlāta, however, argues that even though a knowledge has a non-existent as its *O-c*, the two requisite conditions for perception are nonetheless still fulfilled,[15] by virtue of inferring the successive cause-effect relationship involved. In this argument, he further clarifies how the Sautrāntika arrives at the claim that a present consciousness/knowledge has as its *O-c* a past object. The argument also details how *pratyakṣa* is possible, notwithstanding the seeming contradictory stance of indirect perception:

> It is only after having grasped (perceived) a present [object field] that one is able to rapidly infer (推尋) the preceding and the succeeding. That is, one is able to infer that such an effect in the present is produced by such a type of cause in the past. This cause in turn was produced by such a cause — in this manner back to the distant past. In each corresponding case (*yathāyogam*), through inference, it is directly experienced (**anu-√bhū*,[16] **pratyakṣī-√kṛ*, **sākṣāt-√kṛ*) as if in the present moment (如現證得). One may also infer that such a type of cause in the present will produce such a type of fruit in the future; this fruit in turn will induce the arising of such a fruit — in each corresponding case, through inference, it is directly realized as if in the present moment. In this way, successively examining the past causes accordingly as the case may be, back to the distant past, one directly realizes as if in the present moment, without any error (*aviparītam*). Although at the particular stage, the object field (*viṣaya*) does not exist, the knowledge is nonetheless not without the two requisites [— *ālambana* and *āśraya*].
>
> [This is so because] at the time when a particular cause-knowledge (*hetu-jñāna*) arises, there exists the *hetu-pratyaya* (因緣) [— the *anudhātu* —] in one's serial continuity. That is: there was formerly produced such a knowledge; through a causal succession (*pāraṃparyeṇa*), it gives rise to a present knowledge of such a form. Since this present knowledge has as its cause the former knowledge; the result is that this present knowledge arises with an understanding conforming to the former one (如昔而解), having as its *ālamabana* the former object. However, that *ālamabana* is now a non-existent; yet though now a non-existent, it constitutes the *ālamabana*. Hence one cannot say that [the present] knowledge is without the two requisites.[17]

Firstly, in Śrīlāta's version of the Sautrāntika doctrine on perception, the so-called "direct perception" expressed by the Sanskrit word *pratykṣa* is clearly a case of retrospection. But it qualifies as a *pratyakṣa* experience

in so as there is an exact correspondence between what is known in this retrospection in the third moment when mental consciousness arises, and the sensory object-field in the first moment: The present *ālambana* that generates the present retrospection is an exact mental representation, having the same appearance — the *ākāra* — of the former object-field. The Vaibhāṣika-s consider the act of recollection as a contribution by the universal (*mahābhūmika*) *caitta smṛti* which arising in every moment of thought functions to take clear note (明記 *abhi-√lap*) of the present object. "It is not the case that without having first taken clear note of the present object-field, there can subsequently be the generation of the recollection of the past [object-filed]."[18] In contrast, the Sautrāntikas deny the existence of *smṛti* as an ontological entity. For them, retrospection or recollection is of the nature of knowledge itself. Or, as Śrīlāta states, a mode of activity of knowledge (*jñānākāra*), i.e., knowledge qua a modality of the activity of thought at each present moment performs the same function of clear noting as the Vaibhāṣika *smṛti.*[19]

Saṃghabhadra argues that since the Sautrāntika maintains that on account of causation being successive, an external object in the preceding moment has not been experienced directly (*pratyakṣam*), there can be no possibility of a subsequent discernment that is of the nature of *pratyakṣa*[20] — having the thrust of vividness and immediacy. The Sautrāntika, on the other hand, argues that not mere recollection, but rather the simultaneity of the experiencing (*anubhava*) and the discerning (*buddhi*) must be admitted to account for such an experience.[21] That is, unless one is self-aware of what one is presently cognizing or knowing — i.e. unless what is termed *sva-saṃvedana*[22] in later Buddhist logical texts is a fact — one cannot in the subsequent moment recollect as a *pratyakṣa* understanding in the manner: "I have experienced such a pleasure or pain."[23] The emphasis here is clearly on the fact the *pratyakṣa* is an experience of a personal nature and is free from error — as when one sees a real before one's very eyes (*prati-akṣa*).[24]

In other words, the Sautrāntika, rejecting simultaneous causality, seeks to account for the sense of vividness and immediacy necessarily entailed in a *pratyakṣa* understanding via a different mechanism: It maintains that the perceptual act is intrinsically self-aware. Like the Sarvāstivāda, it too arrives at the conclusion that the *pratyakṣa* knowledge truly becomes a knowledge only on subsequent recollection; but its doctrinal premises entail that this occurs only in the third moment from the time of the initial appearance of the *indriya* and *viṣaya*.

In AKB, Vasubandhu essentially accepts this Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntika conception. He explains that in spite of the non-existence of the previous object-domain at the present moment of mental consciousness, its recollection is possible because "from the [previous] *citta* of seeing [that object-field], another thought of recollection [now] arises through the process of a [progressive] transformation of the serial continuity."[25] This homogeneous serial continuity is described as containing the memory-seed (*smṛti-bīja*), defined as the capacity engendered by the experience of the initial sensory perception and capable of generating a consciousness of memory subsequently in the same personal serial continuity. These memory seeds are comparable to karmic seeds and plant-seeds in the world.[26] They are not ontological existents, but just efficacies (*sāmarthya*) perpetuated within the serial continuity.[27]

In keeping with this understanding, the Sautrāntika claims that it is consciousness, and not the sensory organ, that sees. Accordingly, when one, conforming to worldly conventions, speaks of the eye seeing an object-domain, it should be understood to mean that the subsequently arising visual consciousness experiences (*anu-√bhū*) or cognizes (*vijānāti*) it.[28] As Vasubandhu explains, consciousness in this case actually does nothing to the cognitive object. It simply arises with a content which is a resemblance (*sādṛśya*) of the object-domain. (See *infra*, § 9.4.). This resemblance is most often – especially in later texts — expressed by the term *ākāra*.


Another point to be noted is that, in Śrīlāta's explanation above, of the possibility of experiencing a past object, he clearly speaks of the mechanism involving *anudhātu*, even though the term is not mentioned explicitly: the present knowledge is called the *hetu-jñāna*, a *jñāna* (= *vijñāna*) corresponding to the experience of the previous sensory object. Its arising is by virtue of a causal succession — the serial continuity being endowed with the *hetu-pratyaya* (如是因智生時, 自相續中因緣有故), i.e., the *anudhātu*.[29] (*Cf.* § 6.5.). Via such a casual succession, thanks to the principle of the *anudhātu* "one directly realizes [the past object] as if in the present moment, without any error." And this constitutes the Sautrāntika notion of *pratyakṣa*.

Various objections, however, are raised against Śrīlāta explanations:
One is that while a knowledge which has as its *O-c* an object previously grasped could be said to have a former object as the present *O-c*; in the case where it has as *O-c* an object which has not been grasped, or recollects future events in a reverse order, how can it have a former object as its *O-c*?[30]

Saṃghabhadra raises other objections: If it is only after a successive search of past causes that consciousness can arise with regard to objects previously grasped, then among the latter the more recently experienced ones would be grasped more quickly than others. Yet this is contradicted by experience: a person presently residing in one place can remember abruptly an event experienced formerly in another far away place — without the need to go through the process of successive deduction.

Another objection: The mental continuum is not always a homogeneous one. Thus, it can happen that immediately after, say, an auditory consciousness, a mental consciousness arises having as *O-c* what was previously perceived. In this case, what constitutes the generative cause of this consciousness? It cannot be the *anudhātu* that has been successively transmitted, since the auditory consciousness did not perceive that object. Nor can it be the consciousness that had perceived it, since that consciousness does not exist at that moment when the mental consciousness is to arise. Neither can it be produced without any cause. With these refutations, Saṃghabhadra concludes that for a Vibhajyavādin who admits the existence of only a single (present) moment, the consciousness that arises having a past or future *dharma* as *O-c* is necessarily without the bi-requisite conditions.[31]

While the Vaibhāṣika maintains that the direct perception by visual consciousness can never grasp a 'jug' as such, the Sautrāntika would say that there is actually the direct perception of the conceptualized 'jug'. And it is with this that one can infer the existence of the atoms out there on the basis of which the superimposed 'jug' is directly perceived. However, this 'direct perception' takes place not in a single — i.e. the first — moment of perception. It occurs in the second moment. The following chart summarizes this process:



X, the representational form (*ākāra*) — a unified complex — corresponding to the external object *O-e*, is the *ālambana-pratyaya* for the *indriya-pratyakṣa*. In the first moment, one can expediently speaks of the 'the eye seeing the object'. It is in this moment that the representation of the object is left in the mental series as *O-e* is passing away. X', the same representation preserved and passed down via the *anudhātu*, is the *ālambana-pratyaya* for *mano-vijñāna-pratyakṣa*. Being simultaneous with *indriya-pratyaya*, it is its *pratyaya*. X'' is likewise passed down via the *anudhātu*. Being simultaneous with *mano-vijñāna-pratyaya*, it is its *pratyaya*. X, X' and X'' are all mental contents: whether sensory or mental, the object of the *pratyakṣa* experience is always past, and unreal.

9.4. The Sautrāntika doctrine that only the *dhātu*-s are real

Given its Dārṣṭāntika inheritance (see above), it is not difficult for the Sautrāntika to arrive at the conclusion that causality *per se*, as an abstract principle dictating a necessary relationship between two entities conceived as "cause" and "effect", is a mentally superimposed concept. It is from such a premise that the Sautrāntika declares in the debate presented above (chapter 4): "Conditioned by visual organ and visible objects, visual consciousness arises. Herein, what is it that sees, and what is it that is seen? It is really devoid of any activity — a mere play of *dharma*-s as cause and effect (*nirvyāpāraṃ hīdaṃ dharmamātraṃ hetuphalamātraṃ ca*)."

Obviously, it is not that the Sautrāntika denies the empirical fact of causal efficacy as such. But what we do experience — and *ipso facto* know to exist — are no more than the momentary flashing of *dharma*-s, now experienced as so-called "cause", now as so-called "effect". The Sautrāntika acknowledgement of causal efficacy as the only reality finds explicit expression in its view that, in the traditional three-fold classification of *dharma*-s — *skandha*, *āyatana*, and *dhātu* — only *dhātu* can be considered as real. In the AKB[33] "*dhātu*" is explained as having the meaning of "*gotra*"('race', 'species', 'lineage') which is then glossed as "*ākara*", "mine". Xuan Zang[34] renders *ākara* as 生本, 'birth-origin' or 'arising-source'. The *dhātu*-s are mines of their own species, each being the homogeneous cause (*sabhāga-hetu*) of the later moments in the existence of a given *dharma*. This Sautrāntika interpretation of *dhātu* which clearly has the connotation of causal efficacy, is rejected by Saṃghabhadra,[35] as it is more in tune with the Sautrāntika *bīja* Theory. He proposes instead that the eighteen *dhātu*-s are said to be *gotra*-s in the sense of being eighteen

different species, each having its distinct essential nature — a proposition that would accord with the doctrine of Sarvāstitva.

In the Ny, this view that *dhātu* alone is real is put forward by Sthavira Śrīlāta, the leading Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika at the time:

> Herein, the Sthavira asserts thus: Both the supporting basis as well as the objects for the five sensory consciousness do not exist truly. For each individual atom by itself cannot serve as a supporting basis or an object; they can do so only in the form of a unified complex (和合); ... He and his disciples employ the simile of the blind in support of their doctrine. It is said that (*kila* — showing Saṃghabhadra's disagreement) each blind person by himself is devoid of the function of seeing visible forms; an assemblage (和集) of these blind persons likewise is devoid of the function of seeing. Similarly, each individual atom by itself is devoid of the function of being a supporting basis or an object; an assemblage of many atoms likewise is devoid of such functions (See Saṃghabhadra's refutation above). Hence, *āyatana* is unreal; *dhātu* alone is real.[36]

Like the Sarvāstivāda, the Sautrāntika too accepts the atoms as real existents. But whereas the Sarvāstivāda acknowledges the existence of both colour (*varṇa*) and shape (*saṃsthāna*) atoms, the Sautrāntika thinks that shapes are nothing but particular arrangements of the colour atoms.[37] The cognitive object being a superimposed unity, the Sautrāntika view amounts to that a sensory consciousness, like mental consciousness, perceives an unreal, conceptualized object. The above passage further asserts unreality of any subject-object/perceiver-perceived relationship — one on which the very classification of *āyatana* is based. Thus, along with the object of perception, the corresponding sense faculty too, is denied. For the Sautrāntika, it is only the real entities — the *dhātu*-s forming the bases for both the *skandha*-s and the *āyatana*-s — are real in the absolute sense (*paramārtha*)[38] These *dhātu*-s are the realities of causal efficacy. From each individual *dhātu* arises each individual *dharma*; and from this perspective, the *dhātu*-s alone are real in the absolute sense.

Śrīlāta goes further: even consciousness itself, as a real entity having an intrinsic nature, is also denied by him — it is not real in as much as its so-called intrinsic function of being conscious of the object need to be manifested through the unified complex of the perceptual fact wherein the sense faculty must function as the supporting basis, and the object, the supporting condition:

> When the *sūtra* speaks of consciousness as that which is conscious (*vijānātīti vijñānam*), it is not a discourse of *paramārtha*; it is a conventional one (*saṃvṛti-deśanā*). If what is conscious is consciousness, then it ought also to be called non-consciousness. That is: if it is capable of being conscious is called consciousness, then it ought to become non-consciousness when it is not capable of being conscious, [as when a requisite assemblage of conditions is lacking]. It ought not be the case that what is a non-consciousness can be called a consciousness.[39]

This is refuted by Saṃghabhadra who, however, concedes that the statement that 'consciousness is that which is conscious' must not be taken to refer to a real agency, such as an *ātman* which can become conscious completely independent of any supporting conditions.[40] Saṃghabhadra accepts the explanation given by some Sarvāstivāda masters concerning the notion of consciousness as that which is conscious: It is only with regard to the specific nature of *dharma* that the one speaks in conventional terms of an agent, so as to refute the view that apart from consciousness there exists that which is conscious; consciousness actually does nothing in the perceptual process:

> In what other situations does one see the reference of an agent as a conventional expression (*prajñapti*) to nothing more than the nature of a *dharma*? One sees in the world that people speak of a shadow as that which moves. In this case there is no movement; but when it arises in a different place in the following moment (*anantaram*), it is said to move. The same is true for the case of consciousness; when it arises serially with regard to a different object, it is said to be that which is conscious — i.e. conscious of the object — even though there [really] is no action [on its [part].[41]

A similar notion of the 'action' of consciousness is found in a passage in the AKB, though we now know that contrary to the assertion by some scholars,[42] such a notion is not confined to the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika (except perhaps for the specific term '*ākāra*'):

> Then, as to what is said in the *sūtra* that consciousness is conscious [of the object], what does consciousness do in that case? It does nothing. Nevertheless, just as an effect, though doing nothing whatsoever, is said to correspond (*anuvidhīyate*) to the cause on account of its acquiring its existence (*ātma-lābha*) resembling (*sādṛṣyena*)[the cause]; likewise, consciousness, though doing nothing whatsoever, is said to be conscious [of the object] on account of its acquiring its existence resembling [the object]. Now, what is its resemblance? The fact of having the form of that [object] (*tadākāratā*). For this very reason, although it is arisen through the sense faculty as well, it is said to be conscious of the object, not of the sense faculty.[43]

9.5. Yogācāra critique of a unified complex as the perceptual object

Like the Vaibhāṣika view, the Sautrāntika doctrine that the cognitive object is a unified complex is also discussed and rejected in the Yogācāra texts. In the VVS, Vasubandhu seems to have grouped and criticized together the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika views as one, since both hold that the object is a collection (*saṃhata*) of atoms. It may be noted that Vasubandhu rejects such a view simply on the ground that there being no such real entity as an atom, any notion of a group of atom cannot be accepted. This is also reflected in Xuan Zang's rendering of *he-he* and *he-ji* for the single Sanskrit word, *saṃhata* (*Cf. supra*, § 8.5).

Sthiramati, while conceding that a sensory consciousness necessarily takes an agglomerated object, disagrees with the realist that such an object exists independent of consciousness, and that it is its agglomerated form (*samcitākāra*) that is perceived. The view rejected, therefore would seem to the Sautrāntika one:

> And the five groups of consciousness take agglomerated objects since they have the form of such [an object]. But no distinct entity in the agglomerated form is found apart from the mere collocation of the parts (*avayava-saṃhati-mātra*), since when the parts have been analytically excluded, there is no consciousness having [such an] agglomerated form. Hence, it is indeed without an external object that consciousness arises having the agglomerated form.[44]

The Siddhi(C) also has a passage corresponding closely to this. It is argued that the agglomerated form, being unreal, cannot serve as the condition (*pratyaya*) for the sensory consciousness, lest a second moon (as an optical illusion) should engender a sensory consciousness.[45] Kuei Ji[46] identifies the rejected view there as that of the Sautrāntika. He explains that according to the Sautrāntika himself, the agglomerated form has only a conceptual existence, like a second moon which can only be perceived by mental consciousness. Accordingly, it cannot serve as a condition, though it may be conceded to be the cognitive object (*ālambana*) of the consciousness. In support, he cites Diṅnāga's **Ālambana-pratyaya* in which the same view is rejected in similar terms with the specific example of the illusory second moon.[47]

As explained above, for the Sautrāntika, it is no contradiction to assert that perception is necessarily indirect and at the same time that there can be the *pratyakṣa* experience. Dignāga, followed by *Dharma*kīrti and others,

states that there are only two valid means of perception (*pramāṇa*): direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) which perceives the specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*), and inference (*anumāna*) which perceives the common-characteristic (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). This is clearly in part an influence from the *Abhidharma* tradition which recognises only two characteristics of existents, *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*. It is well known that although tradition generally regards Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti as Vijñānavādins, it is quite aware of their occasionally Ābhidharmika-Sautrāntika stance. Thus, the well-known Yogācarin master Dharmapāla, in his commentary on Diṅnāga's **Ālambana-parīkṣā*, states explicitly that Dharmakīrti acknowledges the real existence of external objects.[48] The Sautrāntika, as we have seen, was evolved from the Sarvāstivāda. Accordingly, such influences coming from the Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmika doctrines are only to be expected.

In the **Ālambana-parīkṣā*, Diṅnāga, rejecting all views advocating the independent reality of external objects, concludes that "although the external object does not exist, there is the internal *rūpa* which manifests resembling the external object and serves as the *ālambana-pratyaya*."[49] It seems therefore evident enough that he is a Yogācārin — though possibly with some Sautrāntika leaning. Nevertheless, in his *pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti*, we can see him at times attempting to align with some fundamental Ābhidharmika doctrines. Thus, a question is raised there as to whether his doctrine of *pratyakṣa* is contradicted by the *abhidharma* tenets that a sensory consciousness

(a) takes an agglomeration of atoms as object, and
(b) perceives only an *āyatana-svalakṣaṇa* and not a *dravya-svalakṣaṇa* (see above) — since an agglomeration can only be perceived by a mental construction.

Diṅnāga's answer below shows clearly his inheritance from the Ābhidharmika tradition:

> Since it [viz., *pratyakṣa*] is caused by many substances [viz., atoms in aggregation], it is said, in respect of its sphere of operation, that it takes the whole as its object; but it is not [that it operates] by conceptually constructing a unity within that which is many and separate. [Therefore, the definition that *pratyakṣa* is free from conceptual construction is not inconsistent with the Ābhidharmika tenets.][50]

'Kalpanā' in Diṅnāga's definition of *pratyakṣa* is essentially similar to the Sarvāstivāda notion *vikalpa*. It is the process in which the perceived object, which in its intrinsic nature is inexpressible, comes to be associated with *nāman*, *jāti*, etc.[51] This is consistent with the Ābhidharmika notions of *abhinirūpaṇā*- and *anusmaraṇa-vikalpa* owing to the absence of which the sensory consciousnesses said to be a*vikalpaka* (see *supra*). Indeed, some Buddhist masters explicitly equate '*kalpanāpoḍha*' with '*avikalpaka*'[52]

As to Dharmakīrti, his well known definition of *pratyakṣa* as that which is free from mental construction and errors (*pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam* /)[53] is also basically a fine-tuning of earlier Sautrāntika doctrines that we have discussed above — the emphasis on non-erroneousness and non-discriminative-ness. While it seems to remain a moot point as to whether he is really a Sautrāntika by affiliation,[54] his Sautrāntika stance is definitely conspicuous. Besides the remarks we have made above, his realist stance is unambiguous in his definition of an existent in the absolute sense as the object of *pratyakṣa* which is the specific characteristic — a unique essence/ entity (*tattva*), the point-instant of efficiency capable of affecting our sensibility (*artha-kriyā-samartha*):

> The object of that [— direct perception —] is the specific characteristic. That of which there is a variation in the cognitive image on account of [its] nearness or remoteness, is the specific characteristic. That alone is the absolutely real. For a [real] entity (*vastu*) is characterized by its efficacy for a purposive action.[55]

Finally, it is worth noting that the Sautrāntika doctrine that a consciousness can experience the object of the sensory object that existed in the preceding moment is also upheld by Dharmakīrti and other Buddhist logicians of later times. This will be discussed in the following chapter.

Notes

1 Ny, 418c. These are refuted at length by Saṃghabhadra — See Dhammajoti, KL, 'The Sarvāstivāda Doctrine of Simultaneous Causality', JCBSSL, Vol. 1, 32 ff.

2 Ny, 447b.

3 *Loc. cit.*

4 Ny, 447c.

5 See, JCBSSL, Vol. I, 33 ff.

6 *Cf.* AKB, 84: *etad dhi hetu-hetumato lakṣaṇam ācakṣate haitukāḥ / yasya bhāvābhāvayoḥ yasya bhāvābhāvau niyamataḥ sa hetur itaro hetumān iti* / Vy, 197*: yasya bhāve yasya dharma-sya bhāvo niyamena na yadṛcchayā sa hetuḥ / itaro hetumān kārya-dharma ity arthaḥ* / Diṅnāga also explicitly invokes this in his *Ālambana-parīkṣā* (T31, 888c) to argue that the internal object-form, though co-nascent with the consciousness, constitutes the *ālambana-pratyaya* of the latter.

7 Lit: 'the five consciousnesses' — same below.

8 In Śrīlāta's doctrine of successive arising: "Consciousness-contact arises following [the moment of] the eyes and the visible. From this further on are generated the *caitta-dharma*-s. The *vedanā*, etc., co-nascent [with consciousness], are called *caitta-dharma*-s. ...The Sthavira [Śrīlāta] asserts that the *caitta-dharma*-s can only arise at the third moment." (Ny, 385b). Also, Ny, 386b: "It is immediately after the *indriya* and the *viṣaya* that [the sensory] consciousness can arise. It is immediately after [the sensory] consciousness that *vedanā* can arise [in the third moment]". Śrīlāta accepts the three — *vedanā, saṃjñā* and *cetanā* — as *mahābhūmika*-s. (Ny, 384b).

9 Ny, 447c.

10 *Cf. Journal of the Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies*, Vol. I.

11 NY, 448a.《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷19:「若有隨界不同彼者, 理亦不然。於前境中, 今隨界識曾未生故; 如何可言:緣彼境識, 前為緣故, 令今得生? 不可說言, 隨界與識別時緣境, 勿於一時有二時故。… 若謂隨界體非今識, 應一相續二識並生。」(CBETA, T29, no. 1562, p. 448, a8-13).

12 Ny, 447c–448a.

13 *Cf.* Saṃghabhadra's argument in Ny, 542b.

14 Ny, 628a.

15 智緣非有, 亦二決定。

16 AKB(C), 99a gives 證智 corresponding to anubhava-*jñāna* in AKB, 278. Also *cf. yac cakṣurvijñānenānubhūtaṃ tad dṛṣṭam ity uktam* / (AKB, 245; see also below) to: 若境由眼...識 ... 所證, ... 名所見 ... 。(AKB(C), 579a).

17 Ny, 628c.

18 Ny, 389b: 非於現境曾無明記, 後於過去有憶念生。

19 Ny, 389b: 如是明記行相, 即智行相, 無別念 ...This sense of *ākāra* as a mode of mental activity is to be noted, contrasting the usage of the term in the sense of a 'passive' imprint of an object on the mind in perception.

20 Ny, 374c-375a.

21 Ny, 374c.

22 Candrakīrti criticizes this as a Sautrāntika doctrine — See Poussin (ed.) *Madhyāntāvatāra*, 167 f.

23 Ny, 374c: 若五識身唯緣過去, 如何於彼有現量覺? 〔答:〕如於自身受有現量覺, 謂我曾領納如是苦樂。

24 See also Ny, 628c.

25 AKB, 472: *darśanacittāt smṛticittam anyad utpadyate saṃtatipariṇatyā* / AKB(C), 157a: "From the past *citta* which had that object-field as perceptual object, there arises now a recollection-consciousness."

26 AKB, 278: *ko'yaṃ bījabhāvo nāma / ... yathānubhavajñānajā smṛtyutpādanaśaktir yathā cāṅkurādīnāṃ śāliphalajā śāliphalotpādanaśaktiriti* /

27 AKB, 278 f; Vy, 444.

28 AKB, 245: *yac cakṣurvijñānenānubhūtaṃ tad dṛṣṭam ity uktam* /

29 In the same context of discussing the *hetu-pratyaya*, Śrīlāta explains further on the *pūrvānudhātu*: "They have as their characteristics the *dhātu* formed from the perfuming of various *dharma*-s. ... The intrinsic nature (體) of this *pūrva-anudhātu* is ineffable. It can only be stated to be the six *āyatana*-s which, perfumed by karma and defilement, project the fruit of another life." See *supra*, § 6.5.

30 Ny, 628c. This objection is anticipated by Śrīlāta himself, and he gives an answer — which however, is rejected by Saṃghabhadra.

31 Ny, 628c–629a.

32 *Cf.* above: "its *ālambana-pratyaya* is none other than the object (*viṣaya*) of the [corresponding] sensory consciousness." — Ny, 448a.

33 AKB, 21.

34 AKB(C), 5a.

35 Ny, 343c.

36 *Ibid.*, 350c.

37 *Cf.* MVŚ, 63c.

38 Also *cf.* Ny, 666b.

39 Ny, 484b.

40 Ny, 484b–c.

41 Ny, 342a.

42 E.g., Cox, C, 39.

43 AKB, 473 f.

44 TVB, 16.

45 T31, 4b.

46 T43, 270a–b.

47 T31(no. 1624), 888a.

48 T31, 889c: 又若自許不於識外緣其實事, 應有有法自相違過。然法稱不許.... This is pointed by Lu Cheng. However, there is some disagreement among some scholars as to whether 法稱 here actually stands for the name Dharmakīrti, and the exact sense of the sentence '法稱不許'. *Cf.* Funayama, Toru 船山徹, "Two Notes on Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti." ZINBUN 35 (2001), 1-11.

49 T31, 888c. This treatise at the very outset (888b) groups the realists' views into two:

(1) The atoms themselves as real substances (*dravya*) constitute the perceptual object; (2) A unified complex is the perceptual object (Sautrāntika). The first group is further elaborated as two: (1a) The individual atoms themselves; (1b) the agglomerated form generated by virtue of the mutual assistance of the atoms existing together (an interpretation of the Vaibhāṣika view). See also Diṅnāga's (*pratyakṣa-pariccheda*) — *cf.* Hattori, M., *op. cit.*, 33, and note 2.17.

50 Translation (with slight adaptation) by Hattori, M, in his *Dignāga On Perception* (Cambridge, 1968), 26.

51 See Hattori, M., *op. cit.*, 25, and note 26.

52 See statement by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in TSP (stanza 1239-1242), especially 374. *Cf.* Hattori, M., *op. cit.*, 83, note 26 which also cites Mallavādin's *Dvādaśāra-nayacakra*, 59.2-60.1, which explains *kalpanā* in terms of *nirūpaṇānusmaraṇa-vikalpanā*: *athā kā kalpanā / nāma-jāti-guṇa-kriyā-dravya-svarūpāpanna-vastv-antara-nirūpaṇānusmaraṇa-vikalpanā /*

53 Stcherbatsky, Th. (ed), *Nyāyabindu* and *Nyāya-binduṭīkā*, Bibliotheca Buddhica, VII (Petrograd, 1918), Indian Reprint, 42.

54 One of the latest full-length discussion on this is Amar Singh's *The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy — Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti* (Delhi, 1984) in which the author argues that both of them are decidedly Sautrāntika. Singh brings out substantial evidence especially in the case of Dharmakīrti. However, his assumption that "as Dharmakīrti follows Diṅnāga, he too is then bound to be an idealist [if it can be established that Diṅnāga is an idealist]" (61; also 49, etc.) is not impressive, since Dharmakīrti is not a disciple (in the sectarian sense) of Diṅnāga. Moreover, his interpreting Diṅnāga as accepting the reality of atoms in the *Ālambana-parīkṣā* (61 f) is far-fetched.

55 *Nyāyabindu*, 12-15: *tasya [pratyakṣasya] viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam / yasyārthasya saṃnidhānāsaṃnidhābhyāṃjñānapratibhāsa-bhedastatsvalakṣaṇam/tadevaparamārthasat/ arthakriyāsāmarthya-lakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ // Cf. Saṭīkaṃ Nyāyabinduprakaraṇam*, 12 f; also *cf.* Th Stcherbatsky's tr. in *Buddhist Logics* II, 33 ff.

10. *Ākāra*, Sākāra-vijñānavāda, Nirākāra-vijñānavāda

10.1. Sākāra-vijñānavāda and the Sautrāntika

The Sautrāntika theory of perception expounded by Śrīlāta as recorded in the Abhidharma tradition is also elucidated in the logical texts[1], even though the term *anudhātu* itself is not mentioned. Like Śrīlāta, Dharmakīrti too holds that the external object can be experienced by the consciousness arising in the second moment, thus justifying the Sautrāntika position that despite the doctrine of successive causation, the cognitive object of consciousness is none other than the external object itself. Dharmakīrti explains as follows:

> If it is asked how [an object] different in time can be grasped, we would say that the essence of being a graspable (*grāhyatā*) [— i.e. an object —] is none other than the fact of being the cause of [its] distinctive appearance, capable of transferring its knowledge-form (*jñāna-ākāra*).[2]

This explanation satisfies the two-fold requirement for a *dharma* to be an *ālambana-pratyaya*: (1) It must contribute to the causal efficacy for the generation of the consciousness; (2) the consciousness must arise having a resemblance or representational form of it.[3]

This doctrine came to be described in relatively later time as *sākāra-(vi)jñāna-vāda*. The *Tarkabhāṣā* describes this as follows:

> It is held by the Sautrāntika that all that appears in the form of blue, etc., is knowledge itself, not the external object, since an inanimate thing (*jaḍa*) is incapable of manifestation. As it has been said: the objects of the sense faculties are not perceptible, [though] they generate a knowledge possessing their corresponding form (*svākārajñāna*).[4]

The epistemological view that an inanimate or non-intelligent external object can never be known by the mind is one of the fundamental premises, along with successive causation and other, that leads to the theory *sākāra-vijñāna*: the object, for it to be a content of consciousness — for it to be known — must generate its own form or facsimile of a mental nature. And this is called the *ākāra*. In direct perception, this *ākāra* corresponds exactly to the object and

there is absolutely no error. Accordingly, even though direct perception is achieved only in the second moment at which time only the knowledge that the external object existed can be acquired retrospectively, the external object qua the *ālambana-pratyaya* has an existential, and not merely inferential status.[5] Its *ākāra* is the *pratyaya*, though not the *ālambana-pratyaya*, for the perception, and the necessary simultaneity of the perceptual condition with the perceiving consciousness is in this way satisfied. This, however, is not in the manner of the Sarvāstivāda notion of *sahabhū-hetu* which requires the simultaneity of the external object and the consciousness. For this is a case not of mutual causation, but of necessary determination. This doctrine of *ākāra* also serves another important purpose: For the Sautrāntika, it is this specific *ākāra* that specifies the content of the particular consciousness; otherwise, as the opponents might argue, the nature of consciousness being the same in every case, the knowledge of a particular object in our consciousness would be an impossibility. The *Tarkabhāṣā* argues succinctly:[6]

> Knowledge should be conceded as possessing a form (*sākāra*). Now if knowledge is not conceded as possessing a form; then on account of there being no [specifying] form, because of consciousness pertaining to every object being the same, the objects cannot be established as being distinct.[7]

The particular *ākāra* is the coordination (*sārūpya*) or resemblance/conformity (*sādṛśya*) between the consciousness or knowledge and the actual external object, and constitutes the source or means (*pramāṇa*, '*measure*') of knowledge.[8] It being indistinguishable from the corresponding knowledge itself that arises, Dharmakīrti speaks of the *pramāṇa* and the *pramāṇa-phala* (= *pramiti*) as being the same. The latter is the fruit, that is the knowledge acquired; but Dharmakīrti argues that since the relationship between *ākāra* and the consciousness is one of determination (*vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka-bhāvena*), and not of causation, there is no confounding of the cause with the effect in the statement.[9] It is in fact precisely because of this determinative function of the *ākāra* that one can prove the existence of the corresponding external object. *Tarkabhāṣā* explains how this proof works on the principle of *vyatireka*:

> Surely, if what is manifesting is nothing but knowledge alone; then how [does one know that] there exists the external object? [The Sautrāntika answers:] The proof of the external object is possible by the principle of absence (*vyatireka*): For, the forms, blue, etc., do not manifest at all times and in all places. Nor is [the manifestation] possible even when there exists the force

> of merely our own material cause (*upādāna*), since this does not conform to the fact that [a specific consciousness] operates with a specific object. Hence it can be ascertained that there surely exists something which is their cause, distinct from the *samanantara-pratyaya* [of the consciousness], due to the power of which they occur in a certain place at a certain time. The very one is the external object.[10]

One question here arises: We can know the existence of the external object through a direct perception only when a judgement in the form "this is blue" is made. It is only then that it becomes a real source of knowledge.[11] Does it then mean that *pratyakṣa* becomes a *pramāṇa* only when conjoined with a conceptual judgement (*adhyavasāya* = *kalpanā*)? If so, would it not contradict the definition of *pratyakṣa* as a means of knowledge? Dharmottara answers as follows:

> This is not so. Because through a judgement produced by the power of *pratyakṣa*, the object is ascertained (*avasīyate*) as seen, not as imagined. And seeing, called the direct realization of the object, is the function of *pratyakṣa*. Imagining, on the other hand, is the function of conceptual thought (*vikalpa*).[12]

Indeed, even to be distinctly conscious of — seeing — a colour such as blue as an *āyatana dravya* in the case of a sensory perception, some simple judgement has to be exercised. This, as we have seen, is called *svabhāva-vikalpa* in the Sarvāstivāda (*infra*, chapter 6).

The Sautrāntika does not agree that there is such an intrinsic or simple *vikalpa* of the nature of *vitarka*, since it considers the latter as no more than the gross state of the mind. Nevertheless, from the above explanation given by Dharmottara, we can see that the Sautrāntika too concedes some amount of mental ascertainment, operating in the background as it were,[13] in the *pratyakṣa* experience — even though it does not amount to *vikalpa* (= *kalpnā*) in the proper sense which is pure imagination or mental construction.

Historically, the Sautrāntika was evolved from the early Dārṣṭāntika masters of the Sarvāstivāda. Accordingly, doctrinal influences on the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra, coming from the Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmika are only to be expected. At any rate, there is clear indication of such an influence on the doctrines of perception (See §9.5.).

10.2. Nirākāra-(vi)jñānavāda and the Sarvāstivāda

In contrast to the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra, the Sarvāstivāda theory of knowledge is described in the Sanskrit texts as *nir-ākāra- (vi)jñānavāda*: the theory that the external object is directly perceived, without the need of any representational form in the consciousness. However, according to the tradition passed down by Xuan Zang,[14] among all the northern Buddhist schools, it is only the Sāṃmitīya that really holds such a theory, since this school asserts that only mental *dharma*-s are momentary; external things can last longer than one moment. All other schools, including the Sarvāstivāda, would therefore have to be included in the camp of *sākāra-vijñānavāda*. We know of course that the Theravāda school too holds that a *rūpa* lasts 16 moments (*citta-khaṇa*-s) longer than *citta*, so that direct perception in the true sense becomes possible.[15] The confusion between these two traditional sources can only be cleared by examining the notion of *ākāra* differently explained in these schools.

As we have seen, the Sautrāntika notion is that the *ākāra* corresponds exactly to the external object. It allows no possibility of a cognitive error in a genuine *pratyakṣa* experience. However, this *ākāra* is a resemblance (*sadṛśā*) constructed by the mind. In the case of the Sarvāstivāda tradition, we note at the outset the information from the MVŚ that various Ābhidharmika masters — most probably Sarvāstivādins — give various interpretations to '*ākāra*':

> Question: What is the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of the so-called '*ākāra*'? Answer: Its intrinsic nature is *prajñā*. Herein it should be understood thus:
> [i] *Prajñā* is *ākāra*; it is also what cognizes with a form (*ākārayati*) and what is cognized with a form (*ākāryate*).
> [ii] The *citta-caitta-dharma*-s conjoined (*saṃprayukta*) with *prajñā*, while not being *ākāra*, are what cognize with a form as well as what are cognized with a form.
> [iii] Those *viprayukta-saṃskāra*-s and other existent (*sat*) *dharma*-s, while being neither *ākāra*-s nor what cognize with a form, are what are cognized with a form.
>
> According to some: What is called *ākāra* has collectively all the *citta-caitta-dharma*-s as its intrinsic nature. This theory would imply that all *citta-caitta*-s are *ākāra*, and what cognize with a form (*ākārayati*) and what are cognized with an *ākāra*. All the other *dharma*-s, while being neither *ākāra* nor what cognize with an *ākāra*, are what are cognized with an *ākāra*.
>
> According to some others: What is called *ākāra* has all *dharma*-s as its intrinsic nature. This theory would imply that the conjoined *dharma*-s are

> *ākāra*; as well as what cognize with a form and what are perceived with an *ākāra*. The disjoined *dharma*-s, while being *ākāra* as well as what are cognized with an *ākāra*, are not what cognize with an *ākāra*.
>
> Comment: It should be said that what is called *ākāra* has *prajñā* as its intrinsic nature, as given in the first explanation. ...
> Question: What is the meaning of *ākāra*?
> Answer: *ākāra* means the operation in the manner of examination/discernment (簡擇而轉 *pra-vi-√ci*) with regard to the nature of the object.[16]

From this, it is clear that the orthodox Sarvāstivāda view is that *prajñā* is *ākāra*, explained as the function of "operating investigatively (*pra-vi-√ci*) with regard to the object."[17] This is essentially the same as the definition given for *prajñā* as "the investigation of *dharma*-s (*dharma-pravicaya*)"[18] But this investigative operation may be correct or incorrect, skilful (*kuśala*) or unskilful (*akuśala*), sharp (*tīkṣṇa*) or blunt (*mṛdu*), with-outflow (*sāsrava*) or outflow-free (*anāsrava*). Thus, when one commits the cognitive error of mistaking a rope for a snake, or an aggregate of five *skandha*-s for a *pudgala*, it is the case of "the *ākāra* being topsy turvy (*viparīta*)"; the *ālambana* is existent and not illusory — the rope or the *skandha*-s.[19]

In brief, as stated by Saṃghabhadra: "Only a discriminative (*sa-vikalpaka*) consciousness is capable of grasping the specific characteristic of the object [in the form:] 'it is blue, not green', etc".[20] Accordingly, in the Sarvāstivāda epistemology, the operation of *ākāra* pertains to the domain of mental consciousness, not to that of a sensory consciousness where *prajñā* cannot properly function. Moreover, it may or may not correspond exactly to the actual form of the external object.

That, with regard to one and the same perceptual object there can be various *ākāra*, is clearly brought out in a consideration in MVŚ on the question: "If one gets out [of a *dhyāna*] from the *ākāra*, does one also get out from the perceptual object?" The answer to this is given as a four-fold alternative (*catuṣkoṭi*):

> [I] There is a case where one gets out from the *ākāra* but not the perceptual object: viz, a person contemplates a given characteristic with a given *ākāra*; without abandoning this characteristic, he further has another *ākāra* — e.g.: he has as his object the *ākāra* of impermanence of the *rūpa-skandha*, and then immediately after that the *ākāra* of unsatisfactoriness of the *rūpa-skandha* arises before him ....
>
> [II] There is a case where one gets out from the perceptual object but not the *ākāra*: viz, a person contemplates a given characteristic with a given

ākāra; with this same *ākāra*, he further has another characteristic — e.g.: he has as his object the *ākāra* of impermanence of the *rūpa-skandha*, and then immediately after that the *ākāra* of impermanence of the *vedanā-skandha* arises before him ....

[III] There is a case where one gets out from the *ākāra* as well as the perceptual object ...

[IV] There is a case where one gets out neither from the *ākāra* nor the perceptual object ... ."[21]

The above passage also indicates the possibility of simultaneously having one and the same *ākāra* with regard to many, and even all *dharma*-s excepting the knowledge itself at that given moment, its conjuncts and co-existents, as when one contemplates that all *dharma*-s are devoid of a Self, etc.[22] In fact, the only case where the *ākāra* of an object corresponds exactly to the actual nature of the object is when the yogi acquires the *prajñā* qua true insight in the Direct Insight (*abhisamaya*) into the four noble truths — he sees conditioned things truly as they are, in their aspects of being unsatisfactory, impermanent, etc. The contemplating *Yogi* can see several aspects pertaining to a given object, each with a distinct and unconfounded *ākāra* — i.e. *prajñā*. Thus,

> with regard to each with-outflow object (*sāsrava-vastu*), if the knowledge operates by way of the four *ākāra*-s [understanding it] as *duḥkha*, etc., it receives the name *duḥkha-jñāna*. If the knowledge operates by way of the four *ākāra*-s [understanding it] as *samudaya*, etc, it receives the name *samudaya-jñāna*. Hence the *ākāra*-s of the *duḥkha-* and *samudaya-jñāna*-s are not mixed (雜 *miśra*), while the *ālambana*-s are mixed ...[23]

This is clearly a case of mental exertion — mental application with regard to the common characteristics (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-manaskāra*).[24] It is for this reason that the sixteen *ākāra*-s of the four noble truths, *duḥkhatā*, etc., — as direct perception of the *yogi* are said to be *prajñā* — the outflow-free or pure *prajñā*.[25] They clearly do not refer to images or 'aspects' of the objects, but are in the active sense of the mental function of understanding. These common-characteristics are the universal principles of all *dharma*-s intuited by spiritual insight, pertaining to the Absolute Truth;[26] not universals abstractly constructed by the mind as in the case of mental inference. These are called *Dharma*-knowledges (*dharma-jñāna*) where they pertain to the Sense-sphere, and Subsequent-knowledges (*anvaya-jñāna*) where they pertain to the two upper spheres. Both are *pratyakṣa-jñāna*.

Saṃghabhadra insists that the term *anvaya* does not imply that the Subsequent-knowledges are *anumāna*, since in the *sūtra* both knowledges are equally spoken of as capable of seeing truly *duḥkha*, etc. Moreover, the *ārya-jñāna*-s cannot be inferential in nature, and no object pertaining to the *ārya-satya*-s can be realized by an inferential knowledge. He further argues that if the Subsequent-knowledges are inferential, then there would not be even the *Dharma*-knowledges having *Nirodha* as object, since a *nirodha* is always non-empirical (*adṛśya*). But it is from the point of view of *indriyāśrita*- and *anubhava-pratyakṣa* that the objects of Subsequent-knowledges are said to be non-empirical. And in that case there ought not even be the *Dharma*-knowledges of *Nirodha* since a *nirodha* cannot be an object for these two *pratyakṣa*-s. From the point of view of *buddhi-pratyakṣa* (*cf infra*, § 2.15), however, it is not true that the objects of Subsequent-knowledges are those of inferential knowledges. "Hence, all determination of things truly as they are (實義決擇 **tattvārtha-viniścaya*), properly accomplished (如理所引 **yoga-vihita*), are *pratyakṣa-jñāna*-s."[27]

Accordingly, from the Sarvāstivāda perspective, a sensory perception is definitely without an *ākāra* in as much as *prajñā* cannot efficiently function therein. It is for this same reason that MVŚ states that the *prajñā* conjoined with the five types of sensory consciousness is not *dṛṣṭi*, though it is also a knowledge (*jñāna*):

> It does not have a sharp *ākāra* and cannot penetrate deeply into the *ālambana*; it cannot discriminate; it can have as its *ālambana* only the *svalakṣaṇa*, but not the *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*; ... unlike a *dṛṣṭi*, it cannot cogitate and examine an *ālambana*."[28] (See full quotation in §6.7.)

These explanations are essentially a good description of the Sarvāstivāda notion of sensory direct perception. We may note here once again the unambiguous notion that where *prajñā* operates, *ākāra* does not denote the 'exact image/representation' of the *ālambana*. In a sensory perception, *prajñā* is not a *dṛṣṭi* because it operates weakly (though knowledge is also a mode of *prajñā*). It is in this sense that a sensory perception can be said to be without *ākāra* (see also *infra*). This is like stating that a sensory perception is *avikalpaka* even though *prajñā* — the *svabhāva* of judgement and discrimination — being a *mahābhūmika* is present, on account of its feeble operation therein.[29]

The conclusion therefore is that the Xuan Zang tradition is not quite justified in grouping the Sarvāstivāda theory under *sa-ākāra-vijñānavāda*.

However, Pu Guang does speak of two aspects of the notion of '*ākāra*': According to him, this notion connotes both a mode of understanding (行解) and a representational image (影像 *ābhāsā*, *pratibimba*):

> A mode of understanding refers to the difference in the modes of understanding of the *citta-caitta*-s when they grasp [respectively] the generic and specific characteristics pertaining to an object. It refers to the difference in the activities of the *citta* and the *caitta*-s. This mode of understanding may generate a correct or wrong understanding with regard to the object ...
>
> *Ākāra* refers to the fact that the *citta-caitta*-s are clear by nature; as soon as they are confronted with an object, an image arises [in them] spontaneously without the need of any mental application — just as images appearing in a clear pond or mirror ...
>
> If one uses the term 'mode of understanding', only the difference in the activities of the *citta*, etc, is referred to. If one uses the term '*ākāra*', it refers to two types [of *ākāra*]: (1) *ākāra* in the sense of an image, (2) *ākāra* in the sense of a mode of understanding ...
>
> Question: With reference to which of the two — the mode of understanding or the *ākāra* [in the sense of an image] — is it said that [the *citta-caitta*-s] have the same *ākāra* (*sākāra*)?[30]
>
> Explanation: It is with reference to *ākāra* that they are said to have the same *ākāra*. The *citta-caitta-dharma*-s are clear by nature; as soon as they are confronted with a certain object, its form appears spontaneously. As they equally have this form, they are said to 'have the same *ākāra*'. Thus, the *Abhidharmāvatāra*, in its second fascicle, says:
>
> > Just as visual consciousness etc., are produced with eyes etc., as their support; manifesting with an image of the object (義影像 **arthasya pratinidhi*, **arthābhāsā*), the visible etc., and [thus] comprehend their respective objects.[31]
>
> Accordingly, it is only from the point of view of *ākāra* [as the image of the object] that they are said to be having the same *ākāra* ...
>
> Question: From the point of view of which of the two — the mode of understanding or the *ākāra* [in the sense of an image] — is the perceiver so called?
>
> Explanation: From the point of view of the latter, not the former: When the *citta*, etc, is confronted with the object, an image appears; in this sense [the *citta*, etc.,] is called the perceiver, and the object is the perceived. This is because, when the *citta-caitta* perceive an object, they do not do like

> a lamp-flame radiating its ray to reach an object, or like a pair of pincers grasping an object.[32] It is from the perspective of the manifestation of the image that the perceiver and the perceived are so called."[33]

Pu Guang's explanation that *ākāra* connotes both a mode of undertstanding and an image is likely to have been influenced by the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra stance. It shows that Xuan Zang's tradition describes the Sarvāstivāda theory as *sākāra* because (i) the conjoined *citta-caitta*-s are said to have the same *ākāra* which Pu Guang takes in the sense of the object's image; and (ii) the school speaks of a sensory consciousness arising with an image of the object. But, as we have observed, unlike the Sautrāntika, the Sarvāstivāda consistently equates *ākāra* with *prajñā*, so that only Pu Guang's interpretation of *ākāra* as 'a mode of understanding' may be acceptable, even though at the same time, his exposition of the Sarvāstivāda theory here is otherwise basically correct. In particular, his interpretation that *ākāra* can refer to the image of an object which "arises spontaneously without the need of any mental application", contradicts the Sarvāstivāda explanation of it as a mental application. Moreover, it must be noted that, the Chinese *Abhidharmāvatāra* passage cited by him uses the word 影像 which clearly means an image, and not 行相 which is Xuan Zang's usual rendering for *ākāra*. In the corresponding example given in ADV (109; see also note 59) too, the word used is '*pratinidhi*' instead of '*ākāra*'. Since both texts are authored by orthodox Vaibhāṣika masters, it seems safe enough to surmise that in the Sarvāstivāda epistemological theory, the image arising in the sensory consciousness is not an *ākāra* — a mental construction by *prajñā* — but an image essentially belonging to the object, not the mind. And as Pu Guang says, it arises spontaneously like a reflection in a mirror: The reflection does not belong to the mirror which is always clear by nature.

10.3. Interpretation of *sākāra* as an attribute of *citta-caitta*-s

In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, all *citta-caitta*-s are also described as *sākāra*, 'with an *ākāra*'. But what this term means in this context becomes controversial. Vasubandhu raises the question in AKB that since the *caitta prajñā* itself is *ākāra*, *sākāra* in this context would imply that *prajñā*, as a mental *dharma*, is conjoined with another *prajñā*, which is against the Ābhidharmika tenet. He proposes to avoid this apparent contradiction, by defining *ākāra* as the 'object-grasping-mode (*ālambana-grahaṇa-prakāra*) of all the *citta-caitta*-s'.[34] In this way, *prajñā* too, as a *caitta* can be said to be 'with an *ākāra*'. Yaśomitra states that this is a Sautrāntika definition.

It is noteworthy that Vasubandhu here does not contest the MVŚ statement that *ākāra* is *prajñā*; and in fact proceeds to conclude with the same threefold classification of *dharma*-s (*ākāra*, *ākārayati*, *ākāryate*) as we have seen in the MVŚ passage quoted above. This is, however, not to say that Vasubandhu's definition of *ākāra* is identical with that of the Sarvāstivāda. It is for this reason that Saṃghabhadra objects to it, demanding from Vasubandhu more articulation on his definition:

> Herein, the Sūtrakāra affiliates himself with another school, and asserts thus: 'what is called *ākāra* is the object-grasping-mode by the *citta-caitta*-s.' This does not necessarily conform to logic. It must be considered what is meant by the 'object-grasping-mode.' If it refers to the different modes/species (*prakāra*) of the form of the object, then the notion that all [*citta-caitta*-s] can assume the image-form (能像) [of the object] cannot be established at all, for an object has various forms, skilful, permanent, etc. Or rather, the *rūpa-dharma*-s are to be subsumed under *ākāra*, since *rūpa-dharma*-s can also assume the images of the forms of others. If it refers to the ability to grasp the distinctive characteristic of the object, then *ākāra* ought not be possible for the five [sensory] consciousnesses, since they are not capable of grasping the specific characteristic of the object — since only a discriminative (*sa-vikalpaka*) consciousness is capable of grasping the specific characteristic of the object [in the form:] 'it is blue, not green', etc. However, this is not what is conceded [by his definition]. Hence [his definition] is logically invalid.[35]

Saṃghabhadra's objections confirm our surmise above that for the Sarvāstivāda, *ākāra* does not mean the specific form or image of the object. It refers to the operation of *prajñā* at the stage of mental consciousness, and is not applicable in the case of a sensory perception. After criticising Vasubandhu's definition, Saṃghabhadra then proceeds to claim that the Sarvāstivāda explanation is the correct one:

1. The *prajñā* which operates investigatively with regard to the object is said to be the *ākāra*.
2. All *citta-caitta-dharma*-s, including *prajñā*, are said to be 'those which cognize with a form'(*ākārayanti*), which is synonymous with 'those which grasp objects' —*prajñā* investigates the object, *vedanā* feels it, *saṃjñā* grasps its appearance, *vijñāna* cognizes it, etc.
3. All *dharma*-s, real or unreal, are equally said to be 'those that are cognized with a form' (*ākāryante*).

In other words, this explanation leads to the same threefold classification as given in MVŚ which Saṃghabhadra in fact spells out explicitly in conclusion.[36]

Saṃghabhadra does seem to acknowledge, though, that '*sākāra*' in this context needs interpretation to avoid the difficulty pointed out by Vasubandhu, and he himself proposes a few of them. One is that the *citta-caitta*-s, including *prajñā*, are all said to be *sākāra* because they equally (*sa* = *sama*) can grasp the distinctive species of characteristic of the object. Another one: If, however, we consider from the perspective that *prajñā* alone can be called *ākāra*, then all the *citta-caitt dharma*-s other than *prajñā* are said to be *sākāra* in the sense that they equally — i.e. simultaneously; not earlier, not later — with *ākāra* (= *prajñā*), operate on the object. This is comparable to the term *sāsrava*: An object being equal to the *āsrava* is said to be 'with *āsrava*' in the sense that it requires the same counteractive agent (*pratipakṣa*) as the *āsrava* itself. [37]

In Pu Guang's discussion above (§ 10.2.), the notion of having the same *ākāra* refers to the context of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of the "Five sameness (*samatā*)": one of which is the "sameness in *ākāra*" (*ākāra-samatā*).[38] But when sensory consciousness, being free from intellectual judgement, is said to be devoid of *ākāra*; it need not mean that in this case the condition of *ākāra-samatā* is meaningless. Just as in the discussion above on *sākāra* as a synonym applicable to all *citta-caitta*-s including *prajñā*; likewise in this case too, *ākāra-samatā* being applicable to all conjoined *caitta*-s, cannot mean "equality in terms of *prajñā*". But it is meaningful when understood as referring to the equality/sameness of the conjoined *citta-caitta*-s (including the *mahabhūmika prajñā*) in respect of the mode of apprehending the object. E.g., all apprehend a patch of blue, etc. This is permissible by the Vabhāṣikas, as can be seen in Saṃghabhadra's first alternative interpretation of *sākāra* just cited.

10.4. Conclusion:

The Sarvāstivāda school, in its various texts, consistently equates *ākāra* with *prajñā*, both being defined as the investigative operation with regard to the perceptual object. This is in contrast to the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra for whom *ākāra* connotes both an image/representation and a mental understanding arising in the mind — with the difference that the Sautrāntika would regard it as a correspondent to an external existent. To this extent, therefore, it is inappropriate to describe the Sarvāstivāda theory of sensory perception — said to be non-discriminative on account of the weak functioning of *prajñā* therein — as *sākāra-jñānavāda*.

On the other hand, we must note that the *pratyakṣa* of the *Yogi* is said to perceive *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*-s. This perspective is also discernible from the explanation on *buddhi-pratyakṣa.* This is the case of *satyābhisamaya,* in which the outflow-free *ākāra*-s of the Yogi are not conceptual understanding. They correspond truly and exactly to the *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*-s as universal principles pertaining to the absolute truth (*paramārtha*). This perception is therefore also a *pratyakṣa* experience; in fact *pratyakṣa par excellence* — and in as much as it involves *ākāra*-s, is describable as a form of *sākāra-jñāna. Prajñā* at this stage is truly non-discriminative/non-superimposing, though not in the Vijñānavādin sense of transcending the 'subject-object' dichotomy. This Sarvāstivāda notion that a practitioner endowed with true spiritual insight perceives Reality through *ākāra*-s might well have influenced those members among the latter-day Yogācarins who opt for the view that even for those who have acquired the non-discriminative insight (*nirvikalpaka-jñāna*) too, knowledge is *sākāra.*

Notes

1 For example, *cf.* Vācaspatimiśra's description of the Buddhist position in his *Nyāyakaṇikā* — vide B.L., Vol. II, 353 f.

2 *Pramāṇa-vārttikā* of Dharmakīrti, III, v.248 (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series):
bhinnakālaṃ kathaṃ grāhyam iti ced grāhyatāṃ viduḥ /
hetutvam eva ca vyakter jñānākārārpaṇa-kṣamam //
This is cited in various logical texts — *Nyāya-vārtikā-tātparya-ṭīkā*, 101.14; SDS, 36; Tbh, 8; etc. *Cf.* Also, B.L., II, 360; Mookerjee, S. *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, Reprint (Delhi, 1993), 338.

3 *Cf.* T31, 888b, etc. *Cf* also TVB, 16: *bāhyo hy arthaḥ svābhāsa-vijñāna-janakatvena vijñānasya ālambana-pratyaya iṣyate na kāraṇatva-mātreṇa ... /*

4 *Tarkabhāṣā*, 94: *sautrāntikānāṃ matam/ jñānam evedaṃ sarvaṃ nīlādy-ākāreṇa pratibhāsate/ na bāhyo 'rthaḥ / jaḍasya prakāśāyogāt/ yathoktam / svākārajñāna-janakā dṛśyā nendriyagocarā iti /*

5 The difference between the way *pratyakṣa* makes known the external object which is spatio-temporally determined (*niyata*) through its *ākāra* and that in which *anumāna* makes known the object through the marks (*liṅga*) connected with it, is explained by Dharmottara in NBT, 3: *yasmād yasminn arthe pratyakṣasya sākṣātkāritva-vyāpāro vikalpenānugamyate tasya pradarśakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ tasmād dṛṣṭatayā jñātaḥ pratyakṣa-darśitaḥ / anumānaṃ tu liṅga-darśanān niścinvatpravṛtti-viṣayaṃ darśayati / tathā ca pratyakṣaṃ pratibhāsamānaṃ niyatam arthaṃ darśayati/ anumānaṃ ca liṅgasaṃbaddhaṃ niyatam arthaṃ darśayati /*

6 See B.L., II, 358 f.

7 *Tarkabhāṣā*, 26 f: *sākāraṃ cedaṃ jñānam eṣṭavyam / yadi punaḥ sākāraṃ jñānaṃ neṣyate tadā 'nākāratvena sarvatra viṣaye tulytvāt vibhāgena viṣaya-vyavasthā na sidhyati /* Also *cf.* BL, II, 351f.

8 *Cf.* NBT: *arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇam* ***//20 //***
arthena saha yat sārūpyam asya jñānasya tat pramāṇam / iha yasmād viṣayāj jñānam udeti tad viṣaya-sadṛśaṃ tad bhavati / yathā nīlād tpadyamānaṃ nīla-sadṛśam / tac ca sādṛśyam ākāra ity ābhāsa ity api vyapadiśyate /

9 *nīla-sadṛśaṃ tv anubhūyamānaṃ nīlasya saṃvedanam avasthāpyate / na cātra janya-janaka-bhāva-nibandhanaḥ sādhya-sādhanabhāvo yenaikasmin vastuni virodhaḥ syāt / api tu vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka-bhāvena/ tata ekasya vastunaḥ kiṃcid rūpaṃ pramāṇaṃ kiṃcit pramāṇa-phalaṃ na virudhyate /*
Also *cf. Tarkabhāṣā*, 26: *iha nīlāder arthāt jñānaṃ dvirūpam utpadyate / nīlākāraṃ nīlābodha-svabhāvaṃ ca / tatrānīlākāra-vyāvṛttyā nīlākāraṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇam / anīla-bodha-vyāvṛttyā nīla-bodha-rūpaṃ pramitiḥ / saiva phalam / yathoktam* [quoting Dharmakīrti:] *artha-sārūpyam asya pramāṇam arthādhigatiḥ pramāṇa-phalam iti / etac ca vikalpa-pratyayena bhinnaṃ vyavasthāpyate/paramārthaṃ tas tu nāsyeva bhedaḥ / yathoktaṃ* [Dharmakīrti:] *tad eva pratyakṣaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇa-phalam iti /*

10 *Tarkabhāṣā*, 94: *nanu yadi prakāśamānaṃ jñānam evedaṃ tadā 'sti bāhyo 'rtha iti kutaḥ / bāhyārtha-siddhis tu syād vyatirekataḥ / na hi sarvatra sarvadā nīlādaya ākārāḥ prakāśante /*

na caitad svopādānamātra-bala-bhāvitve sati yujyate / niyata-viṣaye pravṛttyayogāt / tasmād asti kiñcid eṣāṃ samanantara-pratyaya-vyatiriktaṃ kāraṇāṃ yad-balena kvacit kadācit bhavantīti śakyam avaśatum/ sa eva bāhyo 'rtha iti /

11 NBT, 16: *tasmād adhyavasāyaṃ kurvad eva pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ bhavati / akṛte tv adhyavasāye nīla-bodha-rūpatvenāvyavasthāpitaṃ bhavati vijñanam /*

12 NBT, 16: *naitad evam / yasmāt pratyakṣa-balotpannenādhyavasāyena dṛṣṭatvenārtho 'vasīyate notpreksitatvena/ darśanaṃ cārtha-sākṣātkaraṇākhyaṃ pratyakṣa-vyāpāraḥ / utprekṣaṇaṃ tu vikalpa-vyāpāraḥ/*

13 *Cf.* NBT, 16: *sva-vyāpāraṃ tiraskṛtya pratyakṣa-vyāpāram ādarśayati ... /*

14 *Cf.* Pu Guang's commentary on AKB, T41, 27a; Kuei Ji's commentary on Siddhi(C), T 43, 269c, 318a; etc.

15 *Cf. Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho*, IV, 8.

16 MVŚ, 408c-409a.

17 MVŚ, 409a.

18 *Cf.* AKB, 54: *matiḥ prajñā dharma-pravicayaḥ* / ADV, *70: dhiḥ prajñā dharma-saṃgrahādy-upalakṣaṇa-svabhāvā* /; etc.

19 MVŚ, 36a; Ny, 623b.

20 Ny, 741b. See also *infra.*

21 MVŚ, 929a.

22 *Cf.* MVŚ, 45c, which states explicitly that the *ākāra* of this form is *prajñā*. MVŚ (42c, 43a) explains that within 2 moments, one can come to acquire such a knowledge with regard to the totality of *dharma*-s.

23 There are four *ākāra*-s for each Truth: For *duḥkha-satya* — *duḥkhatā*, *śūnyatā*, *anityatā*, *nairātmya*; etc. See AKB, 343.

24 MVŚ, 53a. *Cf.* AKB, 108.

25 *Cf.* AKB, 399: *kāśmīrāṇāṃ tāvat*
nāmalaḥ ṣoḍaśabhyo 'nya ākāraḥ
nāsty anāsravākāraḥ ṣoḍaśākāra-nirmuktaḥ| For the Vaibhāṣika tenet that the 16 *ākāra*-s are *prajña*, see also AKB, 401.

26 MVŚ, 399c–400a.

27 Ny, 735c. Saṃghabhadra argues against an opinion held by certain masters that '*anvaya*' (類) here means comparison (比類): the comparison of facts not directly perceived with those which are directly perceived. It receives the name *anvaya-jñāna* as it is subsumed under inference (*anumāna*). Yaśomitra (*Sphuṭārthā Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā of Yaśomitra*, ed. Wogihara U (Tokyo, 1932-36), 542) explains *tad-anvaya* as *tad-dhetuka* — having the *dharma-jñāna* as cause — thus dissenting from the Vaibhāṣika view. Harivarman (**Satya-siddhi*, 藏要 edn. (Nanking, 1930), 245) too rejects the Sarvāstivāda definition above and declares his adherence to the *sūtra* when giving the same opinion thus: "The knowledge of the present *dharma* is named *dharma-jñāna*. As it is said in the *sūtra*, the Buddha told Ānanda, 'With regard to these *dharma*-s, see thus, know thus, penetrate thus. Know the past and future [*dharma*] also thus. The knowledge of the remaining - i.e. the past and future – *dharma*-s is named *anvaya-jñāna*. ... *dharma-jñāna* is *pratyakṣa-jñāna* (現智). Following this *dharma-jñāna* one deliberates and knows inferentially - this is called *anvaya-jñāna*."

28 MVŚ, 490c.

29 Ny, 350b.

30 The Vaibhāṣika tenet is that *citta* and *caitta*-s co-arise necessarily. They are said to be conjoined (*saṃprayukta*).

31 T28, no. 1554, 987c. *Avatāra*(T): *śes pa bźin du don gyi tshul gyi gnas lta bu'i rnam par raṅ gi don khoṅ du chud par byed pa* / — Just like *jñāna* which causes the understanding of *svārtha* (*svārtha-pratyāyana*) in the form of a representation of the *artha*. *Cf* ADV, 109: *jñānavat/tadyathā jñānaṃ cakṣurādīn hetūnapekyārthaṃ vibhāvayati* /; also, 111: *jñānavat* / *tadyathā jñānaṃ cakṣurādīn hetūnapekṣyārthaṃ vibhāvayati* /

32 Pu Guang seems to have got these two examples illustrating that consciousness simply arises with an image of the cognitive object from Siddhi(C) — *cf.* Siddhi(C), 93c; T43 (Kuei Ji's commentary on Siddhi(C)), 493c–494a.

33 T41, 26b-c.

34 *Cf.* AKB, 401: *prajñākāraḥ* /
evaṃ tarhi prajñā sākārā na bhaviṣyati / *prajñāntarāsaṃ[pra]yogāt*/ *evaṃ tu yuktaṃ syāt* / *sarveṣāṃ citta-caittānām ālambana-grahaṇa-prakāra iti* /

35 Ny, 741b. In brief: "The term *ākāra* is a synonym of *prajñā*. The term *ākārayati* is a synonym for the grasping of object (*viṣaya-grahaṇa*); this word *ākārayati* does not exclusively denote *prajñā*. The term *ākāryate* applies to all *dharma*-s." (*loc. cit.*).

36 *Loc. cit.*

37 Ny, 741a–b.

38 *Cf.* MVŚ, 80c; AKB, 62.

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